Doty, a schoolteacher and automobile owner, learned that the high school football team needed transportation to an away game. She told the team's coach, Garst, that he could use her car provided that he—and only he—drove it. Garst accepted and drove Doty's car, carrying players to the game. En route, Garst negligently operated the vehicle, causing an accident in which Gorton, a minor football player, was injured. Gorton (through a guardian) sued both Garst and Doty to recover for negligence, alleging that Garst was acting as Doty's agent. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff against Doty. Doty appealed, arguing there was no agency, only a gratuitous loan of her car and no right of control over Garst's driving beyond the permissive condition.
Did an agency relationship exist between Doty (the car owner) and Garst (the football coach) such that Doty is vicariously liable for Garst's negligent driving when she loaned him her car on the condition that he alone drive it to transport players?
Agency is the fiduciary relationship that results from the manifestation of consent by one person (the principal) that another (the agent) shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to the principal's control, and consent by the other so to act. An agency relationship may arise impliedly from conduct and circumstances; it does not require a formal contract, consideration, or extensive day-to-day control. If an agency exists, the principal is vicariously liable for the agent's torts committed within the scope of the agency.
Yes. An agency relationship existed; Garst acted as Doty's agent when driving the car pursuant to her condition, and Doty is vicariously liable for his negligence.
The court emphasized that agency can be implied from the parties' manifestations and surrounding circumstances. Doty expressly conditioned the use of her vehicle on Garst personally driving it. This condition was more than a mere permissive loan; it identified the particular person who was to act and retained a measure of control over how the task would be performed (who would drive), thereby satisfying the control element in agency. Garst accepted the condition and undertook the trip for the common purpose of transporting the school's players—conduct that the court treated as acting on Doty's behalf within the scope of the agreed-upon undertaking. The court rejected the argument that the arrangement was merely a gratuitous bailment with no agency, noting that consideration is unnecessary for agency and that control need not be pervasive. While Doty did not direct the details of how Garst would drive, her stipulation that only he could do so was a meaningful limitation on the undertaking and a manifestation that he would act for her in the operation of her car. Because the negligence occurred in the course of carrying out that purpose, vicarious liability attached. A dissent (and many later commentators) would characterize the transaction as a simple loan, reasoning that specifying a driver as a condition of permission does not create the necessary right of control and that the owner derived no benefit. The majority, however, treated the condition as sufficient control and reaffirmed that benefit is not a necessary element of agency. On that basis, the judgment against Doty was affirmed.
Gorton v. Doty is a staple in agency formation because it shows how slight manifestations of consent and control can be enough to establish an agency relationship—and thus vicarious tort liability. It cautions owners and would-be principals that imposing conditions on how a task is carried out (here, who will drive) can imply control and trigger liability. The case is often contrasted with modern formulations (e.g., Restatement (Third) of Agency), which may demand a clearer showing of the principal's right to control the agent's actions. As such, the case is both a teaching tool for the elements of agency and a springboard for critiquing the outer limits of vicarious liability.
Gorton v. Doty teaches that agency can arise from subtle manifestations of consent and control, even in casual, gratuitous arrangements. By tying vehicle use to a specific driver, the owner created a relationship the court deemed sufficient to impose vicarious liability for negligent driving.