The defendant circus kept and exhibited a number of trained elephants as part of its performances and promotional processions. During one such procession on a public street, an elephant deviated toward the entrance of the plaintiffs' nearby shop when a small dog barked and agitated the animal. In the ensuing commotion, the elephant intruded into the shop area and caused damage and personal injury to the plaintiffs, as well as harm to their dog and property. The circus had handlers in attendance and argued that the elephants were well trained, that reasonable care had been exercised, and that any reaction was provoked by the barking dog. The plaintiffs sued the circus as keeper of a wild animal, seeking to impose strict liability for the injuries and property damage sustained.
Are the keepers of a wild animal, here an elephant used in a circus procession, strictly liable at common law for personal and property damage of a kind characteristic of the species, notwithstanding careful handling and the absence of negligence or prior knowledge of dangerous propensity, and is such liability avoided merely because the animal reacted to a barking dog?
At common law, the keeper of an animal ferae naturae (a wild animal) is strictly liable for harm done by the animal if the harm is of a kind that is likely to be inflicted by animals of that class. Liability does not depend on negligence or scienter and is not avoided by showing due care in confinement or handling. Only limited defenses may apply, such as the claimant's voluntary assumption of risk, contributory negligence (with apportionment under statute), act of God, a truly intervening act of a third party, or statutory authority. The dangerous character of the species, not the individual animal, governs.
The court held the circus strictly liable. An elephant is a wild animal, and the injuries and damage caused during its loss of control fell within the class of harm characteristic of such animals. The defendants could not avoid liability by proving careful handling or by pointing to the dog's barking as a provocation that would negate the strict duty.
The court began by classifying the elephant as an animal ferae naturae, a categorization that triggers strict liability because such species are regarded as inherently dangerous. The inquiry then turned to whether the harm was of a kind characteristic of the species. The court reasoned that large, powerful wild animals are apt, if not kept fully under control, to cause serious injury or damage through sudden movements or reactions to stimuli. The elephant's response to a barking dog and its consequential incursion into the plaintiffs' shop fell within the general risks that make elephants dangerous. Because the strict-liability rule for wild animals does not rest on fault, the defendants' evidence of training, care, and the presence of handlers did not rebut liability. Nor did the fact of the dog's barking transform the elephant's conduct into something so unforeseeable or extraordinary as to constitute a novus actus interveniens. The reaction was a natural incident of the risk inherent in keeping and parading a wild animal in public. Finally, the court indicated that while limited defenses can narrow or reduce recovery in strict-liability animal cases, none applied on the facts. The plaintiffs had not voluntarily assumed the risk, and the dog's presence and behavior did not amount to such claimant fault as to displace the strict responsibility the law imposes on keepers of wild animals.
Behrens is a staple authority on the strict-liability regime governing wild animals at common law. It clarifies that the keeper's freedom from negligence is irrelevant, that the focus is the dangerous character of the species, and that harm stemming from the animal's loss of control or reactive behavior lies within the scope of strict liability. For exam purposes, Behrens helps students structure analysis by first classifying the animal, then asking whether the harm is characteristic of that class, and finally evaluating any narrow defenses. The case also provides a baseline for understanding how later statutory schemes, such as the Animals Act 1971 in England and Wales, codified and in some respects adjusted these principles while preserving the central notion that some animals attract near-automatic liability because of their inherent risk.
Behrens v Bertram Mills Circus crisply articulates the common-law rule that keepers of wild animals are strictly liable for harm characteristic of the species, and that proof of careful handling cannot defeat liability. The decision underscores that the legal focus is not on fault but on the inherent risks associated with certain animals.