526 U.S. 687 (U.S. Supreme Court 1999)
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes sits at the intersection of land-use regulation, the Takings Clause, and civil rights litigation under 42 U.S.C.
1) In a §1983 action seeking legal damages for an alleged regulatory taking and substantive due process violations arising from repeated land-use permit denials, does the Seventh Amendment guarantee a right to trial by jury on liability and damages? 2) Does Dolan's "rough proportionality" test apply to a case involving repeated permit denials where the government did not demand a dedication or exaction of property as a condition of approval?
• Seventh Amendment: The Amendment preserves the right to a jury trial in actions at law. A §1983 claim seeking legal relief (money damages) for constitutional violations is analogous to traditional actions at law, and thus the parties are entitled to a jury on issues traditionally tried to a jury, including liability and damages. • Regulatory Takings and Temporary Takings: Government regulations that deny all economically beneficial use of property, even temporarily, may give rise to compensable takings, and damages are an available remedy (see, e.g., First English Evangelical Lutheran Church). • Exactions Doctrine Limited: The heightened "essential nexus" and "rough proportionality" tests (Nollan, Dolan) apply to adjudicative exactions—government demands that a permit applicant dedicate property or an interest in property as a condition of approval—not to general permit denials or ordinary land-use decisionmaking where no property dedication is exacted. • Municipal Liability: A municipality can be liable under §1983 when a constitutional deprivation results from an official policy or decision by the municipality's final policymakers (Monell).
Yes. The Court held that the Seventh Amendment entitles the parties to a jury trial in a §1983 action seeking legal damages for alleged regulatory takings and related due process violations arising from land-use decisions. No. The Court further held that Dolan's "rough proportionality" standard does not apply to this case because the City did not demand a property dedication as a condition of permit approval; the dispute involved general permit denials, not exactions. The judgment for the developer was affirmed.
City of Monterey clarifies procedure and doctrine in land-use constitutional litigation. Procedurally, it confirms a jury right in §1983 actions seeking legal damages for regulatory takings and due process violations, recognizing that such claims often turn on fact-intensive disputes suitable for juries. Substantively, it confines the powerful Nollan/Dolan framework to true exaction cases, preventing its overextension to general permit denials. The case also affirms that temporary regulatory takings can yield damages. For students, it underscores the importance of framing claims and remedies, understanding the limits of exactions doctrine, and appreciating Monell's role when suing municipalities. Note: In 2005, Lingle v. Chevron rejected the "substantially advances" test as a takings inquiry, relocating such concerns to due process; Monterey's core holdings on the jury right and the limits of Dolan remain intact.