415 U.S. 36 (1974)
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
Does an employee's prior submission of a discharge grievance to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement preclude the employee from subsequently pursuing a de novo action under Title VII based on the same underlying facts?
An employee's statutory right to a de novo judicial determination under Title VII is not foreclosed by prior arbitration conducted pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement. Title VII rights are independent of the collective agreement, are not susceptible of prospective waiver by the union, and may not be displaced by contractual grievance procedures. While the arbitration record and award may be admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate, they have no preclusive (res judicata or collateral estoppel) effect on a subsequent Title VII action.
No. Prior arbitration under a collective-bargaining agreement does not bar a subsequent de novo Title VII lawsuit. The Supreme Court reversed the lower courts and remanded for further proceedings.
Alexander is a cornerstone of employment discrimination and labor-arbitration law. It establishes that contract-based arbitration under a CBA does not preclude a Title VII lawsuit and that unions cannot waive an employee's substantive Title VII rights. Courts may consider an arbitrator's findings as evidence but must provide a de novo judicial determination of the statutory claim. The decision influenced related rulings (e.g., Barrentine and McDonald) that similarly refused to give preclusive effect to labor arbitration in FLSA and § 1983 contexts. Although later cases (Gilmer and 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett) recognized the enforceability of arbitration agreements covering statutory claims—especially under the Federal Arbitration Act—Alexander's core principles continue to guide how courts treat the relationship between collective bargaining, arbitration, and federal civil rights remedies.