At a Super Bowl Sunday gathering, the plaintiff, Kendra Knight, joined an informal, mixed-gender touch football game on a small, sloped backyard. Early in the game, the defendant, Michael Jewett, made contact with Knight in a way she perceived as rough, causing her to fall. Knight told Jewett to be careful and not to play so rough. Later, during another play, Jewett ran toward a pass, collided with Knight, and stepped on her right hand after knocking her to the ground. Knight suffered severe injuries to her small finger, ultimately requiring partial amputation and additional treatment. She sued Jewett for negligence and assault and battery, alleging that he played too aggressively and disregarded her warning. The trial court granted summary judgment on the negligence claim and summary adjudication on the battery claim, concluding that the doctrine of primary assumption of risk barred recovery for ordinary negligence in a sports setting and that there was no triable issue of intentional harmful contact. The Court of Appeal affirmed. The California Supreme Court granted review (together with a companion case involving waterskiing, Ford v. Gouin) to clarify the status and scope of assumption of risk after the adoption of comparative negligence.
In an informal touch football game, does a co-participant owe a duty of ordinary care to avoid causing injury, or is the plaintiff's negligence claim barred under primary assumption of risk absent reckless or intentional conduct that increases the risks beyond those inherent in the sport? Relatedly, how does comparative negligence interact with assumption of risk after Li v. Yellow Cab?
Under the doctrine of primary assumption of risk, courts determine as a matter of law that a defendant owes no duty to protect a plaintiff from risks inherent in a sport or recreational activity. Co-participants in active sports therefore owe a limited duty: they must not intentionally injure others and must not engage in conduct so reckless as to be totally outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport. When primary assumption of risk applies, the absence of duty bars a negligence claim regardless of the plaintiff's conduct. By contrast, secondary assumption of risk describes situations in which the defendant owes a duty of care but the plaintiff knowingly encounters a risk created by the defendant's breach; in such cases, the plaintiff's conduct is considered under comparative negligence principles and may reduce, but does not bar, recovery.
Primary assumption of risk barred Knight's negligence claim because the risk of collision and accidental contact is inherent in touch football and Jewett's conduct was not shown to be reckless or intentional. Accordingly, Jewett owed no duty to protect Knight from the inherent risks of the game, and summary judgment for Jewett was proper on the negligence claim. The assault and battery claim also failed for lack of evidence of intent to cause harmful or offensive contact.
The Court first clarified that after California's adoption of comparative negligence, assumption of risk did not simply disappear; rather, it divided into two distinct doctrines. Primary assumption of risk concerns duty: if the nature of an activity entails certain inherent risks that cannot be eliminated without altering its fundamental character, participants generally are not obligated to reduce those inherent risks through the exercise of ordinary care. Secondary assumption of risk, by contrast, is folded into comparative negligence because it presupposes a duty and a breach by the defendant, with the plaintiff's knowing encounter of the risk considered in apportioning fault. Applying these principles, the Court observed that physical contact, collisions, and the possibility that players may be knocked down or stepped on are inherent features of even an informal touch football game. Imposing a duty of ordinary care to avoid such contact would chill vigorous participation and fundamentally alter the nature of the activity by encouraging cautious, defensive play inconsistent with the sport. Thus, co-participants owe one another only a limited duty not to act intentionally or in a manner so reckless as to be totally outside the ordinary range of activity for the sport. The record showed no triable evidence that Jewett intended to injure Knight or acted with reckless disregard; at most, his play could be characterized as careless or overly enthusiastic. Knight's admonition to "be careful" did not expand Jewett's legal duty or change the inherent risks of the sport; duties in this context are defined categorically, not privately negotiated play-to-play. Because the risk that materialized was inherent to touch football and Jewett's conduct was not reckless or intentional, the Court concluded there was no duty under primary assumption of risk and affirmed summary judgment. For the battery claim, the Court found no evidence of intent to make harmful or offensive contact, warranting summary adjudication.
Knight anchors modern California tort doctrine on sports and recreational injuries. It reclassifies many assumption-of-risk disputes as threshold duty questions and sets the co-participant standard—no liability for ordinary negligence, only for reckless or intentional misconduct that increases risks beyond those inherent in the sport. The case is essential for law students analyzing duty, assumption of risk, and comparative negligence, and it influences subsequent California decisions involving coaches, instructors, and varied recreational activities (e.g., skiing, baseball, surfing). Knight also exemplifies how policy concerns—preserving the social value of vigorous sports participation—shape tort duties.
Knight v. Jewett reorients assumption of risk analysis around duty and policy. By holding that co-participants in sports owe no duty of ordinary care to protect others from inherent risks of the activity, the Court sought to preserve the social value of vigorous athletic participation while still deterring conduct that is intentional or recklessly outside the sport's ordinary scope.