Plaintiffs were the surviving family members of Azzam Rahim, a naturalized United States citizen of Palestinian origin. They alleged that, while visiting the West Bank in 1995, Rahim was arrested by agents of the Palestinian Authority, detained at a Jericho detention facility, tortured, and ultimately killed. Plaintiffs filed suit in federal district court against the Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organization, asserting claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), codified as a note to 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and other theories. The district court dismissed the TVPA claims on the ground that the statute permits suits only against natural persons, not organizations. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, concluding that the term "individual" in the TVPA refers to human beings only. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the TVPA authorizes liability against organizations such as the PA and PLO.
Does the Torture Victim Protection Act authorize a civil action for torture or extrajudicial killing against organizations (such as the Palestinian Authority or PLO), or does the statute limit liability to natural persons only?
Under the Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, the term "individual" identifies the class of potential defendants and refers only to natural persons. The TVPA therefore authorizes civil suits for torture or extrajudicial killing committed under color of foreign law only against natural persons, not against organizations, corporations, or other collective entities.
The Supreme Court unanimously held that the TVPA's use of the term "individual" encompasses only natural persons. Organizations such as the Palestinian Authority and the PLO are not proper defendants under the TVPA. The judgment of the D.C. Circuit was affirmed.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Sotomayor grounded the decision in the statutory text, ordinary meaning, and context. First, the Court emphasized that the ordinary meaning of "individual" is a human being, as reflected in common usage and dictionaries. Congress's choice to use "individual"—as opposed to the broader term "person"—was significant. The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1, defines "person" to include corporations and other entities, but it does not define "individual"; that contrast supports the conclusion that "individual" is narrower and excludes organizations. Second, the Court examined the TVPA's structure and language. The statute uses "individual" to describe both the perpetrator and the victim, which would be incongruous if the term were read to include organizations (for example, an organization cannot literally be subjected to torture in the sense the statute contemplates). The Act also predicates liability on acts done "under actual or apparent authority, or color of law, of any foreign nation," signaling Congress's focus on human actors exercising or abusing governmental authority, i.e., officials or agents, rather than on collective bodies as such. Third, the Court found that the legislative history reinforced this reading. Earlier drafts used the term "person," but Congress ultimately adopted "individual." Committee reports explained that the TVPA was intended to provide a remedy against human rights abusers—"individuals" acting under color of foreign law—and not to create organizational liability. The Court rejected policy-based arguments that broader liability would better serve accountability goals, noting that such judgments are for Congress, which knows how to provide for organizational liability when it wishes to do so. Finally, the Court observed that reading "individual" to mean natural person harmonizes the TVPA with related statutory frameworks, including the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act and the ATS, and avoids redundancy or unintended overlap. Accordingly, organizations are not proper defendants under the TVPA.
Mohamad is a leading example of textualist statutory interpretation in the human rights context. It clarifies that TVPA claims must be directed at natural persons who, acting under color of foreign law, allegedly committed torture or extrajudicial killing. The decision forecloses attempts to sue organizations and corporations under the TVPA, thereby shaping the defendants and litigation strategies available to human rights plaintiffs in U.S. courts. For students, the case underscores how Congress's word choice—"individual" versus "person"—can decisively cabin the scope of a cause of action and illustrates how courts employ ordinary meaning, structural coherence, and legislative history to reach a unanimous result. The ruling also situates the TVPA within the broader framework of transnational human rights litigation alongside the Alien Tort Statute, later influencing and complementing cases that further define the contours of corporate and extraterritorial liability.
Mohamad v. Palestinian Authority squarely answers a foundational question about the TVPA's reach: only natural persons may be sued under the statute. By grounding its reasoning in ordinary meaning, statutory context, and confirmatory legislative history, the Court delivered a clear rule that aligns the TVPA's text with its purpose of targeting human rights abusers acting under color of foreign law.