Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins vs. Hanna v. Plumer
A side-by-side comparison of two landmark civil procedure cases
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins
304 U.S. 64 (1938) (1938)
Holding
The Supreme Court overruled Swift v. Tyson and held that there is no federal general common law. Federal courts sitting in diversity must apply the substantive law of the state, including state decisional law, not merely state statutes. The case was remanded for application of Pennsylvania law.
Doctrine Established
Erie Doctrine (No Federal General Common Law)
Hanna v. Plumer
380 U.S. 460 (1965) (1965)
Holding
The Supreme Court held that the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure governed. When a Federal Rule directly addresses the issue in question, the Rule applies if it is valid under the Rules Enabling Act — that is, if it is arguably procedural and does not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. The Erie outcome-determinative test does not apply when a Federal Rule is on point.
Doctrine Established
Hanna Two-Track Erie Analysis (Rules Enabling Act Test)
Comparison Analysis
Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins (1938) and Hanna v. Plumer (1965) together form the analytical framework for the Erie doctrine -- the rules governing when federal courts sitting in diversity must apply state law and when they may apply federal law. Erie held that there is no federal general common law and that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases, overruling the century-old precedent of Swift v. Tyson. Hanna refined the Erie analysis by establishing two separate tracks: when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure or federal statute directly conflicts with state law, the federal rule applies if it is valid under the Rules Enabling Act (Hanna's holding); when there is no directly applicable federal rule, courts apply the Erie/Guaranty Trust 'outcome-determinative' test to determine whether the issue is substantive or procedural.
The critical analytical contribution of Hanna is distinguishing between the two types of Erie problems. A 'Hanna track' problem arises when a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly addresses the issue -- in that case, the federal rule controls as long as it does not 'abridge, enlarge, or modify' any substantive right under the Rules Enabling Act, a test the Federal Rules have almost always passed. An 'Erie track' or 'unguided Erie' problem arises when no Federal Rule directly addresses the issue, and the court must determine whether applying different rules would lead to forum shopping or inequitable administration of the law (the twin aims of Erie identified in Hanna's discussion of the policy behind Erie).
Students must be able to identify which track applies to a given fact pattern. If there is a Federal Rule on point, apply Hanna: is the rule arguably procedural and does it comply with the Rules Enabling Act? If there is no Federal Rule on point, apply the Erie analysis: would applying the federal practice lead to different outcomes that encourage forum shopping or create inequitable administration of the laws? This two-track framework governs virtually every choice-of-law question in federal diversity jurisdiction.
Similarities
- Both address the choice between state and federal law in federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction
- Both are foundational cases in the Erie doctrine, taught together as the core analytical framework
- Both involve the federalism concern of preventing federal courts from creating incentives for forum shopping between state and federal court
- Both recognize that the goal of the Erie doctrine is to ensure that the outcome of litigation does not depend on whether the case is filed in state or federal court
Differences
- Erie established the general principle that federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases, while Hanna created the two-track analytical framework for applying that principle
- Erie addressed judge-made federal law (there is no federal general common law), while Hanna addressed congressionally authorized Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (which presumptively apply if valid under the Rules Enabling Act)
- Under Erie, the question is whether the issue is 'substantive' (apply state law) or 'procedural' (apply federal law); under Hanna, the question is whether a Federal Rule directly conflicts with state law and is valid
- Erie overruled a century of precedent (Swift v. Tyson) and represented a dramatic shift, while Hanna clarified and refined the Erie framework without overruling anything
Why This Comparison Matters
Erie doctrine questions are among the most common and most challenging Civil Procedure exam topics. The first analytical step is always: is there a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure directly on point? If yes, apply Hanna (the federal rule controls if valid under the Rules Enabling Act). If no, apply the unguided Erie analysis (would applying the federal practice create outcome-determinative differences that encourage forum shopping?). Students who fail to identify which track applies will analyze the question incorrectly. A common exam trick is presenting a federal practice that seems procedural but where applying it would dramatically change outcomes, requiring careful analysis of both tracks.
More Civil Procedure Comparisons
Pennoyer v. Neff vs. International Shoe Co. v. Washington
Pennoyer v. Neff (1878) and International Shoe Co. v. Washington (1945) represent the most important paradigm shift in personal jurisdiction doctrine. Pennoyer established the territorial model: a court's jurisdiction over a defendant required either physical presence within the state's borders or voluntary appearance. This framework treated jurisdiction as a question of sovereignty -- each state's power ended at its borders, and due process required that the defendant be physically present or have property within the jurisdiction. International Shoe replaced this rigid territorial approach with a flexible contacts-based test: due process requires only that the defendant have 'minimum contacts' with the forum state such that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson vs. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court
World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson (1980) and Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial District Court (2021) both address specific personal jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants in product liability cases, but they reach different results that illustrate the evolution of the doctrine. World-Wide Volkswagen held that an Oklahoma court lacked jurisdiction over a New York car dealer and regional distributor in a product liability suit, because the defendants had no contacts with Oklahoma -- the plaintiffs had unilaterally driven the car there. Ford Motor held that Montana and Minnesota courts had jurisdiction over Ford in product liability cases involving accidents in those states, even though the specific vehicles involved were not sold or originally delivered in those states.
Conley v. Gibson vs. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
Conley v. Gibson (1957) and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007) represent the before and after of modern federal pleading standards. Conley established the liberal 'no set of facts' standard, holding that a complaint should not be dismissed unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle relief. This approach was extremely permissive and allowed virtually any claim to survive a motion to dismiss so long as it gave the defendant fair notice of the claim. Twombly retired the 'no set of facts' language and replaced it with the 'plausibility' standard, requiring that a complaint contain factual allegations that, taken as true, state a claim that is plausible on its face.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett vs. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986) and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. (1986) are part of the Supreme Court's 1986 summary judgment trilogy (along with Matsushita v. Zenith) that transformed summary judgment from a disfavored procedural device into a routine and powerful litigation tool. Celotex addressed the moving party's initial burden, holding that a defendant moving for summary judgment need not produce evidence negating the plaintiff's claim but may simply point to the absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the plaintiff's case. Anderson addressed the standard of proof at summary judgment, holding that the court must view the evidence through the lens of the applicable substantive standard -- meaning that if the plaintiff must prove the claim by clear and convincing evidence at trial, the court evaluates the summary judgment record against that heightened standard.