Master The Supreme Court held that when a land-use regulation is found to effect a taking, the Just Compensation Clause requires payment of compensation for the period of the taking; invalidating the regulation is not the exclusive remedy. with this comprehensive case brief.
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles is a landmark Takings Clause case that reshaped the remedial landscape of regulatory takings. Before this decision, some courts treated invalidation of an offending regulation as a sufficient remedy, denying damages for the time the owner was deprived of use. The Supreme Court rejected that approach, holding that where a regulation is ultimately determined to be a taking, the government must pay just compensation for the period during which the taking was effective, even if the regulation is later withdrawn or invalidated.
The decision thus clarifies that the Fifth Amendment, as incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, is not merely a shield against future enforcement of unconstitutional regulations; it is also a sword for recovering compensation for past injuries when a taking has occurred. Although the Court did not decide whether the specific Los Angeles County ordinance effected a taking on the facts, its ruling on remedy fundamentally altered how courts and governments must approach temporary restrictions that deprive owners of the use of property.
482 U.S. 304 (1987)
First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale owned a 21-acre parcel in Mill Creek Canyon within Los Angeles County, which it operated as "Lutherglen," a religious campground and retreat center serving, among others, children and adults with disabilities. In 1978, after a major forest fire in the surrounding area, heavy rains caused severe flooding and debris flows that destroyed or heavily damaged the camp's buildings. In response to the flood hazard, the County adopted an interim ordinance establishing a flood protection area in the canyon and prohibiting construction or reconstruction of buildings within the designated floodplain pending further study and planning. Because of this prohibition, the Church was not permitted to rebuild Lutherglen's facilities on its property. The Church filed an action in California state court alleging, among other claims, that the County's interim ordinance effected a taking of its property by temporarily denying all economically viable use, and it sought damages in inverse condemnation for the period during which the ordinance barred rebuilding. The trial court struck the damages claim, holding that California law limited relief in such regulatory takings cases to declaratory or injunctive relief (i.e., invalidation of the regulation) rather than compensation. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, relying in part on its understanding of Agins v. City of Tiburon as precluding a damages remedy. The California Supreme Court denied review, and the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.
When a land-use regulation is found to have effected a taking of private property, does the Just Compensation Clause require the government to pay monetary compensation for the period during which the regulation was in effect, or is invalidation of the regulation the exclusive remedy?
Under the Fifth Amendment's Just Compensation Clause, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, when a land-use regulation is adjudged to have effected a taking, the government must pay just compensation for the period during which the taking was in effect. Invalidation or withdrawal of the regulation is not an exclusive or sufficient remedy; compensation is required for temporary as well as permanent takings, unless the government shows the regulation falls within traditional police-power limits (e.g., abating a nuisance) such that no taking occurred.
Yes. If a land-use regulation is ultimately determined to have effected a taking, the government is constitutionally obligated to pay just compensation for the time before the regulation was repealed or invalidated; invalidation alone is not an adequate remedy. The Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings without deciding whether the County's ordinance actually effected a taking on the facts.
The Court began with the text and history of the Just Compensation Clause, emphasizing that it is designed to secure compensation for individuals whose property is taken for public use. The Clause is self-executing with respect to the duty to compensate; when the government has taken property in fact—whether by physical occupation or by regulation that goes "too far"—the Constitution requires compensation for the loss incurred. The Court explained that regulatory actions can constitute takings (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon) and that temporary deprivations of use can be compensable (e.g., temporary physical occupations and floodings in cases such as Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, United States v. General Motors, and United States v. Pewee Coal Co.). There is no principled basis to deny compensation merely because the taking results from regulation rather than physical occupation, or because it is temporary rather than permanent. Addressing the California courts' approach, the Court rejected the notion—purportedly drawn from Agins—that the only remedy for an unconstitutional regulation is to strike it down. While invalidation may prevent future harm, it provides no remedy for the period already endured if a taking occurred. The Court clarified that to the extent Agins suggested invalidation as an exclusive remedy, it was misread and is not controlling. If a regulation is found to have taken property—such as by denying all economically viable use—the government must pay for the time the property was taken from the owner's use and enjoyment. The measure of compensation, the Court noted, would be the value of the use during the regulatory period, akin to rental value. The Court was careful to cabin its decision. It did not decide whether Los Angeles County's ordinance actually effected a taking of the Church's property; that question remained for the state courts on remand. Nor did the Court hold that every interim land-use restriction or moratorium is a taking. The government may defend on remand that the regulation did not go "too far," that normal planning delays are part of the regulatory process, or that the regulation falls within the police power to prevent serious public harm (e.g., nuisance). The decision speaks to remedy: where a taking is proven, compensation is required for the period of the taking, and post hoc invalidation alone cannot satisfy the Constitution.
First English is a remedial milestone in takings jurisprudence. It confirms that the Takings Clause requires monetary compensation for temporary regulatory takings and that invalidation is not a sufficient substitute. The case thereby ensures that property owners have a damages remedy (inverse condemnation) when government regulations—if ultimately found to effect a taking—temporarily deprive them of the use of their property. For law students, the case underscores several doctrinal points: (1) separation of the takings inquiry (did a taking occur?) from the remedy (what is owed if it did?); (2) the compensability of temporary takings; (3) the self-executing nature of the Just Compensation Clause; and (4) the continuing relevance of defenses grounded in the police power (e.g., nuisance). It also foreshadows later cases clarifying the scope of temporary regulatory takings, including Lucas (per se takings where all economic use is denied, subject to background principles) and Tahoe-Sierra (temporary moratoria are not per se takings).
No. The Court expressly declined to decide whether a taking occurred on the facts. It held only that if the ordinance is ultimately found to have effected a taking, the County must pay just compensation for the period the regulation was in force. The case was remanded to the California courts to determine, on the merits, whether the Church suffered a taking.
No. First English addresses remedy, not a categorical rule on liability. It holds that compensation is required when a regulation is adjudged to have effected a taking, even if the taking is temporary. Later, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, the Court clarified that temporary moratoria are not per se takings; whether a taking occurred depends on the multifactor Penn Central analysis and the specifics of the restriction.
California courts read Agins to limit remedies to invalidation of an offending regulation, denying damages for past losses. First English rejected that reading, clarifying that the Just Compensation Clause requires payment of compensation when a taking is found. To the extent Agins suggested otherwise, First English disapproved that remedial understanding.
Compensation is measured by the value of the use of the property during the period of the taking—often conceptualized as the rental value or the return the owner could have realized absent the restriction—plus any other provable losses consistent with takings principles. The government's later repeal or invalidation of the regulation does not extinguish the obligation to pay for the time the taking persisted.
Yes, if the government shows that the regulation prevented uses that were not part of the owner's title to begin with—such as activities amounting to public nuisances or contrary to background principles of state property or nuisance law—then no taking occurs and no compensation is due. First English preserves this defense and leaves the takings determination to the lower courts.
Yes. The principle that compensation is required for temporary takings applies across physical and regulatory contexts, and it binds federal, state, and local governments through the Fifth Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment. The key question remains whether a taking occurred under the applicable takings tests.
First English transformed the remedial framework of takings law by confirming that damages are the constitutionally mandated remedy when a regulation is found to have taken property, even if the regulation is temporary and later withdrawn. The decision ensures that owners are made whole for the period of deprivation and prevents governments from escaping liability by merely rescinding unlawful regulations after the fact.
At the same time, the decision is careful and limited. It does not announce a per se rule that interim restrictions constitute takings; rather, it compels compensation only if a taking is proven under established takings doctrines. In this way, First English balances the needs of government planning and emergency regulation with the constitutional guarantee that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.
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