ContractsDissenting Opinion

Dissent in Sherwood v. Walker

66 Mich. 568, 33 N.W. 919 (1887) (1887) · Supreme Court of Michigan

Sherwood v. Walker, the 'Barren Cow Case,' is a foundational case on mutual mistake of fact as a basis for rescinding a contract. The case established that when both parties are mistaken about a basic assumption that goes to the very nature or substance of the thing contracted for, the contract may be voidable. The distinction between mistakes going to the substance (which allow rescission) and mistakes going to mere quality or value (which do not) has been widely debated but remains influential.

Quick Answer

What was the dissent in Sherwood v. Walker?

Justice Sherwood (no relation to the plaintiff) dissented, arguing that the parties contracted for a specific, identified cow and that the mistake about her breeding capacity was a mistake about quality or value, not substance. The dissent maintained that the cow was the same animal regardless of whether she was pregnant, and that allowing rescission based on the seller's buyer's remorse after discovering the cow was more valuable than expected would undermine the certainty of contracts.

Source: Read Sherwood v. Walker on Google Scholar

Case Overview

Facts

Hiram Walker agreed to sell a cow named Rose 2d of Aberlone to Theodore Sherwood for $80, which reflected the price of beef cattle. Both parties believed the cow was barren and incapable of breeding. Before delivery, Walker discovered that Rose was in fact pregnant, making her worth between $750 and $1,000 as a breeding cow. Walker refused to deliver the cow, and Sherwood sued for replevin to obtain possession.

Majority Holding

The court held that the contract was voidable because both parties were mutually mistaken about a fact that went to the very substance of the agreement. The mistake about the cow's breeding capacity was not a mere mistake about quality or value but rather a mistake about the very nature of the thing sold. A barren cow and a breeding cow are substantially different creatures, and the parties would not have agreed to the sale at the stated price had they known the truth.

Majority Reasoning

Justice Morse, writing for the majority, distinguished between mistakes that go to the substance or essence of the thing bargained for and mistakes that go merely to quality, value, or some collateral fact. If the cow had been sold as a breeding cow but turned out to be of slightly different quality, that would be a mistake in quality that would not justify rescission. But the difference between a barren cow (worth $80 as beef) and a breeding cow (worth $750-$1,000) was so fundamental that it constituted a difference in the very nature of the thing contracted for. The parties had contracted for one thing (a barren cow for slaughter) and the actual subject matter was something entirely different (a valuable breeding cow). The court reasoned that mutual assent requires agreement on the same subject matter, and when both parties are mistaken about what that subject matter actually is, there is no true agreement.

The Dissenting Opinion

Justice Sherwood (no relation to the plaintiff) dissented, arguing that the parties contracted for a specific, identified cow and that the mistake about her breeding capacity was a mistake about quality or value, not substance. The dissent maintained that the cow was the same animal regardless of whether she was pregnant, and that allowing rescission based on the seller's buyer's remorse after discovering the cow was more valuable than expected would undermine the certainty of contracts.

Key Quotes

A barren cow is substantially a different creature than a breeding one. There is as much difference between them for all purposes of use as there is between an ox and a cow that is capable of breeding and giving milk.
The mistake was not of the mere quality of the animal, but went to the very nature of the thing. A barren cow is substantially a different creature than a breeding one.
If there is a difference or misapprehension as to the substance of the thing bargained for, if the thing actually delivered or received is different in substance from the thing bargained for and intended to be sold, then there is no contract.

Impact and Legacy

Sherwood v. Walker became the leading American case on mutual mistake of fact and is included in nearly every Contracts casebook. The substance-versus-quality distinction, while criticized as difficult to apply, remains influential and has been incorporated into the Restatement (Second) of Contracts Section 152, which allows avoidance when both parties share a mistake about a basic assumption on which the contract was made that has a material effect on the agreed exchange. The case generated extensive academic debate about the line between mistake in substance and mistake in quality.

Exam Relevance

Sherwood v. Walker is a perennial exam favorite on the doctrine of mutual mistake. Professors test whether students can distinguish between mistakes going to the substance of the thing (which allow rescission) and mistakes going to quality or value (which do not). Exam questions often present factual scenarios requiring students to determine which side of the line a given mistake falls on, and to consider alternative analytical frameworks like the Restatement approach.

Study Tips

  • Understand the substance-versus-quality distinction: a mistake about what the thing fundamentally is allows rescission, while a mistake about an attribute or quality generally does not.
  • Compare with Lenawee County v. Messerly, which refined the mutual mistake doctrine by asking whether the risk of the mistake was allocated to one party.
  • Note the criticism: the distinction between substance and quality is inherently subjective, which is why the Restatement (Second) shifted to asking whether the mistake concerns a basic assumption with a material effect on the exchange.
  • Consider the dissent's argument as a possible exam question: the cow was the same physical cow regardless of pregnancy, so why should the seller be allowed to rescind simply because she discovered the cow was worth more?

Read the Full Case Analysis

View the complete brief for Sherwood v. Walker including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.

More Contracts Dissents

Jacob & Youngs, Inc. v. Kent

230 N.Y. 239, 129 N.E. 889 (1921) (1921)

Justice McLaughlin dissented, arguing that the builder contracted to use Reading pipe and failed to do so. He maintained that the express terms of the contract should be enforced as written, and the builder should not be excused from full performance simply because the deviation was unintentional. The dissent viewed the majority's approach as undermining the certainty of contractual obligations.

Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining Co.

382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962) (1962)

Justice Irwin dissented vigorously, arguing that the restoration promise was not incidental but was a central part of the bargain and a significant inducement for the Peevyhouses to lease their land. The dissent maintained that the mining company had received the full benefit of the lease and should not be permitted to escape its explicit obligations. Justice Irwin argued that applying the diminution-in-value measure effectively allowed the mining company to breach with impunity and denied the landowners the benefit of their bargain.

Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.

350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (1965)

Judge Danaher dissented, arguing that the court should not remake contracts for the parties and that the legislature, not the judiciary, was the proper body to address concerns about oppressive consumer contracts. He expressed concern that the majority's approach would create uncertainty in commercial transactions and undermine freedom of contract.

Lenawee County Board of Health v. Messerly

417 Mich. 17, 331 N.W.2d 203 (1982) (1982)

Justice Fitzgerald dissented, arguing that the 'as is' clause should not be read to cover a defect as fundamental as an illegally installed sewage system that rendered the entire property uninhabitable. He contended that the 'as is' clause was intended to cover minor defects visible upon inspection, not hidden violations that destroyed the essential purpose of the purchase.

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