Dissent in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College
600 U.S. 181 (2023) (2023) · Supreme Court of the United States
Students for Fair Admissions effectively ended race-conscious admissions in American higher education, holding that the admissions programs at Harvard and the University of North Carolina violated the Equal Protection Clause. The decision overruled the framework established in Grutter v. Bollinger and rejected the use of race as a factor in college admissions, fundamentally reshaping affirmative action law.
What was the dissent in Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College?
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented, arguing that the majority's decision rolled back decades of precedent and precedent of this Court that permitted race-conscious admissions to foster diversity and remedy past discrimination. Justice Jackson dissented as well, providing an extensive historical account of racial inequality and arguing that ignoring race in admissions will not eliminate racial inequality but will entrench it.
Case Overview
Facts
Students for Fair Admissions (SFFA), a nonprofit organization, challenged the admissions programs at Harvard College and the University of North Carolina, both of which considered race as a factor in holistic admissions review. SFFA argued that Harvard's program discriminated against Asian American applicants by assigning them lower personal ratings and that both programs used race in a manner that violated the Equal Protection Clause. Both universities defended their programs as consistent with Grutter's framework.
Majority Holding
The Court held 6-3 that both programs violated the Equal Protection Clause. Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion held that the programs lacked sufficiently focused and measurable objectives to warrant racial classifications, used race as a negative for some applicants, involved racial stereotyping, and lacked a meaningful endpoint. The Court did not formally overrule Grutter but held that the Harvard and UNC programs were inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause.
Majority Reasoning
Chief Justice Roberts held that the Equal Protection Clause applies without regard to race and that racial classifications must satisfy strict scrutiny. The Court found that the diversity interests asserted by the universities were not sufficiently coherent or measurable to be compelling interests amenable to judicial review. The programs effectively used race as a determinative factor for some applicants, treated applicants as members of racial groups rather than individuals, and operated as racial balancing. Roberts noted that applicants could still discuss how race affected their lives in personal essays, but race itself could not be used as a factor in admissions decisions.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Kagan, dissented, arguing that the majority's decision rolled back decades of precedent and precedent of this Court that permitted race-conscious admissions to foster diversity and remedy past discrimination. Justice Jackson dissented as well, providing an extensive historical account of racial inequality and arguing that ignoring race in admissions will not eliminate racial inequality but will entrench it.
Key Quotes
“Eliminating racial discrimination means eliminating all of it.”
“A student must be treated based on his or her experiences as an individual -- not on the basis of race.”
“The student must be treated based on his or her experiences as an individual -- not on the basis of race. Many universities have for too long done just the opposite.”
Impact and Legacy
The decision required universities nationwide to eliminate race as a factor in admissions, transforming higher education admissions practices across the country. It effectively ended the diversity rationale for affirmative action that had governed since Bakke. Universities have since explored race-neutral alternatives to maintain diverse student bodies, with varying degrees of success.
Exam Relevance
Students for Fair Admissions is now the capstone case for affirmative action analysis. Professors test students on the evolution from Bakke through Grutter to SFFA, asking them to evaluate the competing approaches to race-conscious admissions and the meaning of equal protection. Students should be prepared to analyze whether the personal essay carve-out is workable and meaningful.
Study Tips
- Trace the complete doctrinal arc: Bakke (no quotas, diversity is compelling), Grutter (diversity endorsed by majority), SFFA (race-conscious admissions impermissible).
- Understand the majority's critique of the diversity rationale as insufficiently measurable.
- Note the personal essay carve-out and its practical implications.
- Compare the majority's and dissents' competing visions of what equal protection requires in the context of historical racial discrimination.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President and Fellows of Harvard College including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
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