Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (U.S. Supreme Court)
Heckler v. Chaney is the canonical modern statement of administrative enforcement discretion.
Are an agency's decisions not to take enforcement action—here, the FDA's refusal to initiate proceedings to prevent use of drugs in lethal injections—subject to judicial review under the APA, or are they unreviewable because they are committed to agency discretion by law?
Under APA § 701(a)(2), agency action is unreviewable when the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion—i.e., when action is committed to agency discretion by law. As a general matter, an agency's refusal to initiate enforcement proceedings is presumptively unreviewable because it is akin to a prosecutor's decision not to indict and involves a complex balancing of factors peculiarly within the agency's expertise (including resource allocation, enforcement priorities, likelihood of success, and fit with broader policies). This presumption can be rebutted where (1) Congress has provided substantive guidelines or meaningful standards limiting discretion, (2) the agency's refusal rests on a belief that it lacks legal authority (a reviewable legal interpretation), or (3) the agency has consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that amounts to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.
The FDA's decision not to undertake enforcement action to prevent the use of drugs in lethal injections is presumptively unreviewable under APA § 701(a)(2) and, on the record presented, falls within the agency's enforcement discretion. The Court reversed the D.C. Circuit.
Chaney is the leading case on enforcement discretion and APA reviewability. It creates a strong presumption that refusals to enforce are unreviewable, shaping litigation strategy for challengers and agency counsel alike. Law students should internalize both the presumption and its exceptions: meaningful statutory standards, jurisdictional errors, and abdication of duty. The framework is frequently invoked in fields like environmental law (e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA distinguishing when Congress cabins discretion), immigration enforcement, and consumer protection. Practically, Chaney channels challenges away from nonenforcement choices and toward rulemaking, adjudication, or legally reviewable interpretations, unless the challenger can show that Congress has constrained agency discretion or that the agency has effectively renounced its statutory mission.