What are the facts?
An attorney was appointed under the Criminal Justice Act to represent an indigent criminal defendant on appeal in the Eighth Circuit. After concluding the representation, the attorney submitted a compensation voucher that the court reduced. Frustrated by what he regarded as an unfair and inadequate award, the attorney wrote a private letter to court personnel using sharply critical and intemperate language about the court's CJA compensation practices, and he indicated he would decline future CJA appointments. The court of appeals treated the letter as "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 and also referenced 28 U.S.C. § 1927. Without an evidentiary hearing—there being no factual dispute as to authorship or content of the letter—the court imposed disciplinary sanctions suspending the attorney from practice before it. The attorney sought Supreme Court review.
What is the legal issue?
Does an attorney's private, intemperate letter criticizing a federal court's compensation of appointed counsel constitute "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar" under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 justifying discipline, and does 28 U.S.C. § 1927 authorize such disciplinary sanctions?
What rule applies?
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 46 authorizes a court of appeals to discipline attorneys for "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar," after reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause. In this context, "conduct unbecoming" refers to conduct contrary to professional standards that demonstrates unfitness to practice or conduct that is inimical to the orderly and fair administration of justice (e.g., dishonesty, obstruction, serious breaches of professional duties). Mere criticism of the court, without more, does not satisfy this standard. Additionally, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 permits a court to impose excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees on an attorney who unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings; it does not confer authority to suspend or otherwise discipline attorneys and is inapplicable absent multiplication of proceedings.
What did the court hold?
No. The attorney's private, sharply worded letter did not constitute "conduct unbecoming" under Rule 46 because it neither obstructed the administration of justice nor showed unfitness to practice. Section 1927 was inapplicable because there was no multiplication of proceedings and it does not authorize suspension. The disciplinary order was reversed.
What is the reasoning?
The Court began by construing the phrase "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar" in light of longstanding professional norms and prior cases recognizing courts' inherent authority to regulate attorneys. That phrase, the Court explained, has a limited, ascertainable meaning: it targets conduct that violates professional standards—such as dishonesty, fraud, obstruction, or disobedience of court orders—or conduct that directly undermines the fair and orderly administration of justice. Discipline cannot rest merely on speech that is disrespectful or critical, particularly when it is private and unrelated to any pending matter. Applying that standard, the Court emphasized that the attorney's letter, though intemperate, was privately communicated, did not involve misrepresentations, did not seek to improperly influence a pending case, and did not disrupt any proceeding. Expressing dissatisfaction with CJA compensation and announcing a refusal to accept future appointments, standing alone, neither evidences unfitness to practice nor impedes the administration of justice. Lawyers may criticize courts—subject to professional constraints on false statements and interference with proceedings—without risking professional discipline under Rule 46. The Court also noted that due process under Rule 46 was satisfied here because the operative facts (authorship and contents of the letter) were undisputed and the attorney had notice and an opportunity to respond; an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary in the absence of factual disputes. Finally, the Court rejected reliance on 28 U.S.C. § 1927. By its terms, § 1927 targets the unreasonable and vexatious multiplication of proceedings and authorizes only monetary sanctions (excess costs, expenses, and fees). It neither applied on the facts—no proceedings were multiplied—nor furnished a basis for suspending the attorney. Because the conduct fell outside Rule 46's "unbecoming" scope and § 1927 did not apply, the discipline could not stand.
Why is this case significant?
In re Snyder cabined the federal appellate courts' disciplinary power by clarifying that "conduct unbecoming" requires more than rude or caustic criticism; it must be conduct that breaches professional standards or impairs the administration of justice. The case is frequently cited in professional responsibility and federal courts courses for three propositions: (1) lawyers retain substantial latitude to criticize courts, especially outside pending litigation; (2) FRAP 46's "conduct unbecoming" standard is not a blank check and has a settled, narrow meaning; and (3) § 1927 is a limited, monetary cost-shifting device that does not authorize suspensions or disbarment. For students, Snyder illustrates the balance between judicial control over the bar and First Amendment-adjacent protections for attorney speech.
What does "conduct unbecoming a member of the bar" mean after In re Snyder?
It refers to conduct that violates established professional standards and indicates unfitness to practice or behavior that undermines the orderly and fair administration of justice—such as dishonesty, fraud, obstruction, willful disobedience of court orders, or seriously disruptive courtroom conduct. Mere harsh or intemperate criticism, especially in a private communication unconnected to a pending case, does not meet the standard.
Did the Supreme Court find Rule 46 unconstitutionally vague?
No. The Court treated "conduct unbecoming" as a phrase with a settled professional meaning and therefore not unconstitutionally vague as applied to attorneys. Nevertheless, the Court narrowly construed the standard and held the attorney's private critical letter did not cross the line into sanctionable misconduct.
How does In re Snyder limit the use of 28 U.S.C. § 1927?
Snyder confirms that § 1927 applies only when an attorney unreasonably and vexatiously multiplies proceedings and authorizes only monetary sanctions (excess costs, expenses, and fees). It does not provide authority for suspending or disbarring an attorney and was inapplicable where no proceedings were multiplied.
Does Snyder protect all attorney criticism of judges or courts?
No. While Snyder recognizes that mere criticism (even if rude) is not per se sanctionable, attorneys may still be disciplined for false statements of fact made with knowledge or reckless disregard, attempts to improperly influence a case, speech that materially interferes with proceedings, or other conduct violating professional rules or court orders.
What procedural protections did the Court require in federal appellate attorney discipline?
Rule 46 requires reasonable notice and an opportunity to show cause. An evidentiary hearing is necessary only if there are disputed material facts. Where the facts (such as authorship and contents of a letter) are undisputed, written submissions may suffice; however, any discipline must be grounded in conduct that actually falls within Rule 46's substantive standard.
Can a lawyer be disciplined for refusing future CJA appointments?
Snyder indicates that a stated intention to decline future appointments, without more, is not sanctionable "conduct unbecoming" under Rule 46. Discipline would require additional conduct demonstrating unfitness or impairing the administration of justice, or a violation of a specific rule or order obligating the lawyer to accept an appointment.