559 U.S. 229 (2010)
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v.
1) Are attorneys who provide consumer-bankruptcy assistance to debtors "debt relief agencies" under BAPCPA's definition? 2) Do BAPCPA's restrictions on advising clients to incur debt in contemplation of bankruptcy (§ 526(a)(4)) and its advertising disclosure requirements (§ 528) violate the First Amendment or fail for vagueness/overbreadth?
Under BAPCPA, a "debt relief agency" includes any person (not otherwise excluded) who provides "bankruptcy assistance" to an "assisted person" for payment, and the definition encompasses attorneys who render bankruptcy-related legal services to qualifying consumer debtors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(12A), 101(3), 101(4A). Section 526(a)(4) prohibits a debt relief agency from advising an assisted person to incur more debt in contemplation of bankruptcy or to incur debt to pay attorney or petition preparer fees. Properly construed, the prohibition targets advice to take on debt because of the prospect of bankruptcy—i.e., for the purpose of manipulating or abusing the bankruptcy system—not advice about legitimate, economically beneficial borrowing. Section 528's compelled advertising disclosures are evaluated under Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, which permits government to require the inclusion of purely factual, uncontroversial information in commercial speech if the requirement is reasonably related to a legitimate interest (such as preventing consumer deception) and is not unjustified or unduly burdensome. Statutes should, where fairly possible, be construed to avoid serious constitutional doubts; facial overbreadth requires a substantial number of unconstitutional applications relative to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep.
The Court held: (1) attorneys who provide consumer-bankruptcy assistance are "debt relief agencies" under BAPCPA; (2) § 526(a)(4), properly read to prohibit only advice to incur debt because of the prospect of bankruptcy (i.e., for an abusive purpose) and advice to incur debt to pay attorney or preparer fees, is constitutional and not unconstitutionally vague; and (3) § 528's advertising disclosure requirements are valid compelled commercial disclosures under Zauderer and do not violate the First Amendment. The judgment of the Eighth Circuit was affirmed in part and reversed in part.
Milavetz is a leading case on the scope of BAPCPA and the regulation of attorney speech in the consumer-bankruptcy context. It clarifies that attorneys representing consumer debtors are subject to the Act's "debt relief agency" provisions and demonstrates how courts narrowly construe ambiguous language to avoid constitutional problems while preserving legislative objectives. For First Amendment doctrine, Milavetz reinforces the Zauderer standard for compelled, factual disclosures in professional advertising and signals that targeted limits on advice facilitating legal abuse can withstand scrutiny. Practically, it provides compliance guidance for consumer-bankruptcy attorneys regarding permissible counseling and required advertising disclaimers.