44 F.3d 1441 (9th Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 976 (1995)
Barrera-Echavarria v. Rison is a landmark Ninth Circuit en banc decision addressing the scope of the Attorney General's authority to detain excludable (now termed inadmissible) noncitizens for prolonged, even indefinite, periods when removal cannot be effectuated.
Does the Immigration and Nationality Act, consistent with the Constitution, authorize the Attorney General to detain an excludable (inadmissible) alien indefinitely when removal is not reasonably foreseeable and parole has been denied or revoked?
Under the INA's exclusion and parole provisions, including 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(5)(A) and 1227 (pre-IIRIRA), the Attorney General possesses broad discretion to detain excludable aliens pending exclusion and removal and to grant, deny, or revoke parole without an implied temporal limitation; excludable aliens are treated as if stopped at the border for constitutional purposes and thus are entitled to only limited due process protections. Consistent with Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, prolonged detention of an excludable alien whose admission has been denied and whose removal is impracticable does not violate the Fifth Amendment or the Eighth Amendment where the detention is civil and subject to periodic parole review.
Yes. The Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, held that the INA authorizes the indefinite detention of an excludable alien whose parole has been revoked and whose deportation is not reasonably foreseeable, and that such detention does not violate the Constitution. The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief.
Barrera-Echavarria crystalizes the pre-IIRIRA approach to immigration detention for excludable (now inadmissible) aliens, reaffirming the entry fiction and the government's broad discretion to detain where removal is impracticable. For law students, it is essential for understanding the doctrinal divide between excludable and deportable aliens, the intersection of statutory discretion and constitutional limits, and the judiciary's deference to the political branches in immigration policy. Its practical force was later curtailed by Zadvydas v. Davis (2001) and Clark v. Martinez (2005), which construed the post-IIRIRA detention statute (8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6)) to contain a presumptive six-month limit on post-removal-order detention, extending that limit to inadmissible aliens. Barrera-Echavarria thus stands as an important historical and analytical waypoint in the evolution of immigration detention law.