Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), reh'g en banc granted and opinion vacated, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003), appeal dismissed following settlement, 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
Doe I v. Unocal Corp.
Under the Alien Tort Statute, may foreign plaintiffs pursue civil claims against a U.S. corporation for aiding and abetting violations of universally accepted norms of international law—such as forced labor and other severe abuses—committed by a foreign military during a joint venture project abroad, and what standards govern corporate secondary liability?
The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, confers federal jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens for torts committed in violation of specific, universal, and obligatory norms of international law. Violations such as slavery (including forced labor), torture, extrajudicial killing, and crimes against humanity qualify as actionable norms. Aiding-and-abetting liability under the ATS is cognizable where, consistent with international law, a defendant knowingly provides substantial assistance to the principal's commission of the violation; state action is not required for all offenses (e.g., slavery and crimes against humanity), but is required for some (e.g., torture) and may be satisfied by action under color of law. Corporate entities are not categorically immune from civil liability under the ATS. The TVPA authorizes actions only against natural persons. Common defenses—such as political question, act of state, and forum non conveniens—do not bar adjudication when the claims rest on well-defined international norms and the case is justiciable. (Note: The 2002 Ninth Circuit panel articulated these principles, but its opinion was later vacated on grant of rehearing en banc before settlement.)
The Ninth Circuit panel held that (1) forced labor is a modern form of slavery that violates a specific, universal, and obligatory norm of international law actionable under the ATS; (2) corporations can be civilly liable under the ATS; (3) aiding-and-abetting liability is available under the ATS using international law standards that require knowing and substantial assistance; (4) the plaintiffs introduced sufficient evidence to create triable issues that Unocal knowingly assisted the Myanmar military's use of forced labor and related abuses, precluding summary judgment on key ATS claims; and (5) TVPA claims against Unocal, a corporation, fail because the TVPA applies only to natural persons. The court reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. The panel opinion was later vacated when rehearing en banc was granted; the case settled before an en banc decision issued.
Unocal became a touchstone in ATS litigation for its recognition of aiding-and-abetting liability and corporate civil liability for egregious international law violations, as well as for framing forced labor as a modern form of slavery. While the panel opinion was vacated and thus lacks precedential force, its analysis influenced subsequent cases and scholarship, and it foreshadowed later Supreme Court guidance in Sosa (requiring specificity and universality of norms) and the later narrowing of ATS reach in Kiobel (presumption against extraterritoriality), Jesner (no ATS suits against foreign corporations), and Nestlé (domestic-conduct and causation requirements). For law students, Unocal illustrates the interplay between international norms and federal common law remedies, the evidentiary burdens for secondary liability, and the strategic challenges—doctrinal and practical—of transnational human rights litigation against corporate actors.