515 U.S. 687 (1995), Supreme Court of the United States
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon is a cornerstone of Endangered Species Act (ESA) jurisprudence and a leading case on statutory interpretation and administrative deference.
Does the Secretary of the Interior permissibly interpret the ESA's prohibition on 'take' by defining 'harm' to include significant habitat modification or degradation that actually kills or injures listed wildlife?
Under the ESA, 'take' means 'to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct.' 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19). The Interior Department's regulation interprets 'harm' to mean 'an act which actually kills or injures wildlife,' including 'significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually kills or injures wildlife by significantly impairing essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or sheltering.' 50 C.F.R. § 17.3. When a statutory term is ambiguous and the agency's construction is reasonable, courts defer to that interpretation under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.
Yes. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary's definition of 'harm' to include certain forms of habitat modification that actually kill or injure wildlife is a permissible construction of the ESA. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and upheld the regulation.
Sweet Home is a foundational ESA case establishing that 'take' reaches certain indirect harms—specifically, habitat modifications that actually kill or injure protected wildlife. For law students, the case demonstrates Chevron's operation, how statutory purpose and subsequent congressional action inform interpretation, and how courts balance textual canons against agency expertise. It also underscores practical limits through causation requirements and illuminates the regulatory architecture surrounding incidental take permits and habitat conservation planning.