Pierson v. Post vs. Armory v. Delamirie
A side-by-side comparison of two landmark property cases
Pierson v. Post
3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (1805)
Holding
The court held that mere pursuit of a wild animal, even with a reasonable prospect of capture, does not vest property rights in the pursuer. Only actual physical possession through capture, mortal wounding, or trapping such that escape is certain to be prevented can establish ownership of a wild animal.
Doctrine Established
Rule of Capture
Armory v. Delamirie
1 Strange 505, 93 Eng. Rep. 664 (K.B. 1722) (1722)
Holding
The court held that a finder of lost property acquires a possessory right that is good against all the world except the true owner. The goldsmith's apprentice was liable to the finder in trover. Additionally, the court instructed the jury that unless the defendant produced the jewel to show it was of lesser value, they should presume the stones were of the finest quality.
Doctrine Established
Finders' Rights / Relative Title Doctrine
Comparison Analysis
Pierson v. Post (1805) and Armory v. Delamirie (1722) are the two foundational cases on the acquisition of property rights in personal property, establishing complementary principles about how ownership arises outside of voluntary transfer. Pierson held that mere pursuit of a wild animal (a fox) does not create a property right -- only actual physical capture (occupancy) establishes possession and therefore ownership. Armory held that a finder of lost property has a property right superior to everyone in the world except the true owner, establishing the principle of relative title.
Pierson establishes the rule of first possession for unowned resources: you acquire property rights by actually taking control, not merely by investing effort in pursuit. The policy rationale is clarity and administrability -- a rule based on physical capture provides a bright-line standard that reduces disputes, while a rule based on pursuit would generate endless litigation about how close the pursuer was. Armory establishes a different principle: once you have possession, your property right is protected against all the world except someone with a superior claim. The chimney sweep's boy who found the jewel had a right to it against the goldsmith who tried to keep it, even though the boy was not the original owner.
Together, these cases build the common-law property framework from the ground up. Pierson tells us how property rights originate (through actual possession of unowned things). Armory tells us that property rights are relative rather than absolute (the finder has rights against some parties but not others). This framework of first possession plus relative title underlies much of property law, from adverse possession to bailment to the various finders' statutes that allocate rights among finders, landowners, and true owners.
Similarities
- Both establish foundational rules about the acquisition of property rights in personal property outside of voluntary transfer
- Both involve disputes between competing claimants to the same piece of property, requiring the court to determine who has superior rights
- Both rely on possession as the key concept for establishing property rights
- Both are among the first cases taught in Property courses to introduce the concept of how property rights arise
Differences
- Pierson addresses how property rights arise in unowned things (first possession through capture), while Armory addresses the rights of a finder of lost property (relative title against subsequent possessors)
- Pierson denies property rights to the pursuer who invested effort but did not achieve possession, while Armory grants property rights to the finder who merely happened upon the item
- Pierson focuses on the bright-line rule of actual capture as the moment property rights attach, while Armory focuses on the relative nature of property claims (better right than some, worse right than others)
- Pierson involves a dispute between two people competing to acquire unowned property, while Armory involves a dispute between a finder and a third party who wrongfully took the property from the finder
Why This Comparison Matters
Property exams frequently test the concepts of first possession, finders' rights, and relative title. Pierson provides the rule for unowned property: actual possession (capture, occupancy) creates ownership, not mere pursuit or intent. Armory provides the rule for found property: the finder has rights superior to all except the true owner. A typical exam fact pattern will present competing claims to found or captured property and require students to determine the hierarchy of rights using these principles. Students should also know the modern finders' rules that distinguish between lost, mislaid, abandoned, and treasure trove property.
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