Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 (HL)
Bolton v Stone is a foundational torts case on breach of the duty of care where the risk of harm is remote. It clarifies that foreseeability of harm, while necessary, is not by itself sufficient to impose liability in negligence.
Whether the defendants breached their duty of care by failing to take additional precautions against a cricket ball leaving the ground and injuring a passerby when such an event was foreseeable but exceedingly rare; and whether the occasional escape of cricket balls constituted an actionable private nuisance.
A defendant breaches the duty of care only if a reasonable person in the defendant's position would have taken further precautions in light of the risk. Foreseeability of harm is necessary but not sufficient; the probability of harm must be more than a remote possibility. In assessing breach, courts weigh: (1) the likelihood of harm, (2) the gravity of the potential harm, (3) the burden and practicality of additional precautions, and (4) the social utility of the activity. In private nuisance, liability arises where the defendant's use of land unreasonably interferes with the claimant's use or enjoyment, which generally requires a pattern or frequency of interference rather than isolated or extremely infrequent incidents.
No negligence and no nuisance. Although it was foreseeable that a ball might, on rare occasions, leave the ground, the risk was so small that a reasonable person would not have taken additional precautions. The occasional and very infrequent escape of balls did not amount to an unreasonable use of land and so was not an actionable nuisance.
Bolton v Stone frames breach as a function of risk assessment, embedding probability into the duty analysis. It instructs that liability does not attach for every foreseeable harm; the risk must be sufficiently likely to warrant additional precautions. The case also draws a line between negligence and nuisance: occasional, isolated escapes are typically insufficient for nuisance. For students, it is a core authority on balancing risk, cost, and social utility, and it provides a counterpoint to cases where small risks nonetheless require simple, inexpensive precautions (e.g., Wagon Mound (No. 2)) or where frequent escapes change the analysis (e.g., Miller v Jackson).