539 U.S. 90 (2003) (Supreme Court of the United States)
Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Must a Title VII plaintiff present direct evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), or is circumstantial evidence sufficient?
Under Title VII, as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, an unlawful employment practice is established when the plaintiff demonstrates—by direct or circumstantial evidence—that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for an employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (§ 703(m)). If the employer proves it would have made the same decision absent the impermissible motive, the plaintiff's remedies are limited to declaratory and injunctive relief and attorney's fees and costs; compensatory and punitive damages, backpay, and reinstatement are unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (§ 706(g)(2)(B)). No heightened requirement of direct evidence applies.
A plaintiff need not present direct evidence of discrimination to obtain a mixed-motive jury instruction under Title VII § 703(m); circumstantial evidence is sufficient.
Desert Palace removes a major procedural and evidentiary barrier in Title VII litigation by rejecting any special requirement of direct evidence for mixed-motive claims. It permits plaintiffs to reach a jury and obtain a mixed-motive instruction based solely on circumstantial evidence, harmonizing Title VII with ordinary evidentiary rules. The decision also clarifies the post-1991 relationship among Price Waterhouse, § 703(m), and § 706(g)(2)(B), and it underscores that the employer's same-decision showing affects remedies, not liability. For law students, the case is essential to understanding modern Title VII causation, jury instructions, and strategic choices between mixed-motive and single-motive (pretext) theories.