Master The Supreme Court held that a §1182(a)(2) offense triggers the stop-time rule for LPR cancellation of removal even if the noncitizen is charged as deportable rather than inadmissible. with this comprehensive case brief.
Barton v. Barr is a leading Supreme Court decision on the scope of the "stop-time rule" that governs eligibility for cancellation of removal, a key discretionary form of relief for long-term lawful permanent residents (LPRs). The case addresses whether an offense "referred to in" 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2) (the inadmissibility grounds) stops the accrual of the seven years of continuous residence required for LPR cancellation even when the noncitizen is not currently seeking admission and is instead charged with deportability under 8 U.S.C. §1227.
The Court's answer—yes—has major consequences for noncitizens with old criminal histories. By reading the statutory text to trigger stop-time whenever the offense would render the person inadmissible (or removable) regardless of the charging posture, the decision narrows access to cancellation of removal and underscores a textualist approach to cross-referenced provisions in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). The case is also an important study in the distinction between inadmissibility and deportability and how Congress structured those concepts to interact in cancellation eligibility determinations.
Barton v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1442 (2020)
Andre Barton, a Jamaican national, was lawfully admitted to the United States in 1989 and later became a lawful permanent resident (LPR) in 1992. In 1996, within his first seven years of residence after admission, Barton was convicted in Georgia of aggravated assault, criminal damage to property, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Those offenses qualified as crimes "referred to in" 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2)—including at least a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)—that would render a person inadmissible if seeking admission. In 2007 and 2008, Barton sustained Georgia convictions for drug possession, making him removable under 8 U.S.C. §1227(a)(2)(B)(i). The Department of Homeland Security later initiated removal proceedings charging Barton as deportable based on his drug convictions. Barton applied for LPR cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. §1229b(a), which requires (1) five years as an LPR and (2) seven years of continuous residence after admission. The immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals held that the 1996 offenses triggered the stop-time rule, §1229b(d)(1), cutting off his accrual of continuous residence before he reached seven years and rendering him ineligible for cancellation. The Eleventh Circuit denied his petition for review, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does an offense "referred to in" 8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(2) that would render a noncitizen inadmissible stop the seven-year clock for LPR cancellation of removal under the stop-time rule, even when the noncitizen is charged with deportability rather than inadmissibility?
Under the stop-time rule, 8 U.S.C. §1229b(d)(1), "any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to end . . . when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien inadmissible to the United States under section 1182(a)(2) or removable from the United States under section 1227(a)(2) or 1227(a)(4), whichever is earliest," or upon service of a notice to appear. For LPR cancellation under §1229b(a), an applicant must (1) have been an LPR for not less than five years; (2) have resided continuously in the United States for seven years after having been admitted in any status; and (3) not have been convicted of an aggravated felony. An offense triggers stop-time if it is among those "referred to in" §1182(a)(2) and it would render the person inadmissible under §1182(a)(2) or removable under §1227(a)(2) or (a)(4), regardless of the government's chosen removal charge.
Yes. The commission of an offense "referred to in" §1182(a)(2) that would render the noncitizen inadmissible triggers the stop-time rule and ends the accrual of the seven-year continuous-residence period, even if the noncitizen is charged with deportability rather than inadmissibility. Barton's 1996 convictions triggered stop-time, so he was ineligible for LPR cancellation of removal.
Majority (Kavanaugh, J.): The Court adopted a textualist reading of §1229b(d)(1)(B). The provision states that the accrual of continuous residence ends "when the alien has committed an offense referred to in section 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien inadmissible . . . or removable" under specified subsections. The statute uses inadmissibility and removability as status predicates for the offense, not as procedural gateways tied to the government's charging decision. Nothing in the text conditions stop-time on whether the government has charged inadmissibility versus deportability; the clause uses "or," indicating that either status effect of the offense suffices. Reading the language to require a charge of inadmissibility would impermissibly narrow the provision and make the words "or removable" largely superfluous in many cases. The Court emphasized that Congress designed the stop-time rule to limit eligibility for discretionary relief and to key the cutoff to objective events: service of a notice to appear or commission of an offense specified in cross-referenced sections. The phrase "offense referred to in §1182(a)(2)" captures crimes like CIMTs, controlled substance offenses, multiple criminal convictions, and specified serious offenses. If such an offense "renders" the person inadmissible (i.e., the offense is one that would trigger inadmissibility under §1182(a)(2)) or removable under §1227(a)(2)/(a)(4), stop-time is triggered. The majority also noted that the INA elsewhere uses "inadmissible" as a status descriptor without requiring the person to be at the border or seeking admission, confirming that the term is not procedurally confined. Applying the statute to Barton, his 1996 Georgia convictions (including aggravated assault) were offenses "referred to in" §1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I) (CIMT) and would render him inadmissible; the petty-offense exception, §1182(a)(2)(A)(ii), did not apply because he had multiple convictions and his offenses carried potential sentences exceeding one year. Because those offenses occurred within his first seven years after admission, his continuous-residence clock stopped in 1996, leaving him short of the seven years required for LPR cancellation under §1229b(a). The rule of lenity did not apply because the statutory text, structure, and purpose resolved the meaning without grievous ambiguity. Dissent (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan): The dissent argued that "inadmissible" is a term of art applicable when a noncitizen is seeking admission, not a free-floating status for those already admitted and charged with deportability. In the dissent's view, the government's reading improperly collapses the distinct grounds of inadmissibility and deportability and ignores the INA's structural separation of those concepts. The dissent feared practical anomalies and would have held that stop-time based on §1182(a)(2) applies when the person is charged as inadmissible, while §1227(a)(2)/(a)(4) covers those charged as deportable.
Barton crystallizes how the stop-time rule operates: an offense listed in §1182(a)(2) that would render a person inadmissible halts the seven-year residence clock for LPR cancellation even if the current proceeding is based on deportability. For practitioners and students, the case illustrates a strongly textual approach to cross-referenced statutory provisions and highlights the functional, status-based use of "inadmissibility" within the INA. Practically, the decision narrows access to cancellation for long-term residents with early criminal conduct and underscores the importance of analyzing whether any offense within the first seven years post-admission fits within §1182(a)(2) or §1227(a)(2)/(a)(4), as well as whether exceptions (e.g., the petty-offense exception) apply.
Cancellation of removal for lawful permanent residents (8 U.S.C. §1229b(a)) is a discretionary form of relief that, if granted, allows an LPR in removal proceedings to retain status despite removability. The applicant must show: (1) at least five years as an LPR; (2) seven years of continuous residence in the United States after admission in any status; and (3) no aggravated felony conviction. The stop-time rule in §1229b(d)(1) can end the seven-year accrual upon service of a notice to appear or when the person commits a qualifying offense.
The stop-time rule, §1229b(d)(1), provides that accrual of continuous residence (or presence) ends when either (A) the government serves a notice to appear or (B) the person has committed an offense referred to in §1182(a)(2) that renders the person inadmissible under §1182(a)(2) or removable under §1227(a)(2) or (a)(4). Barton held that subsection (B) is status-neutral: it applies if the offense would render the person inadmissible (or removable) regardless of whether the current proceedings charge inadmissibility or deportability. Thus, an early §1182(a)(2) offense can stop the seven-year clock even in a deportability case.
No. Barton squarely rejects any requirement that the government charge inadmissibility. The statute asks whether the offense is one "referred to in §1182(a)(2)" and whether it would render the person inadmissible under §1182(a)(2) or removable under §1227(a)(2)/(a)(4). If so, stop-time is triggered when the offense is committed, regardless of the charging posture.
An offense triggers stop-time only if it actually "renders" the person inadmissible or removable. Under §1182(a)(2)(A)(ii)(II), the petty-offense exception removes certain single CIMTs from inadmissibility if the maximum penalty does not exceed one year and the person was not sentenced to more than six months. If an exception applies, the offense would not render the person inadmissible and thus would not trigger stop-time under §1229b(d)(1)(B). In Barton's case, the exception did not apply due to multiple convictions and the seriousness of the offenses.
Pereira v. Sessions (2018) addressed stop-time subsection (A) and held that a notice to appear lacking time and place does not trigger stop-time. Barton concerns subsection (B) and clarifies that, independently of any notice-to-appear defects, an offense referred to in §1182(a)(2) that renders the person inadmissible (or an offense that renders the person removable under §1227(a)(2)/(a)(4)) will stop the clock on the date of commission.
Section 1229b(d)(1)(B) is disjunctive: stop-time is triggered when the offense either renders the person inadmissible under §1182(a)(2) or removable under §1227(a)(2) or (a)(4). Thus, an offense that is not "referred to in §1182(a)(2)" can still trigger stop-time if it renders the person removable under the enumerated deportability grounds.
Barton v. Barr confirms that the stop-time rule operates by reference to the objective characteristics of prior offenses, not the procedural posture of a removal case. By holding that an offense listed in §1182(a)(2) triggers stop-time even when the noncitizen is charged as deportable, the Court emphasized the statute's text, structure, and Congress's intent to constrain eligibility for discretionary relief.
For students and practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of precise statutory parsing and the practical necessity of scrutinizing all early-life offenses for their potential to halt the seven-year clock. It also offers a clear example of how the INA's inadmissibility and deportability frameworks interact with relief eligibility, and how textualist reasoning can have significant real-world immigration consequences.
Need to cite this case?
Generate a perfectly formatted Bluebook citation in seconds.
Use our Bluebook Citation Generator →