What are the facts?
Respondent Catrett filed a wrongful death action in federal court against numerous asbestos manufacturers and suppliers, including Celotex Corporation, alleging that her husband's exposure to asbestos-containing products caused his death. After discovery, Celotex moved for summary judgment, asserting that Catrett lacked evidence that the decedent had been exposed to any Celotex product—a necessary element of causation and product identification. Celotex did not submit affidavits affirmatively disproving exposure; instead, it argued that the record contained no competent evidence tying Celotex to the decedent's exposure. In opposition, Catrett submitted documentary materials (including a deposition transcript and two letters referencing the decedent's work history and product exposure) to suggest the decedent had encountered Celotex products. Celotex objected that these materials were inadmissible hearsay and insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. The district court granted summary judgment to Celotex. The D.C. Circuit reversed, reasoning that Celotex, as movant, failed to meet its initial burden because it did not support its motion with affidavits or other evidence negating Catrett's case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
What is the legal issue?
May a party moving for summary judgment, who does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, obtain judgment by pointing out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmovant's case without submitting affidavits or other evidence negating the claim?
What rule applies?
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment shall be entered if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A movant who does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial satisfies its initial burden by showing—i.e., by pointing out to the court—an absence of evidence to support an essential element of the nonmovant's case. The burden then shifts to the nonmovant to designate specific facts, by reference to materials in the record (depositions, documents, affidavits, admissions, etc.), showing a genuine issue for trial. The nonmovant need not present evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial, so long as the substance could be presented in an admissible form at trial.
What did the court hold?
Yes. The moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other materials negating the opponent's claim. It may discharge its initial burden by pointing out the nonmovant's lack of evidence on an essential element. The Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit and remanded for further proceedings to assess the sufficiency of the nonmovant's submissions under the correct standard.
What is the reasoning?
The Court began with the text and structure of Rule 56, emphasizing that the rule's purpose is to pierce the pleadings and assess whether there is evidence supporting a triable claim. Nothing in Rule 56 requires a movant to file affidavits negating the opponent's case. Rather, Rule 56(c) permits summary judgment based on the pleadings, discovery, and disclosures, and Rule 56(e) (now 56(c)(1), (d)) requires the nonmovant to come forward with specific facts once the movant shows the absence of evidence on an essential element. Conceptually, the Court distinguished the burden of production at the summary judgment stage from the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial. A party without the trial burden (typically a defendant) can carry its Rule 56 burden by identifying the lack of record evidence on a necessary element of the claim; it need not disprove that element. Requiring affirmative, evidentiary negation would graft an extra-textual requirement onto Rule 56 and impede the rule's goal of efficiency. The Court noted that the nonmovant must then respond with specific, record-supported facts; mere allegations are insufficient. Additionally, the Court clarified that summary judgment materials need not be in a trial-admissible form at the time of the motion, provided their content could be presented in admissible form at trial. Applying these principles, the Court concluded that Celotex's motion adequately pointed out the absence of evidence tying its products to the decedent's exposure. The D.C. Circuit erred by requiring Celotex to submit affidavits negating exposure. The Court did not resolve whether the materials offered by Catrett (to which Celotex objected as hearsay) sufficed to create a genuine dispute; that determination, and other unresolved issues, were remanded for consideration under the proper Rule 56 framework.
Why is this case significant?
Celotex is a cornerstone of modern summary judgment practice. It establishes that a movant without the trial burden may prevail by showing the nonmovant's evidentiary gap on an essential element, thereby shifting the burden of production to the nonmovant. Together with Anderson and Matsushita, Celotex guides courts and litigants on how to evaluate evidence, the required quantum of proof, and the plausibility of inferences at summary judgment. For law students, Celotex teaches the allocation of burdens, the necessity of citing record evidence, and the strategic use of discovery to prepare for and resist Rule 56 motions.
What is the movant's initial burden after Celotex?
If the movant does not bear the burden of persuasion at trial, it may meet its initial Rule 56 burden by pointing out the absence of evidence supporting an essential element of the nonmovant's claim. It need not present affidavits or other materials negating the claim, but it should identify where in the record the evidentiary gap exists.
What must the nonmovant do in response?
The nonmovant must designate specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial, citing to materials in the record (depositions, documents, affidavits, admissions, interrogatory answers). Conclusory allegations or mere denials are insufficient. The evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could find for the nonmovant on the element at issue.
Must summary judgment evidence be in admissible form?
Not necessarily in its current form. Celotex clarifies that materials used at summary judgment need not be presented in a form admissible at trial, so long as their content could be presented in an admissible form at trial (for example, hearsay in a report that could be presented through live testimony).
Does Celotex apply to both plaintiffs and defendants?
Yes. The principle concerns which party bears the trial burden on the element at issue. A party moving for summary judgment who does not bear that trial burden—whether plaintiff or defendant—may point to an absence of evidence on that element to shift the burden of production.
How does Celotex fit with Anderson and Matsushita?
Celotex addresses the movant's initial burden and burden-shifting. Anderson addresses the quality and quantum of evidence required, tying the summary judgment standard to the substantive evidentiary standard at trial. Matsushita cautions that the nonmovant must offer evidence that makes its theory plausible, not merely conceivable. Together, they form the trilogy governing Rule 56.