504 U.S. 334 (1992)
Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v.
Does Alabama's imposition of a higher disposal fee on hazardous waste generated out of state, but disposed of in Alabama, violate the Dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce based on origin?
State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce on their face are virtually per se invalid. To survive, the state must demonstrate that the discriminatory measure advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives. This strict scrutiny of discriminatory laws stems from decisions such as Philadelphia v. New Jersey and Maine v. Taylor. The market-participant exception permits a state to favor its own citizens only when it is acting as a market participant rather than a market regulator; however, when the state regulates private market actors, the exception does not apply. Quarantine laws remain a narrow exception, justified only when the out-of-state article is inherently harmful in a manner uniquely tied to its origin and where nondiscriminatory measures are inadequate.
Yes. Alabama's out-of-state hazardous-waste surcharge is facially discriminatory and violates the Dormant Commerce Clause because Alabama failed to show that its legitimate local interests could not be served by reasonable, nondiscriminatory alternatives. The market-participant and quarantine exceptions did not apply.
Chemical Waste Management v. Hunt is a pivotal case constraining state-based environmental protectionism under the Dormant Commerce Clause. It reinforces the principle that states may not isolate themselves from a national problem—here, hazardous-waste disposal—by discriminating against articles of commerce based on their out-of-state origin. The decision, along with Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. DEQ, clarifies that differential fees or taxes targeting out-of-state waste demand rigorous justification and will usually fail when nondiscriminatory tools are available. For law students, the case illustrates how the Court differentiates between facial discrimination (strict scrutiny) and evenhanded regulations with incidental effects (Pike balancing), while also clarifying the narrow scope of both the market-participant and quarantine exceptions.