Summary
Section 8A defines intent for purposes of intentional torts. An actor intends the consequences of conduct if the actor desires those consequences or believes that those consequences are substantially certain to result from the conduct. This dual definition—desire or substantial certainty—is the foundation of all intentional tort analysis.
The substantial certainty prong is particularly important because it extends liability beyond cases of deliberate harm to situations where the actor knows to a substantial certainty that the harmful consequences will follow, even if those consequences are not desired. This captures cases where the actor acts with knowledge of near-inevitable harm.
Section 8A applies across all intentional torts—battery, assault, false imprisonment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, trespass, and conversion. Understanding its two prongs is essential to analyzing any intentional tort claim.
Key Elements
- 1Intent exists when the actor desires the consequences
- 2Intent also exists when consequences are substantially certain to result
- 3Applies to all intentional torts
- 4Subjective standard—what the actor actually believed
- 5Distinguished from negligence (which requires only unreasonable risk) and strict liability (no intent required)
Practical Application
Courts apply § 8A when determining whether a defendant acted with the requisite intent for an intentional tort. The substantial certainty prong is frequently invoked in workplace injury cases (where an employer knowingly exposes workers to certain harm) and environmental contamination cases (where a polluter knows its conduct will cause harm to neighbors).
Exam Relevance
Intent under § 8A is tested early in most torts courses. The classic exam trap is distinguishing between desire and substantial certainty. If a defendant throws a bomb into a crowd to kill one person, the defendant intends a battery against everyone injured because harm to bystanders is substantially certain. Also watch for transferred intent issues, which build on § 8A.