452 U.S. 18 (1981)
Lassiter v. Department of Social Services is a cornerstone U.S.
Does the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every state-initiated termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, and, if not, did due process require appointment of counsel on the facts of Lassiter's case?
There is no automatic federal constitutional right to appointed counsel in all termination-of-parental-rights cases. Under the Due Process Clause, whether counsel must be appointed is determined case by case using the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, which weighs (1) the private interests at stake, (2) the government's interests, and (3) the risk of erroneous deprivation and the probable value of additional safeguards. The Court recognized a presumption that an indigent litigant's right to appointed counsel arises when, if he or she loses, physical liberty is at stake. Outside that context, the presumption may be overcome only when the balance of Mathews factors shows that fundamental fairness requires the appointment of counsel in the particular case.
No. The Due Process Clause does not require the appointment of counsel for indigent parents in every termination-of-parental-rights proceeding, and, on the particular facts of this case, the trial court's failure to appoint counsel did not violate due process. The judgment upholding the termination was affirmed.
Lassiter is a foundational due process case that establishes the framework for evaluating the right to appointed counsel in civil cases, especially in termination-of-parental-rights proceedings. It links the right to counsel to the risk of physical liberty loss and requires case-by-case determinations under Mathews v. Eldridge rather than a categorical rule. For law students, Lassiter illuminates procedural due process balancing, demonstrates how constitutional protections can vary across civil contexts, and provides the analytic template used in later cases considering counsel in civil contempt or family law matters. It also explains why many states have responded via statute or rule to provide broader rights to counsel in termination cases even though the federal Constitution does not mandate it in every instance.