Employment Discrimination
491 U.S. 164 (1989)
Study notes for Patterson v. McLean Credit Union: professor notes, cold call prep, exam angles, and memory aids.
Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 does not cover claims of racial harassment or discrimination occurring after the formation of an employment contract.
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Supreme Court addressed the scope of Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, focusing on whether it applies to racial harassment and discrimination occurring post-contract formation in the employment context. The Court held that Section 1981 is limited to actions regarding the creation and enforcement of contracts and does not extend to the incidents that occur after the initial contract has been established. This ruling delineates the boundaries of protections against racial discrimination in employment, raising critical implications for statutory interpretation and employee protections under civil rights law.
Professors may emphasize the importance of this decision regarding the origins and intended scope of Section 1981, prompting discussions on the limits of lawful protections against discrimination and harassment in the workplace. The implications of this case may also lead to discussions on the necessity for legislative reform to address gaps in protections against racial discrimination in employment that arise outside the initiation and enforcement of contracts.
Contract Comes First (CCF) – Section 1981 applies only to contract formation and enforcement, not post-formation conduct.
| Case | Distinction |
|---|---|
| Faragher v. City of Boca Raton | Faragher allows for claims of hostile work environment under Title VII which is broader than the limited scope of Section 1981. |
| Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson | Meritor focused on sexual harassment and recognized broader protections under Title VII, contrasting with the limitations imposed by Patterson. |
Restricting Section 1981 to contract-related issues promotes clarity in the law and encourages Congress to create targeted statutes addressing workplace harassment separately.
Limiting protections against racial harassment undermines civil rights and allows employers to perpetuate discriminatory behaviors without accountability.
This case is often tested on its interpretation of Section 1981 and its limitations regarding employment discrimination claims, especially focusing on the implications of racial harassment claims post-contract formation.