Master The Supreme Court limited Congress's Fourteenth Amendment Section 5 enforcement power, invalidating RFRA as applied to states and announcing the "congruence and proportionality" test. with this comprehensive case brief.
City of Boerne v. Flores is a foundational constitutional law case that sharply defines the boundary between Congress's power to enforce constitutional rights and the judiciary's power to interpret those rights. In striking down the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to state and local governments, the Supreme Court announced the "congruence and proportionality" standard, a now-canonical test for assessing whether Congress's Section 5 legislation appropriately remedies or prevents constitutional violations without redefining the substantive scope of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The decision recalibrated the post–Employment Division v. Smith legal landscape for free exercise claims against state and local governments, restoring Smith's deferential standard for neutral laws of general applicability while simultaneously signaling to Congress that nationwide, strict-scrutiny mandates untethered to a record of state constitutional violations exceed Section 5's enforcement remit. For law students, Boerne is indispensable when analyzing federalism, separation of powers, and the doctrinal architecture of constitutional remedies.
521 U.S. 507 (U.S. Supreme Court 1997)
The City of Boerne, Texas, adopted a historic preservation ordinance covering a district that included St. Peter Catholic Church. The Archbishop of San Antonio, Patrick F. Flores, sought a building permit to enlarge the church to accommodate a growing congregation. The city denied the permit under the ordinance. The Archbishop sued in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), which requires the government to demonstrate a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means whenever it substantially burdens religious exercise, even via neutral, generally applicable laws. The district court held RFRA unconstitutional as beyond Congress's enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and in tension with federalism principles; the Fifth Circuit reversed, upholding RFRA and ruling for the Archbishop. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether RFRA validly applies to state and local governments.
Does Congress have authority under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to impose RFRA's strict-scrutiny standard on state and local laws that substantially burden religious exercise, thereby redefining the scope of Free Exercise protections recognized by the Court?
Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is remedial and preventive: it may enact "appropriate legislation" to deter or remedy constitutional violations as the Court has defined them, but it may not alter the substantive meaning of the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Such legislation must exhibit congruence and proportionality between the constitutional injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted. Under Employment Division v. Smith, neutral, generally applicable state laws that incidentally burden religion ordinarily do not violate the Free Exercise Clause and need not satisfy strict scrutiny.
RFRA, as applied to states and their political subdivisions, exceeds Congress's Section 5 enforcement power and is unconstitutional. Congress may not, through RFRA, mandate strict scrutiny for all state and local laws that substantially burden religious exercise. The judgment of the Fifth Circuit was reversed.
1) Judicial role versus congressional enforcement: The Court emphasized that the Constitution assigns to the judiciary the authority to say what the law is, including the substantive meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's rights. While Section 5 grants Congress the power to enforce those rights, it does not permit Congress to redefine or expand them beyond the Court's interpretations. RFRA's across-the-board strict scrutiny effectively supplanted the Court's Free Exercise doctrine from Smith, thereby altering the substantive standard that applies to state and local laws. 2) Congruence and proportionality: To be valid under Section 5, legislation must be congruent and proportional to documented constitutional violations by the states. Unlike the Voting Rights Act provisions upheld in cases such as South Carolina v. Katzenbach and the remedial measures discussed in Katzenbach v. Morgan, Congress compiled no legislative record showing a widespread pattern of unconstitutional free exercise violations by states post-Smith. The examples Congress cited were few, often involved laws that were neutral and generally applicable (and thus constitutional under Smith), or concerned federal rather than state action. By imposing strict scrutiny on every state and local action that substantially burdens religion—regardless of evidence of targeted discrimination—RFRA swept too broadly and lacked the necessary tailoring. 3) Overbreadth and federalism concerns: RFRA's reach was expansive: it applied to every state and local law and every government action, required the highest level of judicial scrutiny, and mandated individualized exemptions across myriad regulatory fields. Such a ubiquitous, prophylactic regime was not a remedy to a pattern of constitutional violations but a substantive revision of Free Exercise jurisprudence. This overbreadth intruded on state sovereignty and the traditional police powers of the states without a corresponding evidentiary predicate of constitutional wrongdoing. 4) Clarifying Katzenbach v. Morgan: The Court rejected readings of Morgan that would allow Congress to define new constitutional rights under Section 5. Instead, Morgan permits remedial and preventive measures that are tailored to actual or threatened constitutional violations as understood by the Court. RFRA went beyond such enforcement by attempting to restore the pre-Smith compelling-interest test for all substantial burdens, a standard the Court had already declined to constitutionalize for neutral, generally applicable laws. 5) Application to the case: Because RFRA failed the congruence-and-proportionality requirement, the Court did not evaluate whether Boerne's historic preservation ordinance or the denial of the church's permit itself violated the Free Exercise Clause. The dispositive question was Congress's power to subject state and local governments to RFRA's regime; on that question, RFRA, as applied to the states, was unconstitutional.
City of Boerne v. Flores is the seminal modern case delimiting Congress's Section 5 power and inaugurating the congruence-and-proportionality test. The decision reinforces judicial supremacy in constitutional interpretation and significantly constrains Congress from imposing broad substantive standards on state and local governments under the guise of enforcement. For religious liberty, Boerne restored Smith's rule for state and local conduct, while leaving RFRA in force against the federal government (a point later reflected in cases such as Gonzales v. O Centro). In response to Boerne, Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) under the Spending and Commerce Clauses to target specific contexts (land use and institutionalized persons). Beyond religion, Boerne's framework governs a host of Section 5 cases—invalidating some statutes (e.g., ADEA suits against states in Kimel; ADA Title I damages in Garrett) and sustaining others with robust records and tailoring (e.g., FMLA family-care provision in Hibbs; access-to-courts applications of ADA Title II in Tennessee v. Lane).
RFRA sought to restore the pre–Employment Division v. Smith strict-scrutiny standard for government actions that substantially burden religious exercise. After Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws do not ordinarily violate the Free Exercise Clause, a bipartisan Congress enacted RFRA to require governments—federal, state, and local—to justify substantial burdens on religion by a compelling interest pursued through the least restrictive means.
No. The Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress's Section 5 power as applied to states and their subdivisions, so RFRA cannot be used to impose strict scrutiny on state and local laws. RFRA remains valid as to the federal government because the Section 5 limitation concerns Congress's authority to bind states; subsequent cases, like Gonzales v. O Centro and Cutter v. Wilkinson, apply RFRA (and RLUIPA) in the federal context.
It is a standard for evaluating whether legislation enacted under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment appropriately enforces constitutional rights. Congress may deter or remedy constitutional violations, but its measures must be congruent (closely related) and proportional (not excessively broad) to a documented pattern of state constitutional violations. Statutes that sweep far beyond the identified harms or that effectively redefine rights fail this test.
Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religion are ordinarily constitutional without strict scrutiny. RFRA attempted to override Smith by imposing strict scrutiny on all substantial burdens. Boerne rejected Congress's attempt to redefine the Free Exercise standard for the states, thereby restoring Smith's rule in state and local contexts.
Congress enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) in 2000, grounding it in the Spending and Commerce Clauses rather than Section 5. RLUIPA targets two areas with tailored remedies: land-use regulations and religious exercise by institutionalized persons, conditioning federal funds and regulating activities with interstate effects. RLUIPA has withstood numerous challenges where applied within its enumerated powers.
Identify the underlying constitutional right and the Court's current substantive standard; determine whether Congress is enforcing that standard or redefining it; examine the legislative record for a pattern of state violations; and assess whether the statute's remedies are congruent and proportional to those violations (scope, tailoring, duration, exceptions, and targeting). Conclude with whether the statute is remedial/preventive or an impermissible substantive redefinition.
City of Boerne v. Flores powerfully delineates the constitutional line between interpretation and enforcement. By striking down RFRA's application to states, the Court affirmed that Congress may prevent or remedy constitutional violations but may not unilaterally reset the substance of constitutional rights. The congruence-and-proportionality test that Boerne announced has become the principal framework for evaluating Section 5 statutes across numerous subject areas.
For students and practitioners, Boerne's enduring value lies in its method. Effective analysis requires careful attention to the Court-defined scope of a right, the evidentiary record of state violations, and the tailored fit of congressional remedies. Understanding Boerne equips lawyers to navigate federalism, separation of powers, and the design of constitutionally sound civil rights legislation.
Need to cite this case?
Generate a perfectly formatted Bluebook citation in seconds.
Use our Bluebook Citation Generator →