473 U.S. 432 (1985)
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center is a cornerstone Equal Protection case that both clarifies and complicates the familiar tiers-of-scrutiny framework.
1) Are people with intellectual disabilities a suspect or quasi-suspect class warranting heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause? 2) Under the applicable standard of review, does the city's requirement of a special use permit and its denial of that permit for a group home for people with intellectual disabilities violate the Equal Protection Clause?
Equal Protection analysis applies different levels of scrutiny depending on the classification. Classifications not involving suspect or quasi-suspect classes, and not burdening fundamental rights, receive rational-basis review and must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. The Court declined to recognize people with intellectual disabilities as a quasi-suspect class. Even under rational-basis review, government action cannot rest on negative attitudes, stereotypes, or a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group; private biases may not be given effect through public law.
1) People with intellectual disabilities are not a suspect or quasi-suspect class; rational-basis review applies. 2) The city's requirement of a special use permit for, and its denial of a permit to, Cleburne Living Center's group home were not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest and thus violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the court of appeals and remanded.
Cleburne is a leading Equal Protection case for two reasons. First, it definitively holds that people with intellectual disabilities are not a quasi-suspect class, preserving rational-basis review for disability classifications under the Constitution. Second, it illustrates a more probing form of rational-basis review—often called rational basis with bite—when government action appears to be driven by animus, stereotypes, or bare fear. The decision has enduring importance in both constitutional and land-use contexts, informing subsequent cases condemning animus-based laws and influencing the treatment of group homes. Although later statutory regimes (such as the Fair Housing Amendments Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Rehabilitation Act) provide robust protections, Cleburne establishes the constitutional floor: governments may not rely on private biases or irrational fears to justify differential treatment.