Master The Supreme Court struck down Colorado's Amendment 2 as violating the Equal Protection Clause because it singled out gays and lesbians for broad legal disabilities unsupported by any legitimate state interest. with this comprehensive case brief.
Romer v. Evans is a landmark Equal Protection decision in which the U.S. Supreme Court invalidated a Colorado constitutional amendment that barred all state and local protections against discrimination based on sexual orientation. Decided in 1996, the case marked a pivotal moment in constitutional law by articulating the modern contours of the "animus" doctrine: the principle that a law born of a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group lacks a legitimate governmental purpose and therefore fails even rational basis review.
For law students, Romer is foundational on several fronts. It demonstrates how facially broad, status-based enactments can falter under Equal Protection without triggering strict or intermediate scrutiny. It situates itself in the lineage of Department of Agriculture v. Moreno and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, reinforcing that the Equal Protection Clause guards against not only explicit suspect-class discrimination but also sweeping legal structures that fence out a targeted group from ordinary political protections. Romer also presaged later LGBTQ+ rights decisions, providing doctrinal scaffolding for cases like Lawrence, Windsor, and Obergefell.
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (U.S. Supreme Court)
In 1992, Colorado voters approved "Amendment 2," a state constitutional provision prohibiting any state or local government entity from enacting, adopting, or enforcing laws or policies that would protect persons on the basis of homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation, conduct, practices, or relationships. The amendment nullified existing anti-discrimination ordinances in several municipalities (including Denver, Boulder, and Aspen) that had extended protections in areas such as housing, employment, public accommodations, and education, and it barred any future legislative, executive, or judicial action conferring such protections. A group of affected individuals and local governments sued in Colorado state court, asserting that Amendment 2 violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The trial court issued a preliminary injunction, later entered permanent relief, and the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed, applying strict scrutiny on the theory that Amendment 2 infringed a fundamental right of targeted groups to participate equally in the political process. The State petitioned for certiorari. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the judgment (but not the state court's rationale), holding that Amendment 2 could not survive rational basis review under the federal Equal Protection Clause.
Does Colorado's Amendment 2, which prohibits all state and local governmental action protecting persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation, violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?
Under the Equal Protection Clause, a law that singles out a class of persons and imposes a broad disability on that class must, at minimum, bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose. A "bare... desire to harm a politically unpopular group" cannot constitute such a purpose, and laws of unusual breadth targeting a specific group may reveal impermissible animus and fail even rational basis review.
Yes. Amendment 2 violates the Equal Protection Clause because it classifies homosexual and bisexual persons to make them unequal to everyone else and is not rationally related to any legitimate state interest.
The Court, applying rational basis review, emphasized the "unprecedented" and "broad" character of Amendment 2. By identifying homosexual, lesbian, and bisexual persons as a class and categorically withdrawing from them, and only them, the ordinary protections of law that others may seek and obtain, the amendment imposed a status-based disability across the board. This sweeping preclusion of all protective measures went far beyond adjusting individual rights or policies; it restructured the political process to fence out a single group from seeking governmental protections available to all others. Colorado argued several justifications: conserving resources to fight other discrimination; respecting the freedom of those who oppose homosexuality; and avoiding the creation of "special rights" for gays and lesbians. The Court found these explanations inadequate. The asserted interests were either not actually furthered by the amendment or were so disconnected from the amendment's breadth as to be implausible. In particular, the "special rights" framing mischaracterized the relevant baseline: the amendment did not deny extraordinary privileges, but withheld ordinary legal protections other groups could pursue. The law's over-inclusiveness and sweeping scope suggested that it was born of animus toward the targeted class, not of any legitimate policy aim. Citing the animus principle from Moreno and the skepticism applied in Cleburne, the Court explained that when a classification is so unusual in character and breadth that it defies the normal articulation of legitimate ends, it fails even deferential rational basis review. Because Amendment 2 singled out a particular class for disfavored legal status without a rational link to legitimate governmental objectives, it violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court thus affirmed the Colorado Supreme Court's judgment, though on rational basis rather than strict scrutiny grounds.
Romer crystallizes the modern "animus" doctrine: laws targeting a politically unpopular group cannot rest on mere moral disapproval or a desire to disadvantage that group. The case is a prime example of "rational basis with bite," showing that even under deferential review the Court will invalidate measures whose breadth and structure signal an impermissible purpose. For students, Romer is essential to understanding how Equal Protection analysis can police status-based, across-the-board disabilities without classifying the targeted group as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Doctrinally, Romer laid crucial groundwork for later LGBTQ+ rights decisions by rejecting anti-gay measures justified only by moral disapproval and by emphasizing equal access to ordinary legal protections. It is frequently cited alongside Moreno and Cleburne in Equal Protection courses to illustrate how courts scrutinize motivations, fit, and legislative breadth under rational basis review.
Amendment 2 amended the Colorado Constitution to prohibit any state, county, city, or other governmental entity from enacting, adopting, or enforcing measures that protected individuals from discrimination based on homosexual, lesbian, or bisexual orientation. It immediately invalidated existing local ordinances providing such protections and categorically barred future protections for the targeted group.
No. Although the Colorado Supreme Court used strict scrutiny based on a political-process theory, the U.S. Supreme Court expressly applied rational basis review. It concluded that the amendment failed even that deferential standard because it lacked a rational relationship to any legitimate governmental purpose and appeared to be motivated by animus.
Colorado claimed interests in conserving enforcement resources, protecting the liberties of those opposed to homosexuality, and avoiding "special rights" for gays and lesbians. The Court found these interests either not actually advanced by the amendment or too attenuated given the amendment's sweeping scope. Because Amendment 2 broadly disabled only one class from seeking protections routinely available to others, the breadth of the measure signaled impermissible animus rather than a legitimate policy fit.
Romer draws on Department of Agriculture v. Moreno and City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center to reinforce that animus-based laws lack legitimate ends and that irrational or extraordinarily broad measures can fail rational basis review. Together, these cases show that Equal Protection prohibits government actions motivated by hostility toward a group, even absent heightened scrutiny.
No. The Court did not designate sexual orientation as a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Instead, it struck down Amendment 2 under rational basis review, emphasizing the amendment's unusual breadth and impermissible purpose. Subsequent cases have developed LGBTQ+ rights further, but Romer stands for the principle that animus-driven laws fail even under the most deferential scrutiny.
Romer v. Evans marks a foundational moment in Equal Protection jurisprudence by clarifying that government may not single out a group for disfavored legal status based on animus. Without invoking heightened scrutiny, the Court condemned a measure whose design and scope revealed an illegitimate purpose and denied ordinary legal recourse to a defined class.
For students and practitioners, Romer underscores that constitutional analysis looks not only to labels and asserted interests, but also to structure, breadth, and context. It is a principal case on the animus doctrine and rational basis with bite, and it remains a touchstone for understanding how the Equal Protection Clause guards against majoritarian efforts to fence disfavored groups out of ordinary legal protections.
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