MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. vs. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
A side-by-side comparison of two landmark torts cases
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (1916)
Holding
The court held that a manufacturer of a product that is reasonably certain to place life and limb in peril if negligently made owes a duty of care to the ultimate user, regardless of privity of contract. The manufacturer is liable in negligence if it fails to exercise reasonable care in manufacturing or inspecting the product and the defect causes injury to a foreseeable user.
Doctrine Established
Elimination of Privity Requirement in Products Liability
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897 (1963) (1963)
Holding
The court held that a manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article it places on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human being. The plaintiff need not prove negligence and need not comply with warranty notice requirements. The liability is based in tort, not contract.
Doctrine Established
Strict Products Liability
Comparison Analysis
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963) represent the two great revolutions in products liability law. MacPherson, authored by Judge Cardozo, eliminated the privity requirement in negligence, holding that a manufacturer owes a duty of care not just to the immediate buyer but to all foreseeable users of the product. Greenman, authored by Justice Traynor, went further by establishing strict products liability, holding that a manufacturer is strictly liable when a defective product causes injury, regardless of negligence or contractual privity.
MacPherson's contribution was eliminating the artificial barrier of privity that had protected manufacturers from liability to end users. Before MacPherson, an injured consumer could only sue the retailer from whom they purchased the product, not the manufacturer who actually created the defect. MacPherson held that when a product is reasonably certain to be dangerous if negligently made, the manufacturer owes a duty to all foreseeable users -- but the plaintiff still had to prove negligence in the manufacturing process. Greenman removed even this requirement, holding that the injured consumer need only prove that the product was defective and that the defect caused the injury.
The shift from MacPherson's negligence-based liability to Greenman's strict liability reflects changing views about the proper allocation of product injury costs. MacPherson rested on fault-based reasoning -- the manufacturer should be liable because it was negligent. Greenman rested on policy reasoning -- manufacturers are in the best position to absorb and distribute accident costs, and strict liability creates incentives for safety that negligence alone does not provide. The Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A codified Greenman's strict liability rule, and the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability refined it with separate categories for manufacturing defects, design defects, and warning defects.
Similarities
- Both eliminated legal barriers that had shielded manufacturers from liability to injured product users
- Both were authored by influential judges (Cardozo and Traynor) whose opinions transformed entire areas of law
- Both involved defective manufactured products that caused physical injury to the end user
- Both are universally taught as landmarks in the evolution of products liability
- Both reflected changing societal views about the proper allocation of accident costs in a mass-production economy
Differences
- MacPherson retained negligence as the basis for liability while eliminating the privity requirement, while Greenman established strict liability regardless of fault
- Under MacPherson, the plaintiff still must prove the manufacturer was negligent; under Greenman, the plaintiff need only prove the product was defective
- MacPherson focused on the duty question (to whom is the duty owed?), while Greenman focused on the liability standard (what must the plaintiff prove?)
- MacPherson was a New York Court of Appeals decision that gradually influenced other jurisdictions, while Greenman was a California Supreme Court decision that was rapidly adopted nationwide
- The policy rationale in MacPherson was traditional fault-based reasoning, while Greenman relied on loss-spreading and safety-incentive rationales characteristic of strict liability
Why This Comparison Matters
Products liability is a heavily tested Torts topic. Students must understand the evolution from privity-based contractual liability, through MacPherson's negligence-without-privity regime, to Greenman's strict liability framework. Exam questions may ask students to analyze a product injury claim under both negligence (MacPherson) and strict liability (Greenman/402A) theories, noting the different proof requirements. The key distinction: under negligence, the plaintiff must prove how the manufacturer fell below the standard of care; under strict liability, the plaintiff need only prove the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's control.
More Torts Comparisons
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. vs. United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad (1928) and United States v. Carroll Towing (1947) are the two most important negligence cases in American tort law, each addressing a different element of the negligence analysis. Palsgraf, through the famous Cardozo-Andrews debate, addresses the duty and proximate cause elements, holding that a defendant owes a duty of care only to foreseeable plaintiffs -- those within the zone of danger created by the defendant's conduct. Carroll Towing, through Judge Learned Hand's algebraic formula (B < PL), addresses the breach element, providing a framework for determining whether a defendant's conduct fell below the standard of reasonable care by comparing the burden of precaution (B) against the probability of harm (P) multiplied by the gravity of the resulting injury (L).
Vosburg v. Putney vs. Garratt v. Dailey
Vosburg v. Putney (1891) and Garratt v. Dailey (1955) are both foundational intentional tort cases that explore the minimal intent required for battery, but they present the issue in different factual contexts that illuminate different aspects of the intent doctrine. Vosburg held that a schoolboy who kicked a classmate's leg during class committed a battery even though he did not intend to cause serious injury, because the kick was unlawful (it occurred during class, not during recess) and the defendant intended the physical contact. Garratt held that a five-year-old boy who pulled a chair out from under an elderly woman could be liable for battery if he knew with 'substantial certainty' that she would attempt to sit down where the chair had been.
Rylands v. Fletcher vs. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) and Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. (1910) both involve liability imposed without fault for damage to another's property, but they rest on different theoretical foundations. Rylands established the principle that one who brings onto their land something likely to do mischief if it escapes is strictly liable for damage caused by its escape, regardless of the landowner's care or fault. This created the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. Vincent held that a ship owner who kept his vessel moored to a dock during a storm to save the ship from destruction was privileged to do so (necessity) but was still liable for the resulting damage to the dock.
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California vs. Dillon v. Legg
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) and Dillon v. Legg (1968) are both California Supreme Court cases that expanded the scope of tort duty beyond traditional limits, but in different directions. Tarasoff established the duty of mental health professionals to warn or protect identifiable third parties when a patient makes a credible threat of violence, overriding the traditional rule that there is no duty to control the conduct of another. Dillon established that a bystander who witnesses a close relative being negligently injured may recover for the emotional distress of witnessing the event, even though the bystander was not physically endangered.