Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 (1933) (Supreme Court of the United States)
Clark v. United States is a foundational evidence case that addresses the boundary between the long-standing policy of protecting jury deliberation secrecy and the judiciary's obligation to root out fraud and misconduct.
May a court pierce the privilege of jury deliberation secrecy and admit juror testimony about deliberations in a contempt proceeding against a juror, where there is a prima facie showing that the juror lied during voir dire and used the jury room to perpetrate a fraud on the court?
Privileges that protect confidential relationships and processes—including the policy of secrecy surrounding jury deliberations—are not absolute. They may not be invoked to facilitate or conceal fraud or other wrongdoing. Before the privilege yields, there must be a prima facie showing—evidence sufficient to support a reasonable inference—that the privilege is being abused for an illegitimate purpose. When that threshold is met, a court may receive otherwise protected evidence to establish the fraud or misconduct. The rule against juror impeachment of a verdict does not bar such testimony when the proceeding's object is not to set aside a verdict but to prove a juror's independent contempt or fraud upon the court.
Yes. Upon a prima facie showing of juror misconduct and fraud on the court, the privilege safeguarding the secrecy of jury deliberations does not bar juror testimony describing the juror's statements and conduct in the jury room when offered to prove the juror's contemptuous wrongdoing. The conviction for contempt was affirmed.
Clark is a touchstone for understanding how evidentiary privileges operate when confronted with fraud. It introduces the prima facie threshold to pierce a privilege and makes clear that privileges—including the policy of jury secrecy—exist to promote, not frustrate, justice. The case is frequently cited in discussions of the crime-fraud exception to the attorney–client privilege and related doctrines. It also anticipates the careful balance later reflected in Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b): while juror testimony about deliberations is generally inadmissible to impeach a verdict, exceptions or distinct proceedings (e.g., contempt) may justify limited inquiry when there is credible evidence of misconduct. For students, Clark illustrates doctrinal interplay between Evidence (privileges and juror testimony) and Criminal Procedure (voir dire and juror qualification), and offers a model of structured judicial reasoning about competing institutional values.