Two unmarried women in a long-term committed relationship decided to have and raise a child together. One partner conceived through anonymous donor insemination and gave birth; both women functioned as the child's parents from birth, sharing caretaking, financial support, decision-making, and the child's surname. Seeking to secure the child's relationship with both parents, the nonbiological mother petitioned in the Probate and Family Court to adopt the child. The biological mother consented and sought an order that would recognize both women as the child's legal parents without terminating the biological mother's parental rights. Because the Massachusetts adoption statute, G.L. c. 210, was not explicit on whether a second-parent adoption by an unmarried partner could proceed without extinguishing the natural parent's rights (an exception explicitly provided in stepparent adoptions for married spouses), the probate judge reported questions of law to the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC). The reported issues included whether the statute permits an adoption by the biological mother's same-sex partner without terminating the biological mother's rights and whether a decree could issue naming both women as the child's legal parents upon a best-interests finding.
Does Massachusetts's adoption statute, G.L. c. 210, permit the same-sex partner of a child's biological mother to adopt the child as a second parent without terminating the biological mother's parental rights, and may a decree issue recognizing both women as the child's legal parents upon a finding that the adoption is in the child's best interests?
Massachusetts adoption law is to be construed to promote the child's best interests. Under G.L. c. 210, § 1 et seq., a person of full age may petition to adopt a child, and the probate court possesses broad equitable authority to structure decrees that serve the child's welfare. Although a decree of adoption generally terminates the rights of the child's natural parents, Massachusetts law recognizes exceptions (e.g., stepparent adoptions), and nothing in the statute forbids an adoption by an unmarried partner where the decree can be fashioned to preserve the consenting biological parent's continuing parentage. The objective of the statute is to create a secure legal family for the child, and statutory silence on the precise family form does not bar relief when consistent with the statute's text, purpose, and the child's best interests.
Yes. The Supreme Judicial Court held that the biological mother's same-sex, unmarried partner may adopt the child as a second parent without terminating the biological mother's parental rights, and the probate court may enter a decree recognizing both women as the child's legal parents if the adoption is in the child's best interests.
The Court began with the paramount principle that adoption statutes exist to advance the child's best interests, not to privilege any particular adult relationship form. Although G.L. c. 210, § 6 provides that a decree of adoption ordinarily terminates the rights of the child's natural parents, Massachusetts law already contains an exception in stepparent adoptions where the adopting parent is married to a natural parent. The SJC concluded that the statute's text does not foreclose a similar outcome for unmarried partners when doing so serves the child and no countervailing statutory command or public policy is violated. The Court emphasized that the statute permits any person of full age to petition for adoption and requires joinder by a spouse only when the petitioner is married; this language does not imply a prohibition against adoption by two unmarried co-parents or against preserving a consenting natural parent's relationship. Reading the statute as a whole and in light of its purpose, the SJC reasoned that the probate court could structure a decree that both confers adoptive parentage on the nonbiological partner and continues the biological mother's legal status. Technically, to the extent § 6 extinguishes a "natural" parent's rights upon adoption, the biological mother's legal relationship can be reconstituted simultaneously as an adoptive parent by virtue of a joint or coordinated decree, resulting in the child having two legal parents with full, coequal obligations and rights. Public policy considerations supported this interpretation. The record showed that the child had been raised by two parents in a stable, loving home, and that legal recognition of both parents served the child's emotional and financial security. The Court rejected arguments that the Legislature intended to confine such adoptions to married couples or to sever existing parent-child bonds; nothing in the statute expressed such a limitation, and Massachusetts courts have long exercised equitable flexibility to effectuate child welfare within the adoption framework. The Court also noted that the anonymous sperm donor had no asserted or recognized parental rights that would complicate the decree. Accordingly, the SJC answered the reported questions in the affirmative and remanded for entry of a decree consistent with the best-interests finding.
Adoption of Tammy is an early and influential recognition of second-parent adoption, providing a durable pathway for same-sex and other unmarried co-parents to secure full legal parentage for both caregivers. The case is frequently taught for its statutory interpretation methodology—liberally construing text to fulfill the statute's child-centered purpose—and for its creative remedial approach to reconcile the termination clause with the need to preserve the consenting biological parent's status. It also anticipates later developments in marriage equality and parentage reform by decoupling child welfare from adult marital status, a theme that recurs in modern family law jurisprudence.
Adoption of Tammy stands as a foundational case in modern family law, demonstrating how courts can harmonize statutory text with child-centered policy to recognize the reality of children being raised by two unmarried co-parents. By permitting a second-parent adoption without severing the biological mother's rights, the SJC ensured that the legal framework reflected the child's lived family and safeguarded her emotional and financial security.{" "}