Model Rule 3.2: Expediting Litigation

When it applies

This comes up whenever a lawyer requests continuances, delays discovery, or otherwise slows a case down. The MPRE tests whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would see the course of action as having a substantial purpose other than delay, or whether it is purely tactical stalling. It's frequently paired with questions about zealous advocacy under Rule 1.3 to test where diligence ends and improper delay begins.

What the rule requires

• Lawyer "shall" make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the client's interests.
• The touchstone is objective: whether a competent lawyer acting in good faith would regard the course of action as having some substantial purpose other than delay. Delay aimed at harassing the other side, frustrating its effort to obtain rightful redress or repose, or reaping a financial or other benefit from the delay itself is improper.
• Legitimate reasons for delay (e.g., needing more time to prepare, or a genuine client interest in postponement that serves a substantial purpose other than delay itself) are permitted.
• The rule applies regardless of whether delay would benefit the lawyer's own client, if the primary purpose is improper.
• A lawyer does not violate the rule simply by pursuing reasonable procedural or substantive positions that happen to slow the case.

Exceptions

• Delay is permissible if there is a legitimate, non-tactical reason tied to the client's actual interests (e.g., health issues, need for additional preparation, settlement negotiations in good faith).
• Reasonable requests for extensions or continuances made for genuine scheduling conflicts are not violations.

How the MPRE tests Model Rule 3.2

• Students often confuse this with Rule 1.3 (diligence); 3.2 is about not causing unnecessary delay, while 1.3 is about not being too slow to act for the client.
• MPRE questions test purpose: a delay tactic is fine if a competent, good-faith lawyer would see a substantial purpose other than delay, but improper if it lacks such a purpose (e.g., it is meant to frustrate or exhaust the opposing party). A tactic need not be motivated 'solely' by an improper aim to violate the rule.
• Students forget that even if delay benefits the client, it can still violate 3.2. Realizing a financial or other benefit from otherwise improper delay is not a legitimate client interest.
• Confusing zealous advocacy with a license for unlimited procedural maneuvering; the rule caps advocacy at reasonable efforts, not maximal obstruction.