444 U.S. 193 (1979), Supreme Court of the United States
Ferri v. Ackerman is a cornerstone decision at the intersection of tort law, federal courts, and professional responsibility.
Does federal law—by virtue of the Criminal Justice Act or federal common law—confer immunity on federally appointed criminal defense counsel from state-law malpractice claims arising out of their representation in federal criminal proceedings?
Absent a clear congressional directive or a significant conflict between a state cause of action and uniquely federal interests, the Supreme Court will not create or infer a federal immunity that displaces state tort law. The Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, does not grant court-appointed defense counsel immunity from malpractice liability, and such counsel are not federal officials entitled to official immunity for acts within the traditional functions of defense representation.
No. Federal law does not confer immunity on court-appointed defense counsel from state-law malpractice suits. The judgment recognizing such immunity was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with the absence of any federally mandated immunity.
Ferri v. Ackerman is a foundational case on the limits of implied federal immunities and the preservation of state tort law against preemption absent clear congressional command. It teaches that defense counsel—whether privately retained or court-appointed—serve the client, not the state, and are presumptively subject to ordinary malpractice standards. For law students, the case highlights how to analyze preemption and federal-common-law claims: identify the asserted federal interest, assess statutory text and history for a clear statement, and evaluate whether a significant conflict justifies displacing state law. Ferri also serves as a professional-responsibility touchstone, reinforcing that accountability to the client remains central even when representation is supported by a federal appointment and compensation scheme.