The decedent executed a coordinated estate plan consisting of a will that poured over her probate residue into a revocable inter vivos trust that she had created and retained the power to amend or revoke. Under the trust terms, the decedent's husband (Mayo) was the primary or initial beneficiary—receiving either an outright distribution or beneficial interests (e.g., income for life)—with remainder benefits designated for alternate beneficiaries (family members and/or charities). In addition to the trust and pour-over will, the decedent had arranged several nonprobate transfers in which the husband was named to receive at death, including beneficiary designations and joint tenancy interests. After the estate plan was put in place, the husband feloniously and intentionally killed the decedent. Litigation followed over whether the husband could receive any benefits traceable to the decedent's death—through probate under the will, through the revocable trust funded in part by the pour-over provision, or through other will substitutes such as insurance, joint property, or plan benefits. The estate and alternate beneficiaries sought to bar the husband and to effect distributions to those who would have taken had the husband not survived.
Does the slayer rule bar a murderer from receiving benefits through a revocable inter vivos trust and other nonprobate transfers, and, if so, should the slayer be treated as having predeceased the decedent such that the trust's alternate remainder beneficiaries take by acceleration?
A person who feloniously and intentionally kills another may not profit, directly or indirectly, from the victim's death. This equitable slayer rule applies not only to probate transfers (by will or intestacy) but also to nonprobate transfers, including revocable inter vivos trusts, joint tenancies, life insurance and similar will substitutes. Courts may impose a constructive trust and treat the killer as having predeceased the victim to carry out the decedent's dispositive plan and prevent unjust enrichment, including acceleration of remainder interests where a disqualified beneficiary would otherwise have taken a prior interest. In Massachusetts, a pour-over from a will to an inter vivos trust is valid even if the trust is amendable or amended, and property poured over is administered according to the trust's terms as they exist at the settlor's death.
Yes. The slayer rule bars the husband from receiving any benefit arising from the decedent's death, including as beneficiary of the revocable trust and other nonprobate transfers. The husband is treated as having predeceased the decedent, the equitable remedy of constructive trust prevents his enrichment, and the trust's remainder interests are accelerated to the alternate beneficiaries designated by the decedent.
The court grounded its decision in the long-standing equitable maxim that no one should profit from his own wrong. Although the earliest cases involved testamentary gifts (e.g., Riggs v. Palmer), the policy basis is not limited to probate transfers. Modern estate planning relies heavily on will substitutes—revocable trusts, joint tenancies, beneficiary designations—and allowing a killer to take simply because the asset passes outside probate would elevate form over substance and undermine the rule's deterrent and moral purposes. The court emphasized functional equivalence: a revocable trust, especially one fully controlled by the settlor until death, operates like a will substitute. When the settlor retains the power to revoke or amend and beneficial enjoyment until death, the ultimate disposition is triggered by the settlor's death much like a will. Thus, there is no principled reason to treat such a trust differently from a will for slayer-rule purposes. Extending the rule preserves the decedent's overall estate plan and prevents the wrongdoer from exploiting nonprobate mechanisms. As a remedial matter, equity imposes a constructive trust on any benefits that would otherwise flow to the slayer, ensuring those assets pass to the persons who would have taken absent the slayer's disqualifying conduct. The court therefore treats the slayer as having predeceased the decedent. In the trust context, this means that if the slayer was to take a prior interest (e.g., an outright distribution or a life interest), that interest is forfeited and the remainder accelerates to the alternate beneficiaries named in the trust. The court also confirmed that the pour-over from the will to the inter vivos trust is valid and administered in accordance with the trust's terms as of death, consistent with statutory validation of pour-over gifts. This approach respects the decedent's dispositive scheme while ensuring that no benefit accrues to the killer through either probate or nonprobate channels.
Clymer v. Mayo is widely taught because it integrates classic equitable doctrine with modern estate planning. It confirms that the slayer rule reaches will substitutes, preventing a killer from circumventing public policy through revocable trusts, joint arrangements, or beneficiary designations. The case also illustrates how courts use constructive trusts and the legal fiction that the slayer predeceased to implement the decedent's plan and accelerate remainder interests. For students, it is a cornerstone on the intersection of trusts, wills, and restitution, and a practical reminder that doctrinal rules must adapt to contemporary wealth-transfer vehicles.
Clymer v. Mayo is a pivotal case for understanding how equitable doctrines police the increasingly nonprobate nature of wealth transfer. By extending the slayer rule to revocable trusts and other will substitutes, the court closed a potential loophole that could have allowed a killer to profit by exploiting form over substance. The decision ensures alignment between public policy, donor intent, and modern planning devices.