Property Practice Exams

The central issue is whether Oscar has satisfied the elements of adverse possession to acquire title to the fifteen-foot strip of Nora's land. Under the common law, a claimant must demonstrate possession that is (1) actual, (2) exclusive, (3) open and notorious, (4) hostile and under a claim of right, and (5) continuous for the statutory period. See Gurwit v. Kannatzer (holding that all elements must be proven by clear and convincing evidence). In Franklin, the statutory period is ten years. Regarding actual and exclusive possession, Oscar physically occupied the strip by building a fence, planting a garden, mowing the grass, and erecting a toolshed. These activities constitute the kind of dominion and control that a typical owner would exercise over similar land. See Marengo Cave Co. v. Ross (actual possession requires use consistent with the nature of the property). No one else, including Nora, used the strip during the relevant period. Oscar's possession was therefore actual and exclusive. The open and notorious element requires that possession be visible enough to put a reasonable owner on notice. Oscar's fence, garden, and toolshed were plainly visible. Indeed, Nora herself observed the fence when she purchased her property in 2010. Under the standard articulated in Mannillo v. Gorski, where an encroachment is of a sufficiently large scale, the open and notorious requirement is satisfied because a reasonable owner inspecting the property would discover the encroachment. A fifteen-foot strip with a fence, garden, and shed easily meets this threshold. Hostility and claim of right present the most contested issue. Courts apply different standards for hostility. Under the objective standard followed in most jurisdictions, the possessor's subjective intent is irrelevant; what matters is that the possession was without the true owner's permission. See Chaplin v. Sanders (rejecting the requirement of intentional dispossession). Under this standard, Oscar's possession was hostile because he occupied the strip without Nora's or her predecessor's consent, regardless of his mistaken belief about the boundary. However, under the minority "intentional trespass" standard of Maine v. Tiffany, Oscar's honest mistake about the boundary would defeat hostility. If Franklin follows the majority objective approach, Oscar satisfies this element. If Franklin follows the good-faith or intentional-dispossession standard, the analysis changes, but the modern trend strongly favors the objective test. Continuity requires uninterrupted possession for the full statutory period. Oscar built the fence in 2006 and maintained the strip continuously through 2018, well exceeding the ten-year period. Nora might argue that the statutory period should restart when she purchased the property in 2010, but this argument fails. Under the doctrine of tacking in reverse, a new owner of the servient estate steps into the shoes of the prior owner for purposes of the running of the limitations period. See Howard v. Kunto. The clock began running in 2006 against Nora's predecessor and continued running against Nora after 2010. By 2016, Oscar had possessed the strip for ten continuous years. Nora may argue that Oscar's failure to pay taxes on the disputed strip undermines his claim. While Franklin does not require tax payment, courts treat it as a relevant factor. Oscar's failure to pay taxes on the strip weakens his claim somewhat, but it is not dispositive. Courts have consistently held that tax payment is merely evidence of a claim of right, not an independent element. See Nome 2000 v. Fagerstrom. Oscar's estoppel argument is unlikely to succeed. Equitable estoppel requires (1) a representation or concealment of material facts, (2) made with knowledge or imputed knowledge, (3) to a party ignorant of the facts, (4) with the intention that the other party act upon it, and (5) the other party's detrimental reliance. Nora made no affirmative representation; her silence and failure to investigate the boundary do not constitute the kind of active deception required for estoppel. Moreover, Oscar cannot show detrimental reliance because he built the fence before Nora even purchased her property. In conclusion, Oscar likely prevails on his adverse possession claim. He satisfies all five elements under the majority objective standard for hostility. His possession was actual, exclusive, open and notorious, hostile, and continuous for well over ten years. The failure to pay taxes on the strip is a negative factor but not fatal. Nora's claim to the strip is time-barred. Oscar's estoppel argument, while creative, adds nothing because adverse possession alone gives him title.

The first issue is the classification of the estates created by Greta's conveyance: "To David for life, then to David's children who survive him." David receives a life estate. The future interest in David's children who survive him is a contingent remainder in fee simple absolute. It is contingent because the remaindermen are not yet ascertainable at the time of conveyance (David had no children in 2010) and because the remainder is subject to a condition of survival — only those children who survive David will take. See Restatement (First) of Property, describing contingent remainders as those subject to a condition precedent other than the natural termination of the prior estate. Since Greta conveyed all interests and retained nothing, there is a reversion in Greta (or her heirs) that operates as a default if David dies with no surviving children. This reversion exists because the contingent remainder might not vest — if all of David's children predecease him, the property reverts to Greta's estate. Now that Fiona and Henry have been born, they are identifiable potential remaindermen, but their interests remain contingent on the condition of surviving David. This is not merely a vested remainder subject to divestment; the survivorship language ("who survive him") is a condition precedent to taking, making the remainder contingent under the traditional classification. See In re Estate of Houston (survivorship language creates a condition precedent, not a condition subsequent). Additionally, more children could be born to David, expanding the class. Turning to the contract dispute between David and Buyer, the doctrine of marketable title controls. Every contract for the sale of land contains an implied covenant of marketable title unless the contract provides otherwise. See Lohmeyer v. Bower. Marketable title is title free from reasonable doubt — title that a reasonably prudent buyer would accept. David holds only a life estate, which is inherently unmarketable as fee simple because it terminates at David's death. The contingent remainder in David's unascertained children (the class may grow) and the reversion in Greta's heirs further cloud title. No buyer could receive fee simple absolute from David alone. David cannot compel specific performance because he cannot convey what he promised. The remedy of specific performance requires that the seller be able to tender the title contracted for. See King v. Trudell. David represented he could convey clear title, which he cannot. Even if David attempted to join Fiona, Henry, and a guardian ad litem, the contingent remainder cannot be fully conveyed because unborn future children of David might also hold interests in the class. The class of David's children who survive him remains open during David's lifetime under the rule of convenience, but the rule of convenience does not close the class early when there is no distribution event during the life tenant's life. Buyer's counterclaim for rescission and return of the earnest money deposit should succeed. Buyer is entitled to rescission because David cannot perform the essential term of the contract — delivery of marketable title. Ellen's rights also affect marketable title. If the jurisdiction recognizes dower, curtesy, or a statutory spousal share in the life estate, Ellen's failure to sign the deed would further encumber the title. Even in jurisdictions that have abolished dower, a homestead exemption may apply because Ellen has been residing in the cottage. Buyer is justified in refusing to accept title burdened by a potential spousal claim. Regarding MegaBank's judgment lien, MegaBank can attach a lien to David's life estate because a life estate is an alienable, presently possessory interest. A judgment creditor can execute on any interest the debtor actually holds. However, MegaBank's argument that the children's contingent remainder can be eliminated through the execution sale is incorrect. A contingent remainder, though not yet vested, is a recognized property interest that cannot be destroyed by the life tenant's creditors. Under the modern rule, contingent remainders are indestructible — they cannot be defeated by forfeiture, merger, or the acts of the life tenant. See Abo Petroleum Corp. v. Amstutz. The buyer at the execution sale would acquire only David's life estate, measured by David's life. Upon David's death, the remainder would pass to David's surviving children, free of MegaBank's lien. MegaBank might argue under the older common law rule that contingent remainders are destructible, meaning that if the supporting life estate is terminated prematurely, the contingent remainder is destroyed. However, the vast majority of American jurisdictions have abolished the destructibility of contingent remainders by statute or judicial decision. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Wills and Other Donative Transfers. Under modern law, even if the life estate is sold or terminated, the contingent remainder is preserved, typically converting into an executory interest or springing future interest. Therefore, MegaBank's execution sale purchaser takes only a life estate pur autre vie — an estate measured by David's life. In conclusion, Greta's conveyance created a life estate in David, a contingent remainder in David's surviving children, and a reversion in Greta's heirs. David cannot convey marketable title, so Buyer is entitled to rescission and return of his deposit. MegaBank may execute on David's life estate, but the children's contingent remainder survives the sale intact under the modern rule of indestructibility.

Philip's strongest theory is an easement implied from prior existing use (quasi-easement). When a common owner severs a tract into two parcels, an easement may be implied if, at the time of severance: (1) the parcels were under common ownership, (2) the use was in existence at the time of the severance and was apparent and continuous, and (3) the easement is reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of the dominant parcel. See Van Sandt v. Royster. Here, the severance occurred in 2000 when Margaret sold Lot B to Thomas. At that time, Margaret had been using the driveway across what became Lot B to access Lot A for five years. The driveway was a visible, physical improvement — a gravel road — making the use apparent. It was continuous, having been used regularly since 1995. The critical question is reasonable necessity. Lot A had no other access to a public road, which strongly supports reasonable necessity; indeed, this level of necessity likely rises to strict necessity. Courts distinguish between easements implied in favor of the grantor (Margaret retained Lot A) and those implied in favor of the grantee. When the grantor retains the dominant parcel, courts traditionally require a higher degree of necessity — often strict necessity — because the grantor could have expressly reserved an easement and failed to do so. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes. However, even under this stricter standard, the total lack of alternative access satisfies the requirement. The implied easement therefore arose in 2000 and burdened Lot B in favor of Lot A. Philip's easement by necessity theory overlaps substantially with the implied easement analysis but is doctrinally distinct. An easement by necessity requires: (1) common ownership of the dominant and servient parcels, (2) severance of the common ownership, and (3) strict necessity for access at the time of severance — meaning the dominant parcel is landlocked. See Othen v. Rosier. Because Lot A had no other access to a public road when Margaret sold Lot B in 2000, the strict necessity requirement is satisfied. An easement by necessity arises by operation of law at the moment of severance, regardless of whether the parties discussed or contemplated it. This theory succeeds independently of the implied easement theory and does not depend on the prior use of the driveway — the landlocked nature of Lot A alone generates the right. The easement by necessity is appurtenant to Lot A and runs with the land to Philip as a subsequent purchaser. Philip's prescriptive easement theory is his fallback. Prescriptive easement requires use that is (1) open and notorious, (2) adverse and under a claim of right, (3) continuous and uninterrupted, and (4) for the statutory period. The jurisdiction requires fifteen years. Margaret used the driveway from 1995 to 2010, and Philip used it from 2010 to 2020. Philip would need to tack Margaret's use to his own. Tacking is generally permitted when there is privity of estate between successive users, which exists here because Margaret conveyed Lot A to Philip. See Howard v. Kunto. Combined use is twenty-five years, exceeding the fifteen-year period. However, the prescriptive easement theory faces a significant obstacle: if an implied easement or easement by necessity already existed from the 2000 severance, then Philip's (and Margaret's) use of the driveway was not adverse — it was permissive under the existing easement. Adverse use requires use without the servient owner's permission and without legal right. Because the implied easement likely existed from 2000, use after that date was rightful, not hostile. If the court rejects the implied easement and easement by necessity theories, then prescriptive use from 2000 onward could be characterized as adverse, and fifteen years of adverse use (2000 to 2015) would establish the prescriptive easement. The analysis depends on which theory the court adopts first. Wanda's bona fide purchaser defense requires analysis under the race-notice recording statute. Under a race-notice statute, a subsequent purchaser takes free of a prior unrecorded interest only if the purchaser (1) gave value, (2) lacked actual or constructive notice of the prior interest, and (3) recorded first. Wanda claims she had no knowledge of any easement and that her title insurance policy shows no recorded easement. However, the BFP defense may fail on the notice element. Constructive notice includes both record notice and inquiry notice. Inquiry notice arises when a purchaser observes facts — or should observe facts upon reasonable inspection — that would prompt a reasonable person to investigate further. See Waldorff Insurance & Bonding, Inc. v. Eglin National Bank. A visible gravel driveway crossing Lot B is precisely the kind of physical condition that should trigger inquiry. Wanda inspected Lot B before purchasing it (she immediately paved the driveway, indicating she knew it was there). A reasonable purchaser who sees an established driveway crossing the property leading to the adjacent parcel should inquire about whether the neighbor has an access right. Wanda's failure to investigate does not negate inquiry notice. If the court finds Wanda had inquiry notice, she is not a BFP and takes subject to the easement. Wanda's extinguishment argument — that the easement was destroyed when Margaret sold Lot B without reserving an easement — misunderstands the doctrine. An easement implied from prior existing use or by necessity arises by operation of law at the time of severance, regardless of whether the deed mentions it. The failure to include an express reservation does not extinguish what the law implies. If anything, the silence in the deed is what creates the implication. Wanda's argument would render the entire doctrine of implied easements meaningless. The easement was not destroyed; it was created in 2000 and has burdened Lot B continuously since. Regarding remedies, if Philip establishes an easement under any theory, he is entitled to a declaratory judgment confirming the easement and an injunction requiring Wanda to remove the gate and restore access. Injunctive relief is appropriate because the easement is a property right, and Wanda's obstruction constitutes a continuing interference that cannot be adequately remedied by damages. Wanda's trespass counterclaim fails because Philip's use of the driveway is privileged under the easement. In conclusion, Philip should prevail. Both the easement implied from prior existing use and the easement by necessity provide strong bases for relief. Wanda's BFP defense likely fails due to inquiry notice from the visible driveway. The court should declare the easement valid, order removal of the gate, and deny Wanda's trespass claim.

The threshold issue is whether the CC&Rs are enforceable as real covenants running with the land or as equitable servitudes. For a real covenant to run with the land, the traditional requirements are: (1) intent that the covenant run, (2) touch and concern the land, (3) horizontal and vertical privity, and (4) notice. For enforcement in equity as a servitude, the requirements are relaxed — horizontal privity is not required, and the covenant must merely touch and concern the land, be intended to run, and the burdened party must have notice. See Tulk v. Moxhay; Neponsit Property Owners' Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank. Here, the CC&Rs expressly state they shall "run with the land and bind all successors and assigns." Intent is clear. Each deed referenced the CC&Rs, providing actual notice, and the CC&Rs were recorded, providing constructive notice. Both Kwan and Webb had actual knowledge. Horizontal privity exists between Coventry and the original purchasers (grantor-grantee relationship). Vertical privity exists through the chain of title to Kwan and Webb. The covenants therefore satisfy the requirements for both real covenants and equitable servitudes. The touch and concern requirement is challenged by Webb with respect to the height restriction. The traditional test asks whether the covenant makes the land more useful or valuable to the benefited party and imposes a burden relating to the use and enjoyment of the burdened party. See Neponsit. A height restriction plainly touches and concerns the land — it directly restricts how the burdened lot may be physically developed and benefits neighboring lots by preserving light, air, views, and aesthetic uniformity. This is a paradigmatic restrictive covenant that touches and concerns. The Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes has moved away from the touch and concern requirement, replacing it with a general reasonableness inquiry, but even under that framework, height restrictions in residential subdivisions are routinely upheld as reasonable. Webb's argument fails under either approach. Webb's argument that the height restriction is an unreasonable restraint on use also fails. Restrictive covenants in a common development scheme are presumed reasonable because they reflect a reciprocal set of benefits and burdens that all lot owners accepted when purchasing. See Rick v. West. A two-story height limit is a common and moderate restriction. The fact that properties outside the subdivision have no height restrictions is irrelevant to the internal reasonableness of the covenant — the covenant governs relations among subdivision lot owners, not relations between the subdivision and the outside world. Webb purchased with knowledge of the restriction and presumably paid a price reflecting the restricted use. He cannot now claim unreasonableness. Turning to Kwan's defenses, the abandonment argument is the most substantial. Abandonment of a restrictive covenant requires evidence that the violations are so pervasive and widespread as to indicate that the benefited parties have abandoned the restriction's purpose. See Fink v. Miller. The evidence here is mixed. Twenty of 150 lots (approximately 13%) now operate as short-term rentals. Courts have reached different outcomes depending on the scale of violations. In some cases, violations by a significant minority have been held sufficient to establish abandonment; in others, courts have required violations by a majority of lot owners. See Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski (refusing to find abandonment where 4% of lots violated covenants). At 13%, the violation rate is meaningful but probably insufficient to establish abandonment of the entire residential-use restriction. However, Kwan has a stronger argument for selective enforcement or waiver — the HOA has never taken formal action against the short-term rental operators, which suggests acquiescence in commercial use of residential lots. The selective enforcement defense, sometimes called the unclean hands or waiver defense, holds that an HOA cannot enforce a covenant selectively in a discriminatory manner. If the HOA has knowingly permitted twenty lots to operate as short-term rentals — which arguably constitute commercial activity — it may be estopped from enforcing the commercial activity prohibition against Kwan alone. See Streams Sports Club, Ltd. v. Richmond. However, this defense has limits. Courts distinguish between violations of the same restriction and violations of different restrictions. Kwan's medical clinic is a more intensive commercial use than a vacation rental — she has constructed a physical addition and sees patients in a professional capacity. The HOA could argue that it reasonably prioritized enforcement against the most significant violations. Additionally, the HOA's failure to act against rentals might reflect an interpretation that short-term rentals are a residential use, not a waiver of the commercial-use prohibition. The strength of Kwan's selective enforcement argument depends on how the court characterizes short-term rentals — as commercial or residential. Kwan's changed conditions defense argues that the surrounding neighborhood has changed so fundamentally that the covenant's purpose can no longer be achieved. The doctrine of changed conditions permits courts to refuse enforcement of a covenant when changes in the surrounding area have made it impossible to achieve the covenant's purpose, rendering enforcement inequitable. See Bolotin v. Rindge Heights Improvement Association. The critical question is whether the relevant "neighborhood" is the subdivision itself or the broader surrounding area. Courts consistently hold that changes outside the subdivision's boundaries generally do not defeat enforcement of internal covenants. See Western Land Co. v. Truskolaski (changes in surrounding area do not justify non-enforcement where subdivision itself remains residential). Here, Coventry Heights itself remains predominantly residential — at least 130 of 150 lots are still used as single-family residences. The expansion of the university and the commercial corridor are external changes. While they have increased property values and made commercial use more attractive, they have not destroyed the residential character of the subdivision. Kwan's changed conditions defense is weak. Kwan's public policy argument — that enforcing the covenant against a medical clinic is contrary to public policy — is creative but unlikely to succeed. Courts have occasionally declined to enforce covenants that conflict with strong public policies, such as covenants prohibiting group homes for the disabled (under the Fair Housing Act) or covenants restricting solar panels (under state renewable energy statutes). See Hill v. Community of Damien of Molokai. However, there is no analogous statute or constitutional provision requiring that medical clinics be permitted in residential subdivisions. The public benefit of medical care does not override the private contractual rights of lot owners in a common scheme. Kwan chose to purchase in a restricted subdivision; she could have located her clinic elsewhere. Regarding remedies, the HOA seeks injunctive relief. Courts traditionally grant injunctions to enforce restrictive covenants because each violation represents a continuing harm that cannot be adequately remedied by damages. See Tulk v. Moxhay. However, the court has discretion. Against Webb, an injunction requiring compliance with the two-story limit is straightforward — he should be required to modify his construction to conform. Against Kwan, the court may consider the equitable factors more carefully, particularly the HOA's failure to enforce against short-term rentals. The court might condition enforcement against Kwan on the HOA's commitment to enforce uniformly, or it might award damages in lieu of an injunction if requiring Kwan to close her clinic would be disproportionately harsh given the HOA's selective enforcement. In conclusion, the CC&Rs are enforceable against both Kwan and Webb as equitable servitudes running with the land. Webb's defenses all fail — the height restriction touches and concerns the land, is reasonable, and remains viable. Kwan has a more colorable defense based on the HOA's selective enforcement, but the abandonment and changed conditions arguments are likely insufficient. The court will probably enforce the covenants but may temper the remedy against Kwan in light of the HOA's inconsistent enforcement posture, potentially ordering damages rather than an injunction or conditioning relief on uniform enforcement going forward.

The foundational issue is whether Alice's January 2015 deed to Brenda was effectively delivered. Delivery is an essential element of a valid conveyance. It requires the grantor's intent that the deed have present operative effect — that is, an intent to presently transfer title. See Sweeney v. Sweeney. Physical transfer of the deed creates a presumption of delivery, but this presumption can be rebutted by evidence that the grantor lacked the requisite intent. Here, Alice executed and recorded the deed but did so under the mistaken belief that it would take effect only upon her death. This is precisely the kind of conditional or testamentary intent that courts scrutinize. Under the general rule, a deed intended to operate only at death is void for lack of delivery because the grantor lacks present donative intent. See Rosengrant v. Rosengrant (holding that a deed placed in escrow with instructions to deliver at death was not effectively delivered). However, the analysis is complicated by the fact that the deed was not merely executed but actually recorded. Recording creates a strong presumption of delivery. See Restatement (Third) of Property: Donative Transfers. Courts have held that once a deed is recorded, the burden shifts to the party challenging delivery to prove by clear and convincing evidence that delivery was not intended. Alice's continued possession of Greenacre supports the argument against delivery — a grantor who remains in exclusive possession may not have intended to part with ownership. But Alice's subjective mistake about the legal effect of the deed cuts the other way: she voluntarily executed and recorded the deed, even if she misunderstood the consequences. The majority of courts hold that a grantor's misunderstanding of the legal effect of a deed does not negate delivery if the grantor voluntarily performed the physical acts of execution and recordation. The grantor's intent is judged by objective manifestations, not by subjective, uncommunicated beliefs. See Havens v. Schoen. Balancing these factors, the deed to Brenda was likely effectively delivered. Alice voluntarily signed the deed, had it recorded, and took no steps to revoke it. Her continued possession is a negative factor, but it is consistent with a life estate arrangement or a family understanding. The recording of the deed is powerful objective evidence of present intent. A court applying the clear and convincing standard would likely find that Charles (who bears the burden of challenging delivery) cannot overcome the presumption arising from recording. Therefore, title passed to Brenda in January 2015. If the deed to Brenda was valid, then Alice had nothing to convey when she executed the quitclaim deed to Charles in March 2016. A quitclaim deed conveys only whatever interest the grantor holds at the time of conveyance. See Brown v. Gobble. Because Alice held no interest in Greenacre in March 2016, the quitclaim deed to Charles conveyed nothing. Moreover, the doctrine of estoppel by deed does not apply to quitclaim deeds in most jurisdictions — only to warranty deeds. Even if Alice later acquired an interest (she did not), the quitclaim deed would not automatically convey it to Charles. Charles's potential protection under the recording act must be analyzed. Under the race-notice statute, a subsequent purchaser for value without notice who records first takes priority over a prior unrecorded conveyance. The statute provides: "No conveyance shall be valid against any subsequent purchaser for value without notice whose conveyance is first recorded." Charles fails on two grounds. First, Charles was not a purchaser for value — the conveyance to him was a gift. Donees are not protected under recording statutes because they do not give value. See Mugaas v. Smith. Second, even if Charles could be characterized as a purchaser, he had actual notice of the Brenda deed. He admitted that he knew about the earlier deed to Brenda but believed it was "just a formality." Actual knowledge of a prior conveyance, even if the purchaser believes it is ineffective, constitutes notice under the recording act. Charles therefore takes nothing under the recording statute. First National Bank's mortgage presents a more difficult question. First National is a subsequent encumbrancer for value — it lent $200,000 in exchange for the mortgage. The question is whether First National had notice of Brenda's prior interest. Brenda's deed was recorded in January 2015, before First National's 2017 mortgage. A proper title search would have revealed Brenda's recorded deed. Therefore, First National had constructive notice (record notice) of Brenda's interest. The fact that First National actually discovered the Brenda deed during its title search confirms that it had actual notice as well. First National cannot qualify as a BFP without notice because it knew of the competing claim. It chose to proceed despite the risk, relying on a title insurance policy rather than on clean title. First National's mortgage is therefore junior to Brenda's title and, because Charles had no interest to mortgage, the mortgage attached to nothing. First National's remedy lies against Charles personally on the note and potentially against the title insurance company under the policy. The shelter rule does not help First National or the Land Trust. The shelter rule provides that a person who takes from a BFP is protected even if they would not independently qualify as a BFP. See Johnson v. Davis. However, Charles was not a BFP — he was a donee with actual notice. Because Charles was not protected under the recording act, no one claiming through Charles can invoke the shelter rule. The Greendale Land Trust's conservation easement follows the same analysis. The Land Trust paid $50,000 for the easement, making it a purchaser for value. However, the Land Trust had constructive notice of Brenda's recorded deed. A proper title search of Greenacre would have revealed the 2015 deed to Brenda. The Land Trust, like First National, took its interest from Charles, who had no title to convey. The conservation easement is therefore invalid as against Brenda. The Land Trust may have a claim against Charles for restitution of the $50,000 paid. Alice's intestate death in 2020 does not alter the analysis. If the deed to Brenda was valid, Alice had no interest in Greenacre at her death, and there is nothing for her heirs to inherit. If, contrary to the analysis above, the deed to Brenda were held invalid for lack of delivery, then Alice would have remained the owner until her death, and Greenacre would pass by intestate succession to Brenda and Charles as her sole heirs in equal shares. In that alternative scenario, the quitclaim deed to Charles would still not convey full title because Alice's post-death interest would pass to both heirs. Charles's inherited half-interest would be subject to First National's mortgage (which would attach to Charles's interest by estoppel or after-acquired title), but Brenda's inherited half-interest would be unencumbered. However, this alternative scenario is unlikely to arise given the strong presumption of delivery from recording. There is one final wrinkle regarding Alice's warranty deed to Brenda and Alice's subsequent conveyance to Charles. Because Alice gave Brenda a general warranty deed, Alice warranted that she had good title and the right to convey, and covenanted against encumbrances and against anyone claiming superior title. When Alice subsequently conveyed to Charles, she breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment (a future covenant that runs with the land). If Charles or anyone claiming through Charles were to assert a claim against Brenda's title, Brenda would have a cause of action against Alice's estate for breach of warranty. However, since Alice's estate has no significant assets, this remedy has little practical value. In conclusion, Brenda holds fee simple title to Greenacre. The deed to Brenda was effectively delivered when it was executed and recorded in January 2015, despite Alice's mistaken belief about its legal effect. Charles received nothing by the quitclaim deed because Alice had no interest to convey, and Charles is not protected by the recording act because he was a donee with actual notice. First National's mortgage and the Land Trust's conservation easement are both invalid as against Brenda because both parties had constructive notice of Brenda's recorded deed and neither can invoke the shelter rule through Charles. Brenda's title is free and clear of all encumbrances. First National and the Land Trust have personal claims against Charles but no interest in Greenacre.