Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980)
Diamond v. Chakrabarty is a foundational U.S.
Is a live, human-made microorganism patentable subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as a "manufacture" or "composition of matter," despite being a living entity?
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, patents may be granted for any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof. The provision is to be given broad scope. Judicially recognized exceptions exclude laws of nature, natural phenomena (including products of nature), and abstract ideas. A claimed invention that is nonnaturally occurring and possesses markedly different characteristics due to human ingenuity may qualify as a patent-eligible manufacture or composition of matter, even if it is a living organism. Congress has not categorically excluded living things from § 101, and policy objections are for the legislature, not the courts, to resolve.
Yes. A live, human-made microorganism is patentable subject matter under § 101 because it is a nonnaturally occurring "manufacture" or "composition of matter" with markedly different characteristics from any found in nature. The Supreme Court affirmed the CCPA's decision permitting patent eligibility.
Chakrabarty is the seminal case establishing that human-made living organisms can be patentable subject matter, catalyzing the modern biotechnology industry. It clarified that eligibility under § 101 turns on human ingenuity and whether the invention is nonnaturally occurring and materially different from nature, not on whether it is alive. The decision's famous "anything under the sun that is made by man" line remains a touchstone for reading § 101 broadly while respecting the judicial exceptions. For law students, the case is indispensable for understanding: (1) the scope and limits of § 101 and the product-of-nature exception; (2) the use of statutory text and legislative history in intellectual property cases; (3) the Court's separation-of-powers approach to science policy; and (4) the doctrinal throughline to later cases such as Mayo, Myriad, and Alice, which refined eligibility by policing claims that monopolize natural laws, natural products, or abstract ideas.