Dissent in Tennessee v. Garner
471 U.S. 1 (1985) (1985) · Supreme Court of the United States
This landmark case held that the Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of deadly force by police to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon unless the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. The decision effectively abolished the common law fleeing felon rule, which had permitted police to use deadly force against any fleeing felon. It fundamentally reshaped the law governing police use of force.
What was the dissent in Tennessee v. Garner?
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the majority's rule was unworkable and would endanger police officers by requiring them to make split-second judgments about a fleeing suspect's dangerousness. The dissent contended that the common law fleeing felon rule was a reasonable means of law enforcement that should not be displaced by the Court.
Case Overview
Facts
Memphis police officers responded to a burglary call. Officer Elton Hymon arrived and observed Edward Garner, an unarmed fifteen-year-old, fleeing the scene by climbing a backyard fence. Hymon was reasonably sure Garner was unarmed and saw no evidence of a weapon. Nevertheless, under Tennessee's fleeing felon statute, Hymon shot Garner in the back of the head to prevent his escape, killing him. Garner had stolen a purse containing ten dollars.
Majority Holding
The Court held that the use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a fleeing felon is constitutionally unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment unless the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or others. The Tennessee statute authorizing deadly force against any fleeing felon was unconstitutional.
Majority Reasoning
Justice White, writing for the majority, applied the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard to the use of deadly force, treating the shooting as a seizure of the person. The Court balanced the government's interest in effective law enforcement against the suspect's fundamental interest in his own life. The Court found that the common law fleeing felon rule had developed in an era when all felonies were punishable by death and most felons were dangerous, but that modern conditions were different: most felonies are nonviolent, and police have other means of apprehension. The Court held that while the government's interest in preventing escape is legitimate, it does not justify the use of deadly force unless the suspect poses a threat to the safety of the officer or the community. The officer's belief that the suspect was unarmed and non-dangerous made the use of deadly force unreasonable.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the majority's rule was unworkable and would endanger police officers by requiring them to make split-second judgments about a fleeing suspect's dangerousness. The dissent contended that the common law fleeing felon rule was a reasonable means of law enforcement that should not be displaced by the Court.
Key Quotes
“A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.”
“The use of deadly force to prevent the escape of all felony suspects, whatever the circumstances, is constitutionally unreasonable.”
“Where the suspect poses no immediate threat to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly force to do so.”
Impact and Legacy
Tennessee v. Garner is one of the most consequential criminal justice decisions of the twentieth century. It fundamentally changed police use-of-force policies nationwide, requiring departments to adopt restrictive deadly force policies. The case effectively ended the common law fleeing felon rule and established the framework that police use of deadly force is a Fourth Amendment seizure subject to reasonableness analysis. It has been cited in virtually every subsequent case involving police use of force, including Graham v. Connor.
Exam Relevance
Tennessee v. Garner is tested in both criminal law and constitutional law courses. In criminal law, it appears in questions about the use of deadly force, self-defense by law enforcement, and the limits of the fleeing felon rule. Students should be able to articulate the Court's balancing test and apply it to hypotheticals involving police use of force against suspects with varying levels of dangerousness.
Study Tips
- Remember the rule: deadly force against a fleeing felon is permitted only when the officer has probable cause to believe the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury.
- Understand the historical context: the common law fleeing felon rule developed when all felonies were capital offenses, making the use of deadly force proportionate to the punishment.
- Connect this case to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness framework and Graham v. Connor's objective reasonableness standard for police use of force.
- Be prepared to discuss the policy implications of restricting police use of deadly force, including officer safety, community trust, and racial disparities.
Read the Full Case Analysis
View the complete brief for Tennessee v. Garner including full reasoning, doctrine, and study resources.
More Criminal Law Dissents
Staples v. United States
511 U.S. 600 (1994) (1994)
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented, arguing that the statute was a public welfare offense and that the majority's approach would make prosecution of firearms offenses substantially more difficult. The dissenters contended that anyone possessing a dangerous weapon should be on notice that it may be subject to regulation, and that requiring proof of knowledge of the weapon's specific characteristics imposed an unwarranted burden on the government.
Commonwealth v. Carroll
194 A.2d 911 (Pa. 1963) (1963)
Justice Musmanno dissented, arguing that the majority's approach effectively eliminated the distinction between first-degree and second-degree murder by making premeditation meaningless. He contended that genuine premeditation requires some period of actual reflection and that an instantaneous killing in the heat of passion should be classified as second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter.
State v. Norman
378 S.E.2d 8 (N.C. 1989) (1989)
Justice Martin dissented, arguing that the majority applied an unrealistic standard to the circumstances of battered women. The dissent contended that traditional self-defense doctrine was developed with male confrontational violence in mind and that the imminence requirement should be adapted to account for the cyclical nature of domestic abuse. In the dissent's view, the evidence of battered spouse syndrome supported a reasonable belief that lethal harm was inevitable, making the threat effectively imminent even though the abuser was sleeping.
In re Winship
397 U.S. 358 (1970) (1970)
Chief Justice Burger dissented, arguing that the majority's holding was an unwarranted intrusion into state juvenile justice systems. He contended that the rehabilitative purpose of juvenile proceedings justified a lower standard of proof and that imposing criminal procedural requirements would transform juvenile courts into adversarial arenas, undermining their reformative mission.
Jackson v. Virginia
443 U.S. 307 (1979) (1979)
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment but expressed concern that the majority's standard might be too difficult for lower courts to apply consistently. He favored a clearer articulation of the standard that would give more guidance to reviewing courts.
Pinkerton v. United States
328 U.S. 640 (1946) (1946)
Justice Rutledge dissented, arguing that the majority's rule went too far in imposing liability without proof of personal participation or knowledge of the specific substantive acts. He contended that the conspiracy charge itself adequately punished the agreement and that adding liability for all substantive offenses was disproportionate and unfair.