Jose Leocal, a lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Florida to driving under the influence (DUI) and causing serious bodily injury, a third-degree felony under Fla. Stat. § 316.193(3)(c)(2). The statute does not require proof that the defendant intended to cause injury or that he acted with a mental state greater than negligence; it criminalizes operating a vehicle while under the influence and, by reason of such operation, causing or contributing to serious bodily injury to another. Leocal received a sentence exceeding one year. The Immigration and Naturalization Service (later the Department of Homeland Security) charged him as removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony—specifically, "a crime of violence" as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16 and incorporated into 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). An immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals agreed that his DUI offense was a crime of violence, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether Florida's DUI causing serious bodily injury qualifies as a crime of violence under § 16(a) or § 16(b).
Does a state DUI offense that results in serious bodily injury, but requires no more than negligent (or accidental) conduct, constitute a "crime of violence" under 18 U.S.C. § 16 and, therefore, an aggravated felony under the INA?
Under 18 U.S.C. § 16, a "crime of violence" is: (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another; or (b) any other felony that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense. The term "use" of physical force connotes active, volitional employment of force; offenses that require only negligent or accidental conduct do not satisfy § 16(a) and do not, by their nature, involve a substantial risk that force will be actively used within the meaning of § 16(b). Courts apply a categorical approach, focusing on the statutory elements rather than the facts of the defendant's conduct. Any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes are construed in favor of the noncitizen.
No. A DUI offense like Florida's, which requires no more than negligent or accidental conduct and does not have as an element the active use of physical force against another, is not a "crime of violence" under § 16(a) or § 16(b). Therefore, it is not an aggravated felony for removal purposes.
The Court, in a unanimous opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, adopted a textual and structural interpretation of § 16. For § 16(a), the phrase "use of physical force against the person or property of another" implies active employment of force—something more than merely causing injury as a result of negligent or accidental conduct. The statutory text links "use" with terms like "attempted" and "threatened," reinforcing that Congress contemplated purposeful or knowing conduct directed "against" another, not fortuitous harm. Florida's DUI statute does not require any such mens rea concerning the injury or the use of force; it punishes driving under the influence that, by reason of operation, results in serious injury. Because the offense can be committed with a mental state no higher than negligence, it cannot have as an element the use of physical force in the § 16(a) sense. Turning to § 16(b), the Court emphasized the clause's focus on whether an offense, "by its nature," involves a substantial risk that physical force may be used "in the course of committing the offense." This risk concerns the active use of force, not merely the possibility that injury might occur. While drunk driving often leads to injuries, the statute's language targets crimes where the actor will actively employ force against another while committing the offense, not crimes that create a risk of accidental harm. Moreover, the present-tense phrasing "may be used" and the requirement that the risk arise during the course of committing the offense again suggest volitional conduct. Applying the categorical approach, the Court looked to the elements of the Florida statute, not the underlying facts, and concluded it does not, by its nature, involve a substantial risk that the actor will use force against another. The Court underscored that the immigration context warrants caution: if any ambiguity remained after a straightforward reading, the canon of construing deportation statutes in favor of the noncitizen would support the narrower interpretation. The Court expressly reserved the question whether recklessness suffices under § 16, deciding only that negligence and accidental conduct do not. Accordingly, the judgment treating Leocal's DUI as a crime of violence was reversed.
Leocal is foundational for understanding how "crime of violence" provisions are construed in immigration and criminal contexts. It clarifies that the "use of force" requires active, volitional conduct, excluding offenses satisfied by mere negligence or accident. The decision entrenches the categorical approach and highlights the immigration-lenity canon. Leocal has influenced later jurisprudence on force clauses and mens rea, and it framed debates later seen in cases addressing reckless conduct and residual clauses. For law students, Leocal exemplifies careful statutory interpretation, the interaction between criminal classifications and immigration consequences, and the importance of mens rea in defining violent offenses.
Leocal v. Ashcroft narrowed the definition of "crime of violence" by insisting that "use of force" entails active, volitional conduct. By rejecting the government's attempt to classify a negligence-based DUI causing injury as a crime of violence, the Court protected noncitizens from aggravated felony removal based on offenses that do not involve intentional or knowing use of force.