116 Me. 399, 102 A. 106 (Me. 1917) (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine)
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin is a staple in first-year Contracts for its clear illustration of how an offer calling for an act—rather than a return promise—can be accepted by performance and bind the offeror.
Does an offer to convey land in return for the offerees' performance—relocation and caretaking—become binding upon the offerees' performance such that the offeror cannot revoke, and, if so, is specific performance available notwithstanding the Statute of Frauds?
An offer calling for performance (a unilateral contract) is accepted by the requested act; upon performance, a binding contract arises that the offeror cannot revoke. Equity will decree specific performance of a contract for the conveyance of land where the legal remedy is inadequate, especially given the unique character of real property and where the offerees have taken possession and rendered substantial performance in reliance. A signed writing by the party to be charged that states the essential terms satisfies the Statute of Frauds; alternatively, part performance—including taking possession, making improvements, and rendering agreed services—may remove an oral land contract from the Statute of Frauds and warrant specific performance.
Yes. The daughter and son-in-law accepted the mother's offer by performing the requested acts of relocating, taking possession, and commencing the agreed caretaking. The mother could not revoke after performance, and equity would specifically enforce the agreement. The deed to the son was set aside, and conveyance to the Brackenburys was ordered, subject to the mother's retained rights during her lifetime.
Brackenbury v. Hodgkin is frequently cited to teach that (1) a unilateral offer is accepted by performance and becomes irrevocable once performance is rendered; (2) specific performance is a natural remedy for real estate contracts because legal damages are inadequate; and (3) the Statute of Frauds in land transactions can be satisfied by a signed writing or overcome by part performance and possession. The case bridges formation doctrine and equitable remedies, offering a concrete example of courts protecting reasonable reliance and completed performance in family settings where formalities are often minimal but the stakes are high.