Dissent in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore
517 U.S. 559 (1996) (1996) · Supreme Court of the United States
BMW v. Gore is the landmark Supreme Court case establishing constitutional limits on punitive damages under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that grossly excessive punitive damages violate due process and articulated three guideposts for evaluating whether a punitive damages award is constitutionally excessive.
What was the dissent in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore?
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Due Process Clause does not provide a substantive right to a particular standard of punitive damages and that the three-guidepost test was unworkable and lacked foundation in the Constitution's text or history. Justice Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that the Court should defer to state procedures for controlling excessive verdicts.
Source: Read BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore on Google Scholar
Case Overview
Facts
Dr. Ira Gore purchased a new BMW automobile from an authorized dealer in Alabama. He later discovered that the car had been repainted before delivery to conceal acid rain damage. BMW had a nationwide policy of not disclosing pre-delivery repairs costing less than three percent of the car's suggested retail price. The cost to repaint Gore's car was approximately $601. A jury awarded Gore $4,000 in compensatory damages and $4 million in punitive damages, which the Alabama Supreme Court reduced to $2 million.
Majority Holding
The Supreme Court held that the $2 million punitive damages award was grossly excessive and violated the Due Process Clause. The Court established three guideposts for evaluating the constitutionality of punitive damages: (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, (2) the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages, and (3) the comparison between the punitive damages award and civil penalties authorized for comparable misconduct.
Majority Reasoning
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, reasoned that while states have broad discretion to impose punitive damages, the Due Process Clause imposes substantive limits on their size. The Court found that BMW's conduct, while fraudulent, was not highly reprehensible — it involved economic harm rather than physical danger and was not motivated by malice or indifference to safety. The ratio of punitive to compensatory damages (500 to 1) was breathtakingly high. And the available civil penalties for similar fraud were far lower than $2 million. Applying these three guideposts, the Court concluded that the award transcended constitutional limits.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Due Process Clause does not provide a substantive right to a particular standard of punitive damages and that the three-guidepost test was unworkable and lacked foundation in the Constitution's text or history. Justice Ginsburg also dissented, arguing that the Court should defer to state procedures for controlling excessive verdicts.
Key Quotes
“Elementary notions of fairness enshrined in our constitutional jurisprudence dictate that a person receive fair notice not only of the conduct that will subject him to punishment, but also of the severity of the penalty that a State may impose.”
“The $2 million in punitive damages awarded to Dr. Gore by the Alabama Supreme Court is grossly excessive.”
“Three guideposts, each of which indicates that BMW did not receive adequate notice of the magnitude of the sanction that Alabama might impose.”
Impact and Legacy
BMW v. Gore established the constitutional framework that governs punitive damages in every American jurisdiction. The three guideposts have been applied in thousands of cases and were further refined in State Farm v. Campbell (2003), which suggested that single-digit ratios of punitive to compensatory damages are more likely to satisfy due process. The case fundamentally changed how courts review punitive damages awards and imposed meaningful limits on jury discretion.
Exam Relevance
BMW v. Gore appears on exams testing the constitutional limits on punitive damages. Students should be prepared to apply the three guideposts to a given punitive damages award and analyze whether the award is constitutionally excessive. The case also tests the intersection of constitutional law and torts.
Study Tips
- Memorize the three guideposts: (1) reprehensibility, (2) ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, and (3) comparison to civil penalties for comparable conduct.
- Know that State Farm v. Campbell later suggested single-digit ratios are more likely to satisfy due process.
- Understand the policy tension between punishing wrongdoers and protecting defendants' due process rights.
- Be prepared to apply the guideposts to novel fact patterns and argue whether a given award is constitutionally excessive.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Torts Dissents
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co.
248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928) (1928)
Judge Andrews wrote a vigorous dissent arguing that negligence is not relative to the individual but rather is a matter of whether the defendant's conduct was unreasonable. He advocated a broader proximate cause analysis, arguing that everyone owes a duty of care to the world at large and that liability should extend to all injuries that are the proximate result of negligent conduct, not just those to foreseeable plaintiffs.
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924 (1980) (1980)
Justice Richardson dissented, arguing that the majority abandoned the fundamental tort requirement of causation. He contended that market share liability imposes liability on defendants who may not have caused the plaintiff's injury and that the judicial branch should not create such radical new theories of liability. He argued this was properly a matter for legislative action.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (1976)
Justice Clark dissented, arguing that the duty to warn would undermine the therapeutic relationship, deter patients from seeking treatment, and discourage therapists from treating potentially dangerous patients. He contended that the duty was unworkable because therapists cannot reliably predict violent behavior and that the majority's ruling would ultimately cause more harm than it prevented.
Katko v. Briney
183 N.W.2d 657 (Iowa 1971) (1971)
Justice Larson dissented, arguing that the majority's rule allowed trespassers and thieves to sue property owners who attempted to protect their property. He contended that property owners should have broader rights to defend their homes and possessions, particularly when they have been repeatedly victimized by break-ins.
Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
109 Minn. 456, 124 N.W. 221 (1910) (1910)
Justice Lewis dissented, arguing that the damage was caused by the storm, not by the defendant's conduct, and that the defendant should not be liable for an act of God. He contended that the defendant had no realistic alternative and should not be penalized for acting reasonably in an emergency.
Thing v. La Chusa
48 Cal. 3d 644, 771 P.2d 814 (1989) (1989)
Justice Broussard dissented, arguing that the majority's strict rules were arbitrary and that a mother who arrives at the scene moments after the accident and sees her injured child suffers the same type of emotional distress as one who witnesses the accident itself. He argued that the flexible Dillon approach better served the interests of justice.