A consortium of Jewish art dealers in Germany acquired the Guelph Treasure (Welfenschatz), a medieval collection of ecclesiastical art, in 1929. After selling some pieces, the dealers still held valuable remnants when the Nazi regime rose to power. In 1935, under intense persecution and pressure, the dealers sold the remaining pieces to the State of Prussia, then led by Hermann Göring, allegedly for a price far below market value and under duress. The treasure eventually became part of a German state museum administered by the Stiftung Preussischer Kulturbesitz (SPK), an instrumentality of Germany. Decades later, the heirs of the dealers pursued restitution in Germany; after adverse recommendations from Germany's Advisory Commission on Nazi-looted art (which concluded the sale was not a coerced Nazi confiscation), the heirs sued Germany and the SPK in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. They invoked the FSIA's expropriation exception, asserting that the forced sale was part of genocide and thus a taking in violation of international law. The district court denied Germany's motion to dismiss, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that genocidal takings from a state's own nationals can fall within the expropriation exception. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Does the FSIA's expropriation exception, 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3), allow U.S. courts to exercise jurisdiction over claims that a foreign state took property from its own nationals as part of a genocidal campaign?
Under the FSIA, foreign states are presumptively immune from suit in U.S. courts unless a specific statutory exception applies. The expropriation exception removes immunity in cases where "rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue" and certain commercial-nexus requirements are met. Interpreted in light of its text, structure, and historical context, the phrase "taken in violation of international law" in § 1605(a)(3) refers to the international law of expropriation, which traditionally concerns a sovereign's taking of property from aliens. The "domestic takings" rule therefore applies: a sovereign's taking of property from its own nationals, even if wrongful, is not a violation of the international law of expropriation. Allegations that the taking was part of genocide do not convert a domestic taking into an international law violation within the meaning of the FSIA's property-based exception.
No. The FSIA's expropriation exception does not apply to claims that a foreign sovereign took property from its own nationals, even when the taking is alleged to be part of genocide. The Court reversed the judgment of the D.C. Circuit and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
The Court began with the statutory text. The key phrase—"rights in property taken in violation of international law"—is framed in property terms and, read as a whole, invokes the international law of expropriation. Historically, that body of law addresses state responsibility for takings from aliens; it does not treat a state's taking from its own nationals as a violation of international law (the domestic takings rule). The Court emphasized that Congress in the FSIA used precise, topic-specific language across exceptions, reserving human-rights-oriented language (e.g., for torture or terrorism) to those exceptions and not embedding it in the expropriation provision. Reading § 1605(a)(3) to encompass all property losses connected to human-rights abuses would collapse carefully drawn statutory boundaries and allow plaintiffs to recast human-rights claims as property claims, thereby circumventing other FSIA limits (such as the tightly cabined terrorism exception). The Court rejected the heirs' argument that because genocide violates international law, any property taking that is part of genocide is "taken in violation of international law" under § 1605(a)(3). That reading, the Court explained, detaches the provision from its property-law moorings and from the international law of expropriation that Congress had in view. The statute's structure reinforces this conclusion: the expropriation exception includes specific commercial-nexus requirements and references "rights in property," signaling an expropriation-focused regime, not a free-ranging human-rights carveout. The Court also noted that, while the allegations were morally compelling, the FSIA is a jurisdictional statute that reflects Congress's balance between sovereign immunity and private redress, and courts must apply the text as enacted. Because the allegations involved a taking by Germany from (allegedly) German nationals, the domestic takings rule foreclosed reliance on § 1605(a)(3). The Court did not need to resolve disputes about the dealers' nationality at the time of the sale because, even assuming they were German nationals, the exception would not apply.
Philipp clarifies that the FSIA's expropriation exception is narrowly tethered to the international law of expropriation and does not incorporate broader human-rights norms such as genocide. For litigators, it underscores that sovereign immunity questions turn on the FSIA's text and that creative reframing of claims will not expand exceptions beyond Congress's design. For scholars and students, it is a significant example of textualist statutory interpretation in the foreign-relations arena and a reminder that morally compelling claims may still be barred by jurisdictional limits. Practically, Philipp constrains Holocaust-era restitution suits against foreign states in U.S. courts unless plaintiffs can show takings of aliens (or satisfy some other FSIA exception and nexus requirements), channeling many such disputes back to foreign or diplomatic fora.
Federal Republic of Germany v. Philipp firmly cabins the FSIA's expropriation exception within the traditional international law of expropriation, reaffirming the domestic takings rule and rejecting efforts to import genocide and other human-rights violations into a property-focused jurisdictional provision. The Court's unanimous opinion applies a careful, text-and-structure analysis that respects Congress's allocation of authority in foreign affairs and the delicate balance the FSIA strikes between private redress and sovereign immunity.