Two separate FELA suits were filed in Montana state court against BNSF Railway Company, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Texas. Neither suit had a connection to Montana: one plaintiff, Robert Nelson, was a North Dakota resident who alleged he sustained knee injuries while working for BNSF in North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota; the other plaintiff, Kelli Tyrrell (a South Dakota resident), sued as the personal representative of her late husband Brent Tyrrell, alleging he was exposed to toxic substances while working for BNSF in South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, and Wyoming. BNSF maintained significant operations in Montana—over 2,000 miles of track and more than 2,000 employees—amounting to about 6% of its track, about 5% of its workforce, and less than 10% of its revenue, but was neither incorporated nor headquartered there. The Montana trial court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction in one case and denied dismissal in the other; on consolidated review, the Montana Supreme Court held that Montana courts could exercise general jurisdiction over BNSF based on (1) FELA §56 and (2) Montana's 'doing business' approach to general jurisdiction. The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed.
1) Does FELA §56 authorize state courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over railroads in any state where they do business? 2) Consistent with the Due Process Clause, may Montana courts exercise general personal jurisdiction over BNSF for claims that do not arise out of or relate to the company's activities in Montana?
• FELA §56 sets venue for federal district courts and provides for service of process in federal FELA actions; it does not confer personal jurisdiction on state courts. State courts hearing FELA cases apply their own jurisdictional rules subject to constitutional due process limits. • General personal jurisdiction over a corporation exists where the corporation is 'essentially at home' in the forum state. The paradigm forums are the corporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business; only in an 'exceptional case' may a corporation be deemed at home elsewhere. Mere substantial, continuous, and systematic business in a state—even if large in absolute terms—does not render a corporation at home there. See Daimler AG v. Bauman and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown; compare Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
1) No. FELA §56 does not provide state courts with personal jurisdiction over railroads; it addresses federal venue and federal service of process only. 2) No. Montana courts lack general personal jurisdiction over BNSF in these cases because BNSF is not 'at home' in Montana and the claims do not arise from BNSF's Montana activities.
Statutory interpretation. The Court read FELA §56's text as addressing federal court venue—permitting suit in a federal district where the defendant resides, where the cause of action arose, or where the defendant is doing business—and as authorizing nationwide service of process for federal courts. The statute's reference to concurrent jurisdiction with state courts concerns subject-matter jurisdiction, not personal jurisdiction. Nothing in §56 purports to expand state-court authority to hale out-of-state defendants into court beyond constitutional limits. Thus, state courts adjudicating FELA claims must rely on state long-arm statutes and the Fourteenth Amendment's due process constraints. Due process analysis. Applying Daimler, the Court rejected Montana's 'doing business' theory of general jurisdiction. General jurisdiction requires that the corporation be 'essentially at home' in the forum. The paradigmatic forums are the corporation's state of incorporation and principal place of business. While an 'exceptional case' can justify another forum (e.g., when the forum effectively becomes the corporation's temporary principal base as in Perkins), BNSF's Montana contacts did not approach that mark. BNSF's in-state operations—thousands of employees and miles of track—were significant in absolute terms but constituted a small percentage of its nationwide operations. Such proportional analysis is critical under Daimler; allowing general jurisdiction wherever a large national company does substantial business would resurrect the disapproved 'doing business' approach and render the 'at home' standard meaningless. Other arguments. The Court also noted that registration to do business and appointment of an agent for service do not by themselves create general jurisdiction absent clear statutory consent, and the Montana Supreme Court's decision did not rest on any such consent theory. Finally, because the claims were unconnected to Montana, specific jurisdiction was unavailable, and thus no Montana court could hear these cases consistent with due process. The Court reversed and remanded. Justice Sotomayor concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that §56 does not confer personal jurisdiction on state courts but disagreeing with the majority's general jurisdiction analysis and its application of Daimler to BNSF's extensive Montana operations.
Tyrrell cements Daimler's restrictive general jurisdiction framework and rejects efforts to use FELA to expand state-court personal jurisdiction over out-of-state railroads. It curbs forum shopping by plaintiffs seeking plaintiff-friendly state courts for claims unconnected to the forum. For civil procedure, Tyrrell is essential reading on (i) the distinction between venue, service of process, and personal jurisdiction; (ii) the limits of general jurisdiction over nationwide corporations; and (iii) the continued vitality of the 'exceptional case' carve-out after Daimler. The decision also foreshadows later jurisdiction cases restraining expansive theories of state-court authority over nonresident defendants.
BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell reinforces the modern, constitutional limits on state-court authority over out-of-state corporate defendants. By holding that FELA §56 does not expand personal jurisdiction and by applying Daimler's 'at home' test, the Court rejected a return to the discredited 'doing business' approach to general jurisdiction.