Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987) (U.S. Supreme Court)
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca is a foundational case in U.S.
Does the INA's asylum standard of a "well-founded fear of persecution" under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) require the same showing as the "clear probability of persecution" standard for withholding of deportation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h), and is the BIA's contrary interpretation entitled to deference?
Under the Refugee Act of 1980, an applicant is eligible for asylum if they qualify as a "refugee," defined as a person who is unable or unwilling to return to their country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The "well-founded fear" standard is distinct from, and more generous than, the "clear probability" (more-likely-than-not) standard that governs withholding of deportation under former 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h). A well-founded fear requires both a subjective fear and an objective showing that persecution is a reasonable possibility; it does not require demonstrating that persecution is more likely than not. Where Congress unambiguously expresses its intent in the statutory text, courts give effect to that intent and do not defer to an agency's contrary interpretation.
No. The asylum standard of a "well-founded fear of persecution" is different from and more generous than the "clear probability" standard applicable to withholding of deportation. The BIA's contrary interpretation is not entitled to deference because Congress clearly intended different standards. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.
Cardoza-Fonseca is the cornerstone of modern U.S. asylum law. It definitively separates asylum eligibility from withholding of removal, lowering the evidentiary burden for asylum seekers to show a reasonable possibility of persecution rather than a probability greater than 50%. For law students, it is also a prime example of statutory interpretation, use of international law to illuminate congressional intent, and Chevron Step One analysis. Practically, it shapes how immigration judges evaluate evidence, requiring them to consider credible, country-condition-based risks and not demand proof that persecution is more likely than not. The case continues to influence asylum adjudications, scholarship, and later decisions refining nexus, credibility, and evidentiary standards.