544 U.S. 528 (U.S. 2005)
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A.
Is the "substantially advances a legitimate state interest" test a valid method of identifying a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause?
The "substantially advances" test is not a valid takings test under the Fifth Amendment. A claim that a regulation fails to substantially advance a legitimate state interest sounds in substantive due process, not in the Takings Clause. Regulatory takings are analyzed under established frameworks: (1) per se takings for permanent physical occupations (Loretto) and for regulations that deprive property of all economically beneficial use (Lucas); (2) the ad hoc, multifactor balancing of Penn Central for partial regulatory burdens; and (3) specialized scrutiny of land-use exactions under Nollan (essential nexus) and Dolan (rough proportionality).
No. The "substantially advances" formula, to the extent it was suggested by Agins v. City of Tiburon, is not a valid takings test. It is a due process inquiry. The Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for consideration of Chevron's claims under the proper takings frameworks, if any.
Lingle resets regulatory takings doctrine by removing a due process-style efficacy test from the Takings Clause. It channels challenges to the wisdom or effectiveness of legislation back into substantive due process, while preserving established takings analyses focused on the nature and magnitude of the burden on property. For law students, Lingle is critical for exam organization: it clarifies the discrete takings pathways (Loretto, Lucas, Penn Central, Nollan/Dolan), the distinct role of substantive due process in means-ends review, and the difference in remedies (compensation versus invalidation). It curtails courts' temptation to use takings to second-guess economic policy and reinforces doctrinal coherence across constitutional provisions.