Dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut
381 U.S. 479 (1965) (1965) · Supreme Court of the United States
Griswold v. Connecticut established a constitutional right to privacy, holding that the Bill of Rights creates zones of privacy through its penumbras and emanations. The case struck down a state law prohibiting the use of contraceptives by married couples and laid the doctrinal foundation for later reproductive rights and personal autonomy decisions.
What was the dissent in Griswold v. Connecticut?
Justices Black and Stewart dissented separately. Both argued that while the Connecticut law was foolish, there was no general constitutional right to privacy. Justice Black argued that the Court was engaging in the same substantive due process analysis it had properly rejected in repudiating Lochner, substituting its own values for those of the legislature.
Case Overview
Facts
Connecticut had an 1879 law that prohibited the use of contraceptives and made it a crime to assist, abet, or counsel another in using them. Estelle Griswold, the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, and Dr. C. Lee Buxton, a physician and professor at Yale Medical School, opened a birth control clinic in New Haven. They were arrested and convicted as accessories for providing contraceptive information and medical advice to married couples.
Majority Holding
The Court held 7-2 that the Connecticut law was unconstitutional because it violated the right to marital privacy. Justice Douglas's majority opinion found that specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from those guarantees that create zones of privacy. The marital relationship lies within this zone of privacy.
Majority Reasoning
Justice Douglas identified the right to privacy as emanating from the penumbras of several Bill of Rights guarantees: the First Amendment's freedom of association, the Third Amendment's prohibition against quartering soldiers, the Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable searches, the Fifth Amendment's self-incrimination clause, and the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to the people. Together, these create a general right to privacy that protects the marital relationship. The Connecticut law was struck down because it operated directly on the intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's role in that relationship.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justices Black and Stewart dissented separately. Both argued that while the Connecticut law was foolish, there was no general constitutional right to privacy. Justice Black argued that the Court was engaging in the same substantive due process analysis it had properly rejected in repudiating Lochner, substituting its own values for those of the legislature.
Key Quotes
“Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”
“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”
“We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights.”
Impact and Legacy
Griswold's recognition of a constitutional right to privacy became the foundation for an expanding line of personal autonomy decisions, including Eisenstadt v. Baird (extending contraceptive rights to unmarried persons), Roe v. Wade (abortion), Lawrence v. Texas (same-sex sexual conduct), and Obergefell v. Hodges (same-sex marriage). The case fundamentally reshaped substantive due process by shifting its focus from economic rights to personal autonomy.
Exam Relevance
Griswold is fundamental to any substantive due process or privacy rights exam question. Students should be able to identify the different concurring opinions and their distinct theories for locating the right to privacy. Professors frequently ask students to compare Douglas's penumbras approach with Harlan's due process approach and Goldberg's Ninth Amendment approach.
Study Tips
- Learn the different rationales offered by each concurring justice: Douglas (penumbras), Goldberg (Ninth Amendment), Harlan (substantive due process), and White (due process).
- Understand how Griswold revived substantive due process for personal liberties while the Court continued to reject it for economic rights.
- Trace the doctrinal line from Griswold through Eisenstadt, Roe, Casey, Lawrence, and Obergefell.
- Be able to address Justice Black's critique that the penumbras approach is no different from discredited Lochner-era reasoning.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Griswold v. Connecticut including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
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