Free MBE Contracts Practice Questions
12 MBE-style Contracts questions. Answer each one, then open the explanation to see why the best answer wins and why the tempting wrong answers lose.
1. On June 1, Bert called Carol, a jewelry designer, to discuss a potential custom engagement ring. After describing the design he wanted, Bert asked, 'Will you make this ring for $3,500?' Carol responded, 'That sounds like a reasonable price, but I need to order the diamond and check my schedule. I'll call you back tomorrow with a final answer.' The next day, Carol called Bert and said, 'I can make the ring, and I'm confirming the price of $3,500.' Bert said, 'Great. I look forward to it.' Carol then ordered the diamond, but before starting work, the price of diamonds surged and the raw materials would now cost her $4,500. Carol refused to proceed with the ring and told Bert the project was off. Bert has now sued for breach of contract. Which of the following best describes the legal status of the parties?
- (A) Bert will lose because Carol's initial response was a counteroffer that required Bert to accept in writing before a contract formed.
- (B) Bert will lose because the diamond price surge constitutes an unforeseen circumstance that discharges Carol's obligations.
- (C) Bert will likely win because Carol began performance by ordering the diamond before repudiating the contract.
- (D) Bert will likely win because Carol's call on June 2 was an acceptance that formed a binding contract with Bert's response.
Show answer
D. Bert's question was an offer. Carol's first reply ('sounds reasonable, but I need to check… I'll call you back') was neither a rejection nor a counteroffer, so the offer stayed open, and her June 2 call accepted it and formed a contract. The counteroffer-requiring-written-acceptance theory fails because her reply proposed no different terms, and nothing required a written acceptance. A rise in material costs, even a sharp one, is a foreseeable market risk; it does not discharge a seller under impracticability or frustration. The theory based on Carol beginning performance is irrelevant: the contract was already formed by acceptance, and ordering the diamond does not create liability by itself.
2. Michelle, a software developer, submitted a written bid to BuildCo for a $50,000 custom application project. The bid stated: 'This offer is good for 30 days from the date below.' BuildCo did not respond within 30 days, but on day 35, BuildCo's purchasing manager called Michelle and said, 'We've decided to accept your bid and we're awarding you the contract.' Michelle responded, 'I appreciate the call, but my offer has expired, and I'd need to re-quote you now because my labor costs have increased.' BuildCo replied, 'Your original price was locked in for 30 days. Your offer is still good.' Michelle refused to proceed at the original price. Has a contract been formed?
- (A) No, because Michelle's offer expired after 30 days and BuildCo's late acceptance on day 35 did not form a contract.
- (B) Yes, because BuildCo relied on Michelle's initial bid by awarding the contract within a reasonable period.
- (C) Yes, because BuildCo's oral acceptance by phone constituted acceptance within the meaning of the mailbox rule.
- (D) No, because the contract must have been formed in writing to be enforceable under the statute of frauds.
Show answer
A. An offer that states a fixed duration lapses at the end of that period. On day 35 there was no longer an offer to accept, so BuildCo's call was at most a new offer, which Michelle rejected. The mailbox rule decides when a timely acceptance takes effect; it cannot revive a lapsed offer, and in any event a phone call is instantaneous communication. Reliance on a bid can make it irrevocable only during the period it is outstanding, and BuildCo did not rely before the offer expired. The statute of frauds is beside the point, because a contract for services that can be performed within a year needs no writing, and the real problem is that no contract was formed.
3. A software company offered to sell a database system to a accounting firm for $50,000, with delivery "on or about June 15." The offer did not expressly state when payment was due. The accounting firm accepted the offer in writing. On June 14, the software company tendered the system, and the accounting firm accepted it. On June 20, the software company demanded payment, and the accounting firm refused, claiming it was not yet obligated to pay because the delivery date had not been met. The software company sued for the contract price. Which of the following best supports the software company's position?
- (A) The accounting firm's acceptance of the system constituted a waiver of the delivery condition.
- (B) The software company materially breached by delivering on June 14 instead of June 15, excusing the accounting firm's payment obligation.
- (C) The delivery date was only a condition precedent to formation and does not affect when payment becomes due.
- (D) Under the UCC, payment and delivery are concurrent conditions, so the accounting firm's acceptance of the system triggered its obligation to pay.
Show answer
D. When a sale-of-goods contract is silent on payment, UCC 2-310 makes payment due when and where the buyer receives the goods. Tender of payment and tender of delivery are concurrent conditions. Delivery here was timely because a June 14 tender satisfies "on or about June 15." The firm's acceptance of the system therefore triggered its duty to pay. The waiver choice is tempting but unnecessary: there was no unmet delivery condition to waive. The early-delivery-as-material-breach choice fails because a one-day-early tender under an "on or about" term is conforming. The condition-to-formation choice misstates the role of the delivery term.
4. An owner hired a general contractor to renovate a commercial building for $200,000. The contract stated: "Contractor must obtain a certificate of occupancy from the city before the owner is obligated to pay the final installment of $50,000." After the contractor substantially completed the work, the city building inspector flagged numerous code violations that the contractor failed to remediate. The contractor refused to fix the violations, claiming that correcting them would cost an additional $30,000. The owner refused to pay the final installment because the contractor could not obtain the certificate of occupancy. The contractor sued for $50,000. Which of the following best describes the owner's liability?
- (A) The owner is not liable because the certificate of occupancy is an express condition precedent to the owner's payment obligation, and it has not been satisfied.
- (B) The owner is liable for the full $50,000 because the contractor substantially performed the contract, excusing the condition.
- (C) The owner is liable for $20,000 because the contractor is entitled to recover the reasonable value of work performed despite failing to obtain the certificate.
- (D) The owner is not liable because the contractor materially breached by not obtaining the certificate of occupancy, which was the only obligation listed in the contract.
Show answer
A. The contract expressly makes obtaining the certificate of occupancy a condition precedent to the final installment. Express conditions require strict compliance. The certificate was not obtained because of the contractor's own refusal to cure code violations. The substantial-performance choice is tempting, but substantial performance applies to constructive conditions and does not excuse an express condition. Nothing excuses this one, since the failure was the contractor's own fault and there is no forfeiture problem. The $20,000 choice has no basis in the facts. The material-breach choice wrongly calls the certificate the contract's only obligation.
5. A homeowner promised her adult daughter that she would pay off the daughter's $50,000 student loan debt as a gift, without any bargained-for exchange. The daughter relied on this promise by declining an out-of-state job that paid significantly more, instead accepting a lower-paying position locally. Six months later, the homeowner learned the daughter had turned down the better job and refused to pay the loan. The daughter sued for breach of contract. Is the daughter likely to prevail?
- (A) No, because there was no bargained-for consideration; the promise was a gift.
- (B) Yes, because the daughter provided consideration by accepting the local job.
- (C) Yes, under promissory estoppel, because the daughter reasonably relied on the promise to her detriment.
- (D) No, because a promise to pay the debt of another lacks good faith.
Show answer
C. The promise was a gratuitous gift, so there was no bargained-for consideration. It is still enforceable under promissory estoppel because the promisor should reasonably have expected the daughter to change her position, and she did so to her detriment. The choice saying the daughter gave consideration by taking the local job is wrong because the mother did not request that act in exchange for her promise. The choice relying solely on the absence of consideration ignores §90 reliance as a substitute for consideration. The choice invoking 'lack of good faith' states no recognized rule; promises to pay another's debt raise suretyship issues, not good-faith issues.
6. A contractor agreed in writing to build a house for a homeowner for $300,000, payment due upon completion. The contractor completed the work, but because of market-rate changes, the homeowner discovered that a similar house would now cost $250,000 to build elsewhere. The homeowner refused to pay the full contract price, alleging the contract was unconscionable. The contractor sued for the contract price. Is the contractor likely to prevail?
- (A) Yes, because the contract price was agreed to in writing and the homeowner received the benefit of the bargain.
- (B) No, because economic duress allows the homeowner to escape an unfavorable contract.
- (C) No, because the homeowner is entitled to rescind when the contractor's performance is worthless.
- (D) Yes, because the contractor substantially performed and mere price disparity does not constitute unconscionability.
Show answer
D. Unconscionability is judged at the time of contract formation and requires oppressive or unfair-surprise terms. A later market shift making the price look high is not unconscionability, and mere price disparity alone does not establish it. The contractor completed the work and is owed the agreed price. The choice relying on the written agreement is weaker because a writing does not by itself defeat an unconscionability defense. The economic-duress choice fails because there was no wrongful threat. The rescission choice fails because the contractor's performance was not worthless.
7. A 27-year-old first-time homebuyer entered into a written contract to purchase a house for $250,000. The buyer's father, concerned about his son's financial stability, told the real estate agent: "My son doesn't really understand mortgages, and I'm not sure he can handle this commitment." The agent responded, "Don't worry. I've seen lots of young buyers succeed." The father then told his son to sign. Two weeks before closing, the buyer—now having studied the mortgage documents—decided he didn't want the house and claimed he lacked capacity to contract because he was immature and financially inexperienced. The seller sues for specific performance.
- (A) The buyer will lose because age 27 is presumptively sufficient legal capacity to contract.
- (B) The buyer will prevail only if the seller knew or should have known the buyer was unable to understand the transaction.
- (C) The buyer will prevail because his father expressed doubts about his ability to handle the commitment.
- (D) The buyer will lose only if he can prove he had actual knowledge of the mortgage terms before signing.
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A. A 27-year-old is an adult presumed to have full contractual capacity, and inexperience or immaturity does not make a contract voidable. The father's doubts are irrelevant because a third party's opinion does not create incapacity. The choice requiring the seller to know or have reason to know the buyer could not understand the transaction borrows from the mental-incapacity doctrine, but nothing suggests a mental illness or defect that would trigger it. The choice requiring the buyer to prove actual knowledge of the mortgage terms misstates the law, because a party is bound by a signed contract whether or not he read or understood it.
8. A lender made a $150,000 construction loan to a developer, with the written agreement stating that the developer must obtain a building permit before drawing down the funds. The developer signed the agreement but did not initially understand that obtaining a permit would take four months and might not be certain. Two weeks before the contract was signed, the developer's business partner had been arrested, and the developer was deeply distressed about the partnership's viability. The lender, aware of the arrest, did not explain the permit timeline or risk and promptly had the developer sign. The developer now seeks to void the contract for duress.
- (A) The developer will succeed because the lender knew of the developer's emotional distress at the time of signing.
- (B) The developer will succeed only if the lender's actions created an improper threat or pressure that left the developer no reasonable alternative but to sign.
- (C) The developer will succeed only if the lender explicitly threatened to call the loan if the developer did not sign.
- (D) The developer will fail because the developer was not in imminent physical danger and had time to consult an attorney.
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B. Duress requires an improper threat that leaves the victim no reasonable alternative but to assent. The lender's mere awareness of the developer's distress from an unrelated arrest, and its failure to explain the permit timeline, is neither a threat nor improper pressure. Emotional distress caused by third parties does not establish duress, which defeats the choice based on the lender's knowledge. The choice demanding an explicit threat to call the loan is too narrow, because any improper threat suffices. The choice requiring imminent physical danger is wrong because economic duress is recognized.
9. A restaurant supplier sold a refrigerator to a restaurant owner under a written contract that stated 'as is' and 'all warranties excluded.' The supplier did not examine the refrigerator before sale and had no knowledge of its condition. The refrigerator had a hidden mechanical defect that caused it to fail completely three days after delivery. The restaurant owner was unable to store perishable goods and lost significant profits. The restaurant owner sues for breach of warranty. Is the supplier liable?
- (A) Yes, because the supplier, as a merchant, impliedly warranted that the goods were merchantable despite the 'as is' language.
- (B) No, because the defect was hidden and the supplier could not reasonably inspect for conditions that would not be apparent.
- (C) No, because the 'as is' and warranty disclaimer language effectively excluded all express and implied warranties.
- (D) Yes, because the supplier is liable for latent defects even when warranties are disclaimed.
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C. Under UCC 2-316(3)(a), 'as is' language that calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion disclaims all implied warranties, including merchantability, and no express warranty was made here. Merchant status does not override a valid 'as is' disclaimer. Sellers are not liable for latent defects when warranties have been effectively excluded. The fact that the defect was hidden is not the reason the seller escapes liability, because merchantability would be breached by a hidden defect absent the disclaimer.
10. On Monday, a homeowner sent a signed written offer to a contractor to renovate the kitchen for $35,000, with materials to be supplied by the contractor. The offer stated: "This offer will remain open for acceptance until 5 p.m. on Friday of this week. Acceptance must be communicated to me in writing, signed by you, and delivered to my home by that deadline." On Wednesday morning, the contractor mailed a signed written acceptance to the homeowner's address. The acceptance letter arrived at the homeowner's mailbox on Thursday at 2 p.m., but the homeowner did not retrieve it until Friday at 6 p.m. At that point, she posted a notice on the contractor's door declining the offer. The contractor learned of the acceptance letter reaching the mailbox on Thursday morning when the homeowner's spouse mentioned it in passing. Does a contract exist between the homeowner and contractor?
- (A) No, because the homeowner retrieved the letter after the 5 p.m. Friday deadline, so acceptance was ineffective.
- (B) Yes, because the contractor learned of the acceptance letter's arrival on Thursday morning, which is before the Friday deadline.
- (C) No, because the homeowner's revocation notice prevented the acceptance from becoming effective.
- (D) Yes, because the acceptance was mailed on Wednesday and arrived at the homeowner's address by Thursday, before the Friday deadline.
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D. The offeror controls the manner of acceptance. Here she displaced the mailbox rule by requiring a signed writing delivered to her home by Friday at 5 p.m. That condition was met when the letter reached her mailbox on Thursday, because delivery to the designated place is effective whether or not the offeree reads it. Her late retrieval of the letter is irrelevant, since receipt, not reading, controls. Her Friday-evening notice came after a contract had already formed, so it could not revoke the offer or block acceptance. The contractor's own knowledge that the letter had arrived plays no role, because acceptance turns on delivery as the offer specified.
11. A retailer sent a written purchase order to a supplier for 100 cases of bottled juice at $50 per case, total $5,000, with delivery "on or about July 15." The purchase order stated: "This order is subject to all terms on the reverse side of this form," which included a clause requiring the supplier to maintain product liability insurance. The supplier received the purchase order but did not have a form to send back. Instead, the supplier simply prepared the goods and shipped 100 cases on July 14, accompanying the shipment with a packing slip noting the price of $50 per case. The packing slip was silent on insurance. The retailer accepted and paid for the goods. Three weeks later, one customer became ill from the juice and sued the retailer. The retailer had to settle for $50,000. The retailer now seeks $25,000 from the supplier as an indemnity, claiming the supplier breached the insurance requirement in the original purchase order. Can the retailer enforce the insurance clause against the supplier?
- (A) Yes, because the purchase order was a clear offer that the supplier accepted by shipping the goods, and acceptance incorporated all terms stated on the reverse side.
- (B) No, because the supplier's shipment was a counteroffer that modified the original terms, and by accepting the goods without objection, the retailer accepted the counteroffer on the supplier's terms.
- (C) Yes, because the supplier's conduct—shipping the goods on the date requested—demonstrates an intent to accept all terms of the purchase order, including the insurance requirement.
- (D) No, because the packing slip constituted a separate agreement that superseded the original purchase order's terms, and the retailer accepted the packing slip terms by accepting the goods.
Show answer
A. Under UCC 2-206, an order to buy goods invites acceptance in any reasonable manner, including prompt shipment of conforming goods. Shipping the goods therefore accepted the purchase order on its terms, including the reverse-side terms it expressly incorporated by reference. The packing slip proposed no different or additional terms on insurance, so there was no counteroffer and no battle-of-the-forms conflict. The choice treating the shipment as a counteroffer is wrong, as is the choice treating the packing slip as a superseding agreement. The choice relying on the supplier's subjective intent shown by shipping on the requested date reaches the right result for a weaker reason. The operative principle is acceptance by shipment of an offer whose terms include the incorporated clause.
12. A retailer placed a written order with a manufacturer for 500 widgets at $10 each, delivery within 30 days. The retailer's order form contained a clause stating that any additional terms proposed by the seller would not become part of the contract unless the retailer expressly agreed to them in writing. The manufacturer responded with a written acceptance that included a new clause requiring the retailer to pay all shipping costs and a warranty disclaimer limiting the manufacturer's liability to replacement or refund of defective goods. The retailer received the acceptance but did not respond. Goods conforming to the order were delivered 25 days later, and the retailer accepted and paid for them without objection. Which of the following best describes the terms of the contract?
- (A) The additional terms proposed by the manufacturer became part of the contract because the manufacturer is a merchant and the retailer did not object.
- (B) The additional terms proposed by the manufacturer did not become part of the contract because the retailer's form explicitly precluded additional terms, and the retailer's conduct in accepting the goods does not constitute acceptance of the additional terms.
- (C) The additional terms proposed by the manufacturer became part of the contract because the goods were conforming and delivered within the stated timeframe.
- (D) The additional terms proposed by the manufacturer did not become part of the contract only if the retailer can show that the shipping and warranty terms are materially different from trade usage.
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B. Under UCC 2-207, a definite written expression of acceptance forms a contract even if it adds terms. Between merchants, additional terms become part of the contract unless the offer expressly limits acceptance to its terms, the terms materially alter the contract, or the offeror objects. The retailer's form expressly barred additional terms absent its written assent, and the warranty disclaimer is also a material alteration. So the terms dropped out, and accepting and paying for conforming goods does not signify assent to them. The answer resting on merchant status plus silence ignores the offeror's express limitation. The answer resting on conforming, timely delivery confuses performance with assent. The answer tying exclusion to trade usage invents a standard that 2-207 does not use.
What MBE Contracts tests
Formation: offer, acceptance, and the mailbox rule
Formation of a contract requires mutual assent (an offer and an acceptance of the same terms) and consideration. The MBE tests whether you can distinguish an offer from a non-offer (like an invitation to deal, advertisement, or preliminary negotiation), identify when an offer has lapsed or been terminated, recognize what counts as a valid acceptance, and apply the mailbox rule to determine when acceptance becomes effective. This section covers the critical threshold question: has a binding contract been formed? Master this area to spot whether a fact pattern creates enforceable rights and duties or leaves the parties still free to walk away.
UCC Article 2: scope, merchants, firm offers, and battle of the forms
UCC Article 2 governs the sale of goods—things that are movable at the time of identification to the contract—and displaces the common law of contracts in this narrow domain. The MBE tests whether you can identify when Article 2 applies, distinguish merchants from non-merchants (a distinction that triggers special rules), understand the firm offer doctrine that makes certain promises binding without consideration, and navigate the "battle of the forms"—the collision between buyer's and seller's forms when terms conflict. These rules exist because goods sales differ fundamentally from service contracts: goods are fungible, transactions are often fast and informal, and the parties often exchange forms rather than negotiate every term. The exam demands precision: Article 2 applies only to goods, merchants get more duties than non-merchants, and the battle-of-the-forms rules require you to compare the forms, classify each new term as additional or different, and decide whether additional terms materially alter the contract. You must also know when Article 2 is silent and common law fills the gap.
Consideration and its substitutes, including promissory estoppel
The MBE tests consideration—the exchange of value that makes a contract binding—as a foundational requirement for contract formation. This section covers what constitutes valid consideration (including situations where consideration is illusory or absent), the substitutes for consideration that can make an otherwise informal promise binding (promissory estoppel, firm offers, and written modifications in some contexts), and the circumstances in which courts excuse the consideration requirement. The examiners focus heavily on distinguishing real consideration (even a bargained-for peppercorn) from sham or merely recited consideration, output/requirements contracts, illusory promises, and conditional gifts, and they consistently test promissory estoppel as an equitable remedy that can enforce a promise without consideration when reliance is reasonable and detrimental. You must master both the doctrinal rules and the fact patterns that trick test-takers into ignoring or misapplying these doctrines.
Defenses to formation: capacity, mistake, misrepresentation, duress, unconscionability
The MBE tests whether a contract was properly formed by examining whether both parties had legal and mental capacity to contract, and whether either party's assent was genuine and voluntary. Even when offer and acceptance have occurred, a contract fails to form or becomes voidable if one party lacked capacity (age, sanity, or status), if either party made a material mistake about the bargain, if one party made a misrepresentation that induced the other to assent, if one party coerced the other through duress, or if the agreement is so one-sided and unfairly imposed that it shocks the conscience (unconscionability). The MBE tests your ability to identify which defense applies to a given fact pattern, whether the defense makes a contract void or voidable, who can invoke it, and how courts apply these doctrines to reach fair outcomes. These questions typically present a completed or partially completed contract and ask whether it is enforceable, or ask whether a party can rescind or avoid liability. Understanding the elements and timing of each doctrine is essential, as courts distinguish between misrepresentation and mistake, between duress and unconscionability, and between when a party has lost the right to avoid the contract by affirming it.
Statute of Frauds
The Statute of Frauds requires certain contracts to be evidenced by a writing signed by the party against whom enforcement is sought. The MBE tests which types of contracts fall within the Statute, what the required writing must contain, what conduct can satisfy the writing requirement (including "part performance" in land sale cases), and the primary exceptions. Questions focus on whether a given contract triggers the Statute, whether the writing is sufficient, whether the party opposing enforcement has signed, and whether an exception applies. The exam rewards precision about which doctrine applies and careful reading of what evidence the testmakers provide.
Parol evidence rule and interpretation
The parol evidence rule and contract interpretation are core MBE Contracts topics that test whether oral statements, prior negotiations, or extrinsic evidence may supplement or explain written agreements. The MBE tests the scope and exceptions of the parol evidence rule, how courts determine whether a writing is "integrated," the distinction between ambiguity and integration, the role of extrinsic evidence in resolving ambiguities or establishing side agreements, and the modern trend (UCC and Restatement) toward admitting evidence of prior negotiations and trade usage. You will encounter questions asking whether specific extrinsic evidence is admissible, whether a party can avoid contract terms by claiming a prior oral agreement, whether the court should apply a plain-language rule or admit evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade, and how to distinguish between attempts to vary the writing (barred) and attempts to prove the existence of a separate agreement (often allowed). Mastery here requires understanding both the traditional rule and its modern exceptions, and knowing how the UCC and common law differ.
Conditions: express, constructive, and excuse of conditions
The MBE tests conditions—events that qualify the parties' performance duties—as a central contracts doctrine. A condition is a fact or event (other than the passage of time) whose occurrence or non-occurrence affects the legal duty to perform under a contract. The exam distinguishes three types of conditions: express conditions, which the parties explicitly state in the contract's language; implied-in-fact conditions, which courts infer from the parties' intent and the contract's context and treat like express conditions; and constructive (implied-in-law) conditions, which courts impose to secure a fair exchange of performances. The exam also tests doctrines that excuse conditions, such as waiver, estoppel, prevention, and avoidance of forfeiture. The bar exam also tests the distinction between conditions precedent (which must occur before a performance obligation arises), conditions subsequent (which terminate a duty once they occur), and concurrent conditions (which must occur simultaneously). Mastery of this area is essential because it determines whether a party must perform, whether a party's failure to perform is a breach, and when a party is discharged from its obligations. MBE questions test your ability to identify conditions, classify them, determine the order of performance, apply constructive conditions to fact patterns, and recognize doctrines that excuse or waive conditions.
Performance, substantial performance, and the perfect tender rule
This section covers the seller's obligation to deliver goods and the buyer's duty to accept and pay under Article 2 of the UCC and common-law contract principles. The MBE tests when delivery must be perfect (the perfect tender rule and its exceptions), when a party has substantially performed despite defects (substantial performance doctrine), and what remedies are available when performance is incomplete or deficient. This area appears frequently on the exam as part of contract formation, conditions, and breach questions. The exam tests the interplay between the UCC's perfect tender rule (which applies to sales of goods), the common-law substantial performance doctrine (which applies to services and other non-goods contracts; mixed goods-and-services contracts are classified under the predominant-purpose test, so a contract predominantly for goods is governed by the UCC), the cure doctrine, acceptance and rejection rights, and the duty to mitigate. Expect questions combining a deficiency in performance with questions about whether the other party accepted, rejected, or failed to give notice in time.
Breach, anticipatory repudiation, and adequate assurances
The UCC and common law treat breach and repudiation as distinct events that trigger remedies, suspend the other party's performance obligation, and permit termination. Breach is a failure to perform when performance is due; anticipatory repudiation is a clear indication before the due date that performance will not occur. Adequate assurances are a remedy available to either party when the other party's conduct or circumstances give reasonable grounds for insecurity about its performance. The MBE tests whether you can identify when a breach has occurred, distinguish present breach from anticipatory repudiation, understand when the non-breaching party must or may terminate, recognize what words or conduct amount to repudiation, and apply the UCC's demand-for-assurances mechanism. These questions often involve close-call judgments about the severity of breach, the clarity of an unequivocal commitment to non-performance, and whether a party has rightfully suspended its own obligation or wrongfully materially breached.
Impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose
The UBE tests three related doctrines that excuse performance of an otherwise enforceable contract when supervening events make performance impossible, impracticable, or frustrate the parties' purpose. These doctrines allocate the risk of unforeseen circumstances that neither party foresaw or allocated in the contract. The MBE focuses on distinguishing when a party's duty is excused versus when the party must still perform or breach and pay damages, the precise conditions that trigger each doctrine, and the critical difference between objective impossibility (which may excuse) and subjective inability (which does not). Questions test your understanding of what counts as a "supervening" event, what renders performance impracticable rather than merely difficult or expensive, and how frustration differs from impossibility. Most questions present fact patterns where something goes wrong after formation—a building burns, a war blocks trade, a performer dies, prices skyrocket—and ask whether the promisor's duty is discharged or the promisor is in breach.
Modification and discharge
Modification and discharge covers how parties can terminate or alter their contractual obligations. The MBE tests whether a contract has been discharged (fully eliminated), whether a party is excused from performance, and whether the parties have validly modified a contract. This area includes modification of contracts, agreement to discharge, accord and satisfaction, release, performance and breach as discharge events, and the doctrines of impossibility, impracticability, and frustration of purpose. The exam focuses on when a party is truly released from liability, what consideration or substitute doctrine supports the release, and the distinction between conditions that must occur (or be waived) and events that excuse performance entirely.
Third-party beneficiaries
Third-party beneficiaries are nonparties to a contract who seek to enforce it because the contract was intended to benefit them. The MBE tests whether a third party has an enforceable right to sue on a contract, and if so, which party or parties the third party may sue. This doctrine creates an exception to the general rule of privity of contract—ordinarily only the contracting parties may sue to enforce the contract. The bar exam focuses on the rules that determine when a contract's beneficiary is intended, when that intent gives rise to enforceable rights, how a third party's status (creditor beneficiary, donee beneficiary, or incidental beneficiary) affects enforcement rights, and the consequences of performance, modification, and release on the third party's claim.
Assignment of rights and delegation of duties
The assignment of contract rights and delegation of contract duties tests a bar taker's understanding of when a party may transfer its benefits and burdens to third parties, and when such transfers are enforceable. The MBE focuses on the requirements for valid assignments and delegations, the rights of third-party assignees and obligees, the effect of an assignment on the assignor's liability, and the restrictions on assignability and delegability imposed by contract language, public policy, and the nature of the obligation. Questions test whether an assignment is effective, whether consideration is required, whether the assignor's warranties are breached, what rights the assignee acquires, whether a delegation releases the delegating party from liability, and how to interpret anti-assignment and anti-delegation clauses. This area also covers the rules for successive assignments and defenses available against assignees.
Remedies: expectation, reliance, restitution, and limits on damages
The remedies section tests how courts compensate promisees for breach of contract and allocate risk between the parties. The MBE focuses on the three main damages theories—expectation, reliance, and restitution—and the doctrines that limit or refuse them. You must identify which theory a plaintiff is pursuing (or should pursue), calculate damages under that theory, and apply doctrines like foreseeability, mitigation, certainty, and good faith that restrict recovery. Questions test whether you can distinguish damages theories, apply the machinery of calculating lost profits or cost of cure, and recognize when a plaintiff has failed to meet the burden of proof. The exam also tests nonmonetary remedies (specific performance and injunctions) and the doctrine of substantial performance in breach situations. Master the rules on what is recoverable, what must be proven, and the policies that limit awards.
UCC remedies, risk of loss, and warranties
The MBE tests UCC remedies, risk of loss, and warranties as core contract performance topics that determine what each party owes and what recourse they have when the other party fails to perform. Risk of loss (UCC Article 2) allocates the economic burden of damage or destruction to goods between buyer and seller based on the type of sale, delivery terms, and breach—the question is who bears the loss if something happens to the goods before the buyer receives them or while they are in transit. Warranties are promises about the goods themselves: merchantability (goods are fit for ordinary use), fitness for particular purpose (goods suit a specific need the seller knows about), and express warranties (promises the seller makes). Remedies are the tools each party uses when the other breaches: a seller can withhold delivery, reclaim goods, or resell and collect damages; a buyer can reject goods, revoke acceptance, cover (buy substitute goods) and collect the difference, or sue for damages. The MBE tests whether you can apply the right remedy to the right breach scenario, identify which warranty applies and what it requires, and determine who bears risk of loss at each stage of the transaction.
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