Why does a normal IRAC brief fall apart in administrative law?
A 1L brief assumes one decisionmaker applying one body of law. An administrative law case has at least two: an agency that acted first, and a court reviewing that action second. If your brief says only "the Court held the rule was arbitrary and capricious," you have skipped the part your professor will test — what the agency actually did, what statute let it do that, and how much slack the court was required to give it.
The second problem is that the governing law is usually a statute, not a common law rule. Most of the doctrine sits in the Administrative Procedure Act: definitions in 5 U.S.C. § 551, rulemaking procedure in § 553, formal adjudication in §§ 554 and 556–557, the reviewability provisions in §§ 701–704, and the scope-of-review provisions in § 706. Your brief should name the subsection the court is applying. "Arbitrary and capricious" is § 706(2)(A); "in excess of statutory jurisdiction" is § 706(2)(C); "without observance of procedure required by law" is § 706(2)(D); "unsupported by substantial evidence" is § 706(2)(E) and applies only to formal proceedings and cases where an organic statute imports it.
What fields should the brief actually contain?
Use this skeleton for every case in the course. It should fit on one page, and the fields should stay in this order so you can compare cases across the semester.
The two fields students most often omit are "Agency action" and "Standard of review." Those are the fields that let you answer an exam question about a new agency, because the outcome usually follows from the characterization, not from the merits.
- Caption and citation, plus the reviewing court and year.
- Agency and organic statute — which agency acted, and which enabling act it invoked.
- Agency action — legislative rule, interpretive rule, policy statement, formal adjudication, informal adjudication, licensing, enforcement decision, or refusal to act.
- Agency procedure used — notice and comment, on-the-record hearing, no procedure at all — and whether anyone challenged its adequacy.
- Procedural history in two stages: what happened inside the agency, then the route to court (district court under § 703, or direct petition for review in a court of appeals under the organic statute).
- Reviewability: standing, final agency action, ripeness, exhaustion, statutory preclusion (§ 701(a)(1)), and commitment to agency discretion (§ 701(a)(2)).
- Issue(s), phrased as "whether the agency may/must ___ ," not "whether the plaintiff wins."
- Standard of review, with the APA subsection or constitutional test named.
- Holding and reasoning, including any deference framework applied.
- Remedy: affirmed, vacated, remanded, remanded without vacatur, or remanded for further explanation.
- Separate opinions and the doctrinal slot the case occupies in your outline.
How do you correctly characterize the agency action?
Start by asking whether the agency was making rules or deciding a case. Rulemaking under § 551(5) is agency process for formulating a rule of future effect; adjudication under § 551(7) produces an order resolving a particular party's rights. The distinction drives the required procedure, the constitutional due process baseline (compare Londoner-style individualized hearings with the Bi-Metallic principle that general policymaking needs none), and often the standard of review.
If it is a rule, classify it further. A legislative (substantive) rule has the force of law and generally requires notice and comment under § 553; interpretive rules and general statements of policy are exempt under § 553(b)(A), and Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n, 575 U.S. 92 (2015), holds that an agency may amend an interpretive rule without notice and comment. Note in your brief which label the agency claimed and which the court applied — that fight is the case in Perez, and in most § 553 problems.
If it is an adjudication, ask whether the organic statute requires a hearing "on the record," which triggers formal procedure under §§ 554 and 556–557 and, with it, substantial evidence review under § 706(2)(E) as construed in Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). Informal adjudication gets § 706(2)(A) review on the administrative record, as in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). Also record whether the court refused to impose procedures beyond the APA's floor — that is the holding of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978), and it is a frequent exam trap.
What belongs in the reviewability line?
Many administrative law cases never reach the merits, and briefing the threshold holding separately keeps you from mislabeling a jurisdictional case as a substantive one. Run the checklist in order and write one clause for each element the court actually discussed.
Finality is the most heavily tested. Under Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997), agency action is final if it marks the consummation of the agency's decisionmaking and determines rights or obligations or has legal consequences. Ripeness for pre-enforcement challenges to rules runs through Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967), which asks whether the issue is fit for review and whether withholding review causes hardship. Section 701(a)(2) removes action "committed to agency discretion by law"; Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), applies that to an agency's refusal to bring an enforcement action, with a presumption of unreviewability that can be rebutted by statutory guidelines. Standing follows ordinary Article III doctrine, but note whether the plaintiff also had to satisfy a statutory review provision or zone-of-interests test.
How do you brief the standard of review after Loper Bright?
Separate three distinct questions and give each its own line. First, questions of statutory meaning: Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024) overruled Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and directs courts to exercise independent judgment about what a statute means, while giving weight to an agency's reasoning under Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), and respecting statutes that expressly delegate discretionary authority within statutory limits. When you brief a pre-2024 Chevron case, write the Chevron analysis as the court gave it, then add a one-line note on whether the reasoning survives — Loper Bright expressly left prior Chevron-based judgments undisturbed as a matter of stare decisis, so the outcomes stand even though the framework does not. Keep United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001), in your notes as the case that limited Chevron to formats carrying force of law.
Second, an agency's reading of its own regulation: that is Auer/Seminole Rock deference, cabined by Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), which requires genuine ambiguity after exhausting the tools of construction, a reasonable reading, and an official, expertise-based, non-surprise interpretation. Kisor was not overruled by Loper Bright; say so in the margin of your Loper Bright brief.
Third, discretionary policy choices: arbitrary and capricious review under § 706(2)(A) and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). Brief State Balm's four failure modes — reliance on impermissible factors, failure to consider an important aspect of the problem, an explanation counter to the evidence, or implausibility — because they function as a checklist on exams. For policy reversals, add FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502 (2009): the agency need not show the new policy is better, but must acknowledge the change and address serious reliance interests.
Why does the remedy line matter more here than in other courses?
Administrative law remedies are unusually specific, and the difference between outcomes is often the tested point. Under SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943), a court may uphold agency action only on the grounds the agency itself invoked, so a defective explanation produces a remand rather than affirmance on a better rationale supplied by counsel. Write in your brief whether the court remanded for a fuller explanation, vacated the action outright under § 706(2), or remanded without vacatur, and whether the agency remains free to reach the same result on better reasoning. Chenery II, 332 U.S. 194 (1947), then confirms the agency's discretion to announce new policy through adjudication rather than rulemaking.
Note separation-of-powers holdings separately from APA holdings. Cases about removal protection, adjudicator appointment, agency funding, or jury rights resolve constitutional questions and do not turn on § 706 at all; keep them in a distinct section of your outline so you do not import an arbitrary-and-capricious analysis into a removal problem.
How do you cite the agency materials in the brief?
Bluebook Rule 14 governs administrative and executive materials. Cite a codified regulation by title, part or section, and year: 40 C.F.R. § 60.1 (2024). Cite a rule in the Federal Register by volume, page, and exact date, with a parenthetical noting future codification: 89 Fed. Reg. 1,234 (Jan. 5, 2024) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). Cite the APA by U.S. Code section, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), not by public law number.
Agency adjudications are cited like cases, using the agency reporter where one exists and the agency's name in the court-and-date parenthetical. Formats vary by agency, so check Table T1.2 for the reporter abbreviation rather than guessing. For a case brief you write for yourself, a short form is fine; use full form when the citation goes into a memo, a seminar paper, or a moot court brief.