Petitioners were Nigerian nationals from the Ogoni region who alleged that during the 1990s, the Nigerian military and police engaged in widespread human rights abuses—including extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary detention, and crimes against humanity—in response to local protests over environmental harms associated with oil exploration. They sued Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. and related foreign corporate entities (affiliates of Shell) in the Southern District of New York under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, asserting that the companies aided and abetted the Nigerian government by, among other things, providing transportation, logistical support, and payments to security forces who carried out the abuses. All alleged primary conduct occurred in Nigeria, and defendants were foreign corporations; some plaintiffs resided in the United States. The district court dismissed some claims but allowed others to proceed; the Second Circuit ordered dismissal of the entire action on the ground that corporations are not subject to liability under the ATS. The Supreme Court initially granted certiorari on the corporate-liability issue, but after argument ordered re-argument focused on whether and under what circumstances the ATS allows suits for conduct occurring in the territory of a foreign sovereign. The Supreme Court ultimately affirmed dismissal on extraterritoriality grounds rather than corporate liability.
Does the Alien Tort Statute provide federal courts with jurisdiction to hear claims for violations of the law of nations that occurred within the territory of a foreign sovereign, and if so, under what circumstances can such claims proceed?
The presumption against extraterritorial application applies to claims under the Alien Tort Statute. Absent a clear indication of congressional intent, federal statutes are presumed not to apply to conduct occurring outside U.S. territory. The ATS is strictly jurisdictional and does not itself rebut that presumption. An ATS claim may proceed only if the asserted claims sufficiently touch and concern the territory of the United States with enough force to displace the presumption; mere corporate presence is insufficient. Any cognizable ATS cause of action must also meet Sosa's requirement that the alleged norm be specific, universal, and obligatory.
The presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, and petitioners' claims—based on foreign conduct by foreign defendants against foreign plaintiffs—do not sufficiently touch and concern the United States to overcome that presumption. Mere corporate presence in the United States is not enough. The action was properly dismissed.
The Court, per Chief Justice Roberts, began by reaffirming that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute that opened federal courts to a narrow set of claims recognized by the law of nations, as clarified in Sosa. Applying the modern presumption against extraterritoriality (as in Morrison v. National Australia Bank), the Court asked whether there was a clear indication that Congress intended the ATS to apply to conduct occurring in foreign territory. Finding none in the text, history, or purpose of the ATS, the Court held that the presumption governs ATS claims. Historically, the ATS was enacted in 1789 to avert diplomatic incidents by ensuring a federal forum for certain law-of-nations violations—such as offenses against ambassadors—occurring in or implicating the United States. While piracy was cited as a classic law-of-nations offense, the Court rejected the argument that piracy supports a broad extraterritorial application, noting that piracy occurs on the high seas, a domain not within another nation's sovereign territory, and thus does not necessarily suggest congressional approval of suits for foreign-soil conduct. Applying the presumption serves separation-of-powers and foreign-relations concerns, avoiding unwarranted judicial interference in matters best suited for Congress and the Executive. The Court articulated a limiting principle: claims under the ATS must "touch and concern" the territory of the United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption. In this case, the relevant conduct—the alleged aiding and abetting of human rights abuses—occurred in Nigeria; the defendants were foreign corporations; and the plaintiffs were foreign nationals. Allegations of a defendant's mere corporate presence in the United States were insufficient. Accordingly, the Court affirmed dismissal. Concurring opinions elaborated on the standard: Justice Kennedy emphasized that the door remains open to cases with stronger U.S. connections; Justice Alito (joined by Justice Thomas) would have required that the domestic conduct itself suffice to establish the violation; Justice Breyer (with Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) concurred in the judgment but proposed a different test focusing on U.S. interests, domestic conduct, and U.S. nationality of defendants. The majority, however, anchored its analysis in the extraterritoriality presumption and the touch-and-concern framework.
Kiobel reoriented ATS litigation by imposing the presumption against extraterritoriality and creating the touch-and-concern test, substantially narrowing access to U.S. courts for foreign human rights claims. It underscores that the ATS is not a roving mandate to adjudicate all international wrongs; rather, plaintiffs must show a meaningful U.S. nexus beyond corporate presence. The decision has had major practical effects: many so-called foreign-cubed cases are now barred, and plaintiffs must plead concrete domestic conduct linked to the alleged violation. Lower courts have since grappled with what constitutes sufficient U.S. contacts, and later Supreme Court cases tightened the doctrine further—Jesner barred ATS suits against foreign corporations, and Nestlé required that domestic conduct be more than general corporate decision-making. For law students, Kiobel is essential for understanding extraterritoriality, statutory interpretation, separation of powers in foreign affairs, and the evolving limits of transnational corporate liability.
Kiobel transformed ATS litigation by importing the presumption against extraterritoriality and establishing the touch-and-concern test. In doing so, it closed the door on many foreign-cubed human rights suits and redirected courts to scrutinize the territorial and institutional limits of federal judicial power in cases implicating foreign sovereign interests.