Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California vs. Dillon v. Legg
A side-by-side comparison of two landmark torts cases
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California
17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334 (1976) (1976)
Holding
The court held that when a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of the profession should determine, that a patient presents a serious danger of violence to a foreseeable victim, the therapist incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against such danger. This duty may be discharged by warning the intended victim, notifying the police, or taking other reasonable steps. The protective privilege of therapist-patient confidentiality ends where the public peril begins.
Doctrine Established
Duty to Warn/Protect Identifiable Third Parties
Dillon v. Legg
68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912 (1968) (1968)
Holding
The court held that a bystander who witnesses a close relative's injury or death caused by the defendant's negligence may recover for emotional distress, even if the bystander was outside the zone of physical danger. The court articulated three factors for determining foreseeability: (1) whether the plaintiff was located near the scene of the accident, (2) whether the shock resulted from direct sensory perception of the accident, and (3) whether the plaintiff was closely related to the victim.
Doctrine Established
Bystander Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress (Foreseeability Factors)
Comparison Analysis
Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California (1976) and Dillon v. Legg (1968) are both California Supreme Court cases that expanded the scope of tort duty beyond traditional limits, but in different directions. Tarasoff established the duty of mental health professionals to warn or protect identifiable third parties when a patient makes a credible threat of violence, overriding the traditional rule that there is no duty to control the conduct of another. Dillon established that a bystander who witnesses a close relative being negligently injured may recover for the emotional distress of witnessing the event, even though the bystander was not physically endangered.
Both cases involve the expansion of duty -- the threshold element of negligence -- into areas where no duty previously existed. Traditional tort law held that there was no duty to protect others from third-party violence (absent a special relationship) and no duty to avoid causing emotional distress to bystanders (absent physical impact or zone of danger). Tarasoff created an exception based on the special relationship between therapist and patient, reasoning that the duty to maintain confidentiality must yield when disclosure is necessary to prevent foreseeable harm. Dillon created an exception for bystander emotional distress, using a multi-factor test (proximity to the scene, contemporaneous observation, close relationship to the victim) to determine foreseeability.
Both decisions reflect the California Supreme Court's willingness to adapt tort doctrine to modern understandings of harm and responsibility. They also both generated significant policy debate: Tarasoff raised concerns about chilling effects on therapeutic relationships and the difficulty of predicting violence, while Dillon raised concerns about unlimited liability for emotional distress and the difficulty of drawing principled boundaries around who can recover.
Similarities
- Both are California Supreme Court decisions that expanded the duty of care beyond traditional limitations
- Both address situations where the plaintiff was not in a direct relationship with the defendant or was not physically injured by the defendant's conduct
- Both rely on foreseeability as the key factor in determining whether a duty of care exists
- Both generated significant criticism about the potential for unlimited or unprincipled expansion of tort liability
- Both remain influential nationwide, with many jurisdictions adopting versions of their holdings
Differences
- Tarasoff creates an affirmative duty to act (warn or protect a third party), while Dillon creates a duty not to cause foreseeable emotional harm to bystanders
- Tarasoff is based on a special relationship (therapist-patient) that creates a duty to control a third party's conduct, while Dillon is based on general negligence principles about foreseeable harm to foreseeable plaintiffs
- Tarasoff involves the failure to prevent intentional violence by a third party, while Dillon involves negligent conduct that directly causes emotional distress to a bystander
- Tarasoff raised unique concerns about patient confidentiality and therapeutic relationships, while Dillon raised concerns about the administrability of bystander emotional distress claims
- Dillon was later narrowed by Thing v. La Chusa, which converted its flexible guidelines into firm requirements, while Tarasoff's basic duty has been widely accepted though its scope continues to be debated
Why This Comparison Matters
Duty questions are a perennial exam topic. When a fact pattern involves a professional who learns of a risk to a third party, apply Tarasoff's duty-to-warn analysis, examining the special relationship, the identifiability of the victim, and the foreseeability of harm. When a fact pattern involves a bystander who witnesses an accident, apply the Dillon/Thing v. La Chusa framework, examining proximity, contemporaneous observation, and the closeness of the relationship. Students should also be prepared to discuss the policy arguments for and against expanding duty in both contexts.
More Torts Comparisons
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co. vs. United States v. Carroll Towing Co.
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad (1928) and United States v. Carroll Towing (1947) are the two most important negligence cases in American tort law, each addressing a different element of the negligence analysis. Palsgraf, through the famous Cardozo-Andrews debate, addresses the duty and proximate cause elements, holding that a defendant owes a duty of care only to foreseeable plaintiffs -- those within the zone of danger created by the defendant's conduct. Carroll Towing, through Judge Learned Hand's algebraic formula (B < PL), addresses the breach element, providing a framework for determining whether a defendant's conduct fell below the standard of reasonable care by comparing the burden of precaution (B) against the probability of harm (P) multiplied by the gravity of the resulting injury (L).
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. vs. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co. (1916) and Greenman v. Yuba Power Products (1963) represent the two great revolutions in products liability law. MacPherson, authored by Judge Cardozo, eliminated the privity requirement in negligence, holding that a manufacturer owes a duty of care not just to the immediate buyer but to all foreseeable users of the product. Greenman, authored by Justice Traynor, went further by establishing strict products liability, holding that a manufacturer is strictly liable when a defective product causes injury, regardless of negligence or contractual privity.
Vosburg v. Putney vs. Garratt v. Dailey
Vosburg v. Putney (1891) and Garratt v. Dailey (1955) are both foundational intentional tort cases that explore the minimal intent required for battery, but they present the issue in different factual contexts that illuminate different aspects of the intent doctrine. Vosburg held that a schoolboy who kicked a classmate's leg during class committed a battery even though he did not intend to cause serious injury, because the kick was unlawful (it occurred during class, not during recess) and the defendant intended the physical contact. Garratt held that a five-year-old boy who pulled a chair out from under an elderly woman could be liable for battery if he knew with 'substantial certainty' that she would attempt to sit down where the chair had been.
Rylands v. Fletcher vs. Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co.
Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) and Vincent v. Lake Erie Transportation Co. (1910) both involve liability imposed without fault for damage to another's property, but they rest on different theoretical foundations. Rylands established the principle that one who brings onto their land something likely to do mischief if it escapes is strictly liable for damage caused by its escape, regardless of the landowner's care or fault. This created the doctrine of strict liability for abnormally dangerous activities. Vincent held that a ship owner who kept his vessel moored to a dock during a storm to save the ship from destruction was privileged to do so (necessity) but was still liable for the resulting damage to the dock.