Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985)
Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders is a cornerstone defamation and First Amendment case that carves out a significant "private concern" exception to the damages limitations announced in Gertz v.
Does the First Amendment prohibit a private-figure plaintiff from recovering presumed and punitive damages in a defamation action absent proof of actual malice when the defamatory statement involves a matter of purely private concern?
Under the First Amendment, the heightened constitutional limitations on defamation damages announced in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.—which forbid awards of presumed or punitive damages to a private-figure plaintiff without proof of actual malice—apply when the defamatory speech involves a matter of public concern. When the speech concerns a matter of purely private concern, the state's interest in compensating and deterring reputational harm is stronger, and the First Amendment permits states to allow private-figure plaintiffs to recover presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice.
No. In defamation actions involving matters of purely private concern, the First Amendment does not bar states from permitting awards of presumed and punitive damages to private-figure plaintiffs without a showing of actual malice; the Vermont judgment allowing such damages was affirmed.
Dun & Bradstreet adds a crucial second dimension to defamation analysis: beyond the plaintiff's status (public vs. private), courts must classify the speech as public or private concern. If the speech is of purely private concern and the plaintiff is a private figure, the First Amendment permits states to allow presumed and punitive damages without proof of actual malice. The case thus narrows Gertz's damages limitations to the public-concern context and underscores that speech with limited circulation and no bearing on public affairs receives less constitutional protection. For students, the case is indispensable for understanding defamation remedies, how to analyze the speech's "public concern" character, and how constitutional concerns ebb when reputational torts do not implicate public discourse.